Sovereignty: Now the games really
begin By Ehsan Ahrari
The overt United States occupation
phase of Iraq came to a close on June 28, but its
stealthy phase is still continuing. The holding of the
transfer of sovereignty ceremony two days earlier than
its original deadline of June 30, and the decision to
keep it short and simple, were in recognition of the
extremely precarious security situation that prevails in
Iraq. If it was the beginning of a momentous chapter in
Iraq, the secretive, quiet and an uneventful departure
of the former Iraqi administrator, L Paul Bremer, did
not show it. In the present phase, the activities of the
five actors - the US, Iran, Turkey, Israel and the Iraqi
insurgents - will not only play a major role in
determining the stability of Iraq, but also in
formulating the prospects for the legitimacy of the
interim government. At least for now, that government is
seen as a puppet and a supplicant of the
US, at a time when anti-Americanism is on the rise,
not just in Iraq, but also across the Middle East.
The Bush administration changed its strategy in
Iraq from a largely unilateral occupation - even though
a number of nations have their forces present - to a
presumed strategy of multilateralism before handing over
the authority to an interim government. In that strategy
the United Nations and the new Iraqi interim government
were given a visible role. However, the very modality of
the participation of the former representative of the
world body, Lakhdar Brahimi, in the selection of the
personnel of that government demonstrated that the UN
remained indubitably squeamish about challenging
the-behind-the-scenes scheming of Washington in that
process.
The lingering question was how
independent the interim government was going to be of US
pressure and manipulation after it takes charge. Then,
some representatives of that body had to go to the UN
Security Council and personally assure the doubting
permanent members - China, France and Russia - that they
will indeed exercise autonomy, and thereby establish
legitimacy. For a majority of Iraqis, the ball is now
very much in the court of the new government. It must
establish that it is not merely a willing supplicant in
carrying out the wishes of its Western master. The
continued escalation or de-escalation of violence in
Iraq in the coming months will prove whether the interim
government will fail or succeed in that test. The
interim government will be in charge until Iraqis vote
in a general election, which must take place by January
31 next year, according to a UN Security Council
resolution.
In the meantime, three actors -
Iran, Turkey and Israel - are already involved in a
dangerous game of promoting their clashing strategic
presence and agendas, thereby making Iraq a highly
unstable place. Of the three, Iran's presence or
maneuverings are the most ancient ones because of Iraq's
historical role as the theological center of Shi'ite
Islam. As such, Iran regards its role in the future
political dynamics of its neighbor as genuine, and
highly warranted. What is not clear, however, is what
role Iran should play in influencing the nature of the
future government in Iraq: whether it should push for a
theocracy a la the Islamic Republic, or a moderate
Islamic government? From the vantage point of the Iraqi
Shi'ites, there is no overriding evidence that they want
the creation of an Iran-style democratic theocracy,
which is more theocratic than democratic, given the
heavy-handed performance of the hardliners regarding
political reforms. Even if the notion of separation of
religion and politics were to prevail in Iraq, Iran
would still play a crucial role in the power play inside
Iraq, a reality that is deeply resented by the US and
Israel. As a tactical move, Washington must now connive
in the Israeli maneuvers to frustrate and undermine the
Iranian schemes to enhance its own influence in Iraq,
since the success of Israel will be complementary to the
American clout and presence in Iraq, or at least so hope
Bush officials.
Israel was playing a
behind-the-scenes role in helping the Kurds undermine
the Saddam Hussein regime for many decades. Since the
Kurds hated Saddam as much as did the Israelis and the
Americans, there was a powerful basis for that nexus
among the three. But another major regional player,
Turkey, watched that nexus with considerable
consternation.
For Israel and the US, the
prospects of the creation of an independent Kurdish
state, while Saddam was in power, was a source of
enormous comfort, and a driving force for destabilizing
and eventually bringing an end of that dictator's rule.
However, from the Turkish vantage point, the end of
Saddam's regime did not have to result in the creation
of an independent Kurdistan, which neither Turkey nor
Iran wished to see materialize.
As the Turks
envisage it, the creation of an independent Kurdistan
means a resurgence of the Kurdish aspirations within
their borders for increased autonomy, or even a
potential seceding of the Kurdish populated areas of
Turkey with Kurdistan. Besides, Turkey has always
envisioned a small and independent Kurdistan as a pawn
that would be exploited at will by all regional powers,
especially Israel. If Israel were to play a crucial role
in creating an independent Kurdistan, it would become a
willing participant in the regional balance of
power-related activities of the Jewish state. Such a
potential was not going to be tolerated by Turkey, which
aspires of becoming a regional hegemon, the current
Kemalist tradition of isolationism notwithstanding.
For Iran, the creation of an independent
Kurdistan means another independent Sunni state, and an
entity that has the historical basis to be anti-Iranian,
given the long-standing hostility of and antipathy to
Iran against Kurdish autonomy and independence. Thus, it
is easy for Iran and Turkey to cooperate in nipping in
the bud all potential for the emergence of an
independent Kurdish state. Even Iraqi Shi'ite leader
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani opposed the interim Iraqi
constitution, which gave the Kurds veto power. It can be
argued, however, that al-Sistani's opposition was
focused on safeguarding the Shi'ite power and dominance
in the future government of Iraq, and was not
necessarily based on theological differences between
Shi'ites and Sunnis of that country. As long as the
emergence of an independent Kurdistan remains a tenable
option, Turkey and Iran are likely to set aside their
competitive agendas of regional dominance and focus on
eliminating all prospects of the Israeli presence and
influence in northern Iraq.
From the preceding
emerges a delineation of an intrinsically intricate and
clashing strategic perspectives of the US, Iran, Turkey
and Israel. The latter two countries have hitherto found
many reasons to cooperate in the past. On the Kurdish
issue, however, the government of Turkey is as
unequivocal about foreclosing all prospects for the
creation of an independent Kurdish state, as the
government of Israel is about upholding them.
Consequently, the Turks have made a decision to minimize
the presence of Israeli operatives of Mossad as a
condition for cooperating with the beleaguered Bush
administration in Iraq. However, Ankara will hold its
diplomatic fire for now to see whether Washington will
bring pressure on the Israelis to deescalate their
activities in Iraq. Besides, Turkey needs all the
American support in persuading the Europeans to expedite
its membership in the European Union. The US-Turkish
strategic agenda has to be pursued with utmost care, but
Ankara is in no mood to allow Israel any upper hand in
Iraq.
But the Americans view the Israeli
presence, not as much aimed at facilitating the
emergence of an independent Kurdistan as applying
pressure on Iran to minimize its influence in Iraq. More
important, the US government could as a last resort hope
that Mossad could blow up Iran's nuclear plant at
Natanz, a facility that is generally regarded as aimed
at manufacturing weapons-grade uranium. The Bush
doctrine has fallen on hard times, given the current
deteriorating situation in Iraq and in the wake of the
continuing intransigence of North Korea to agree to
dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Washington could
be hoping for an Israeli "miracle" in putting an end to
Iran's nuclear aspirations, much in the same way an
Israeli air raid destroyed the Osirak nuclear facility
in Iraq in early 1981.
The Iraqi insurgents may or may not
have a comprehensive comprehension of the interplay
among these countries inside Iraq, or their clashing and
competitive agendas. All they want to do for now is to
kill as many Iraqis and Muslim "collaborators" and
Western occupiers as possible. They have recently added
a new wrinkle to their long-standing strategy of making
Iraq a living hell for the outside forces and
"collaborators" by taking hostages and beheading them.
That objective is clearly aimed at creating a stampede
of foreign forces and international
entrepreneurs
from Iraq.
If the end of
occupation on June 28 meant the emergence of a sovereign
interim Iraqi government, that reality has not yet
materialized, at least not in the eyes of a majority of
Iraqis. The most complicating factor for the interim
government is not to appear as a pawn in the hands of
the Americans, Turks, Iranians, but especially the
Israelis. However, with everything else that it must
accomplish in the meantime - the most important of which
is the ability to reestablish or sustain basic services
and oil distribution facilities and reduce the
unemployment rate, which is reported to be between
30-60% - the interim government is indeed faced with an
awesome, and potentially insurmountable, task.
The interim government in Iraq must do all it
can to persuade the Iraqis that the current phase is not
the extension of American occupation under another name.
At the same time, the continued presence of foreign
forces will constantly serve as a reminder that Prime
Minister Iyad Allawi and President Ghazi al-Yawar are
wrong in their claims of being either sovereign or
independent of the Americans. In the meantime, the
insurgents will also do all they can to prove the new
Iraqi rulers wrong.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD,
is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent
strategic analyst.
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US, at a time when anti-Americanism is on the rise,
not just in Iraq, but also across the Middle East.
