SPEAKING FREELY Northern Iraq - calm like a
bomb By W Joseph Stroupe
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As
negotiations at the United Nations on a new resolution
for Iraq apparently near a close, developments with
respect to the Kurds and north Iraq, where there has
been relative calm until now, are looking more and more
ominous. Recently, the People's Congress
of Kurdistan
(the former Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK), announced
an abrupt end to its five-year ceasefire with Turkish
forces, warning that it would soon resort to violent
means to achieve its ends.
Within a few days of
the announcement, Kurdish forces in southern Turkey did
attack Turkish forces, prompting a violent response.
Additionally, according to a recent Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty report, "Kamis Djabrailov, chairman
of the International Union of Kurdish Public
Organizations that represents the Kurdish minorities in
Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia and other CIS [Commonwealth
of Independent States], told Interfax on 31 May that his
organization approves the announcement three days
earlier by the People's Congress of Kurdistan that it
will end on 1 June its five-year ceasefire in
hostilities with the Turkish armed forces."
Hence, the regional political, diplomatic and
even military mobilization of Kurdish forces, in an
attempt to secure its own interests as the June 30 date
for the handover of sovereignty to Iraq nears, appears
to be under way. In verification of that fact, on June
7, Masoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and
Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
threatened to pull out of the interim government unless
the new United Nations Security Council resolution
guarantees Kurdish autonomy and a veto over the
direction of the interim government as promised in the
draft interim constitution, which was very reluctantly
signed by the Shi'ite representatives, but which is
something the Shi'ite majority refuses to accept under
any circumstances.
The Kurdish representatives
also expressed their bitter disappointment over the fact
that no Kurd was chosen to fill the positions of either
prime minister or president. Hence, in the Kurdish view,
their interests are being severely slighted as the June
30 date nears. Whether a political and diplomatic
compromise can be reached that satisfies all the parties
is not at all assured. The Sunnis and Shi'ites appear to
be mostly content with the look of the new interim
council and with Iraq's direction, but the Kurds are
certainly not content. They have been marginalized
before, by the United States itself, and intend to take
care of their own interests, by violence if need be.
This is indeed ominous.
The pointed Kurdish
demands threaten to disrupt the relative contentment
with the transition process, which now exists among the
Sunni and Shi'ite populations, among Iraq's neighbors
and within the international community at large. In
actuality, there is little sympathy for the cause of the
Kurds in Iraq and the surrounding region.
That
is especially so in Turkey, Syria and Iran, where
Kurdish groups are viewed as nothing more than
destabilizing terrorists, threatening the national
security of the three nations, which have recently
deepened their cooperation in the effort to subdue such
groups. And in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the last thing
that is wanted is for such Kurdish groups to push the
region toward violence and instability in the pursuit of
Kurdish autonomy.
An independent Kurdistan is,
therefore, anathema to all but the Kurds themselves. It
is the United States which has greatly exacerbated the
current situation by raising Kurdish hopes for an
independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq. Months ago, in
the atmosphere of violent insurgency in Iraq and the
approaching handover of sovereignty, the US-drafted
interim constitution significantly raised such Kurdish
hopes, giving them a veto over the direction of any
Iraqi interim government, as well as over the final
Iraqi government to be seated in 2005.
Fearful
of the influence of Shi'ite religious fundamentalism as
the transition to sovereignty progressed, the
administration of President George W Bush evidently saw
the Kurds as an entity it could use to keep such Shi'ite
influence in check, to limit its power in any new Iraqi
regime, so as to prevent the formation of an
Iranian-style theocracy in Iraq. However, as matters are
turning out, the most powerful positions being filled in
the interim government are occupied by mostly secular
Sunnis and Shi'ites.
So, the United States now
has little use for the Kurds, who see clearly that once
again they are being abandoned by the US. All the
parties see the Kurds, therefore, as possible spoilers
of the solution currently being put together under UN
auspices. Hence, little sympathy exists for them.
Realizing this fact, the Kurds are already resorting to
threats and violence in an effort to get a satisfactory
hearing. By its short-sighted, ad hoc approach to Iraq's
complicated situation, first using the Kurds and then
casting them aside, the United States may have sealed
both its own and Iraq's fate.
There appears
little hope that the Kurdish demands can be sufficiently
taken into consideration without at the same time losing
the already cautious and tentative support of the Sunnis
and Shi'ites. And there also appears little hope that
the Kurds will suddenly satisfy themselves with what the
other two factions are comfortable in giving them.
Hence, whether the Kurds might temporarily tone down
their demands for the time being, or whether they more
likely will ratchet up their demands as the UN
negotiations proceed and the June 30 date nears, one
thing that appears certain is that they will hold a
major key to how events proceed in Iraq.
The
United States has let loose a Kurdish "monster", not
only on Iraq itself, but also on the region at large, a
"monster" which cannot easily be put back into the box.
If a diplomatic solution cannot be crafted that
satisfies all of Iraq's three factions, and it is
doubtful that one can, then a great deal of military
muscle will be needed in the entire region to keep the
disenfranchised Kurds "in check". And that muscle will
have to come increasingly into play in northern Iraq,
Turkey, Syria, Iran, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
In
the end, the handover of sovereignty on June 30 may not
change anything, except that it may well accelerate
Iraq's descent into sectarian violence, with Turkey and
Syria cooperating militarily to secure their interests
in northern Iraq by taking control of that region, and
the southern regions of Iraq moving significantly closer
into cooperation with Iran, with the US military caught
in the middle. The relative calmness of northern Iraq is
very likely to be much like the calmness of a large bomb
- its calmness very deceptively masks the huge explosion
which is likely imminent.
W Joseph
Stroupe is editor-in-chief of GeoStrategyMap.com, an
online geopolitical magazine specializing in strategic
analysis and forecasting. He may be reached by e-mail
at editor_in_chief@geostrategymap.com.
(Copyright 2004 GeoStrategyMap. All rights
reserved.)
Speaking Freely is an Asia
Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you are
interested in contributing.
of Kurdistan
(the former Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK), announced
an abrupt end to its five-year ceasefire with Turkish
forces, warning that it would soon resort to violent
means to achieve its ends. 
