As
world leaders gather in Istanbul to discuss the future
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
particularly as it pertains to the Middle East and Iraq
in light of the growing momentum for a NATO role in
southern Iraq, the question of the alliance's
relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran deserves
central attention.
In fact, there are several
reasons to be optimistic about the prospect of NATO and
Iran forging bonds in the future, regardless of points
of hesitation by both sides. First, Iran, exceedingly
worried about the spillover conflict from neighboring
Iraq, naturally welcomes a more international
peacekeeping force near its borders than a purely
American-British enterprise, for obvious reasons.
Second, the question of Iran-NATO cooperation must be
couched in terms of regional realities, such as
NATO-Russia cooperation and, more recently, Pakistan's
induction as a "non-NATO ally", which in addition to
Turkey's long-standing NATO membership, translates into
the greater proximity of NATO with Iran.
Third,
Iran, which sent observers to last year's NATO summit in
Munich, is keenly aware of NATO's post-Cold War changing
identity, essentially from a mighty alliance into a kind
of "military tool box", to echo a recent editorial in
the Economist, and, therefore, is less averse toward the
idea of selective, low-level security cooperation with
NATO than in the past, irrespective of strong
reservations about greater NATO intrusion in the region,
notwithstanding the lingering suspicion of NATO as the
US's Trojan horse.
Such an interaction is imperative for
an Iran searching for durable politico-security
solutions to the endemic sources of instability
in its vicinity as well as the myriad
sources of inter-state and intra-state conflicts in
neighboring trans-Caucasus, Central Asia, Northwest and
South Asia. This much was made clear in the recent trip
of President Mohammed Khatami to India, when both
countries pledged cooperation on regional security. This
depends in part on Iran's willingness or ability to
modify its stern anti-US image since India has
effectively eschewed its previous antipathy toward the
US and seeks strong US ties in the near future.
Henceforth, any sign of Iran-NATO improvement is bound
to have positive side effects, for instance, with
respect to Iran-India relations.
Fourth, Iran's participation in NATO summits, when put
in the context of post-Cold War realities and Iran's
present and potential security concerns and interests,
reflects the skillful diplomacy of Iran to inject itself
in the on-going global discussions on the role and
identity of NATO.
Fifth, the interaction of
Iran's officials with NATO leaders can also have
benefits with respect to Tehran's interests in the
Caspian Sea, a rapidly-emerging energy hub of growing
focus for NATO. Concerning the latter, suffice to say
that under the rubric of "Partnership for Peace" (PFP)
programs, NATO has been expanding its influence in the
Caspian basin and beyond. A case in point is Azerbaijan,
where PFP is giving it expertise to strengthen its
ability to protect its borders. PFP programs could
include developing an integrated military-civilian air
traffic control system; developing and training its
coast guard and border guards; upgrading its command,
control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems
to NATO standards; and developing military
interoperability with the "new" NATO concerned with "out
of area" issues. For now, at least, NATO's role in the
region is largely restricted to advisory assistance,
training and guidance in helping the military
establishments of the Caspian states to restructure
along Western lines.
Sixth, an Iran-NATO
dialogue would parallel the Russia-NATO dialogue inked
in Reykjavik, Iceland in May 2002 under the guise of
"NATO-Russia Council" whereby Russia has been integrated
in the NATO debates, although it falls short of Russia's
bid for full inclusion. Thus, emulating Russia somewhat,
the upcoming NATO summit could herald the first stage of
promoting Iran-NATO cooperation by opening a channel for
political dialogue aimed at exploring the areas of
common concern and fostering the mechanisms for
cooperation. The two sides can conceivably agree in
principle on the following themes: (a) Reducing the
likelihood of civil war or inter-state conflict in the
key states of the region; (b) Impede the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (c)
Discourage the spread of militant political, or
religio-political, movements such as the Taliban;
(d) Prevent the spillover of conflicts to areas of
mutual concern, such as the Persian Gulf; (e)
Cooperating on the environmental security of the Caspian
Sea, in the light of recent NATO "workshops" on the
(declining) Caspian environment.
On the whole, a
forward-looking Iranian foreign policy has potentially
much to gain by commencing a carefully-orchestrated
march toward dialogue with NATO. NATO's invitation of
Iran can be reasonably interpreted as a sign of
"appeasing Iran" in the light of on-going insurgency in
Iraq and the linkage with a whole array of foreign
policy issues, such as the "pipeline geopolitics,"
sanctions on US oil investments in Iran's energy sector,
etc. This much has been recognized in Iran by, among
others, Dr Javad Larijani, an advisor to Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in his recent call for
Iran-European Union talks on the future of NATO's role
in the region.
For a "NATO at the crossroads"
still debating its post-Cold War mission and purpose, it
is important to bring an important Middle East country
such as Iran under its policy purview. The 55-year-old
trans-Atlantic organization has recently inducted seven
new members - Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia, although Slovenia has
recently warned that the referendum on its NATO
membership may be jeopardized by the US war on Iraq.
Since 1991, NATO has been grappling with a
self-transformation affecting its military strategy,
security responsibilities, plans and force posture. It
has embarked on a 20,000 rapid reaction force, which
could come in handy in peacekeeping operations in the
troubled parts of Eurasia.
Since Iran has become
increasingly involved in conflict-management in its
region, there is no reason NATO and Iran cannot
cooperate, just as Iran has started to do with respect
to the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe). Across a broad front from the trans-Caspian
to Afghanistan to the Persian Gulf, NATO remains
concerned about a plethora of threats, including
narco-terrorism, and the fact that Iran shares most if
not all of these concerns can potentially translate into
low security cooperation, for instance, on
intelligence-sharing on terrorism.
Faced with
multiple crises beyond its borders, eg, the
Armenia-Azerbaijan quagmire, the impasse with Iraq,
instability in Afghanistan, not to mention the spillover
effects of separatist conflicts in Georgia, Daghestan
and Chechnya, Iran's security capabilities are already
stretched thin, dictating a reconsideration of the
country's national security calculus and priorities.
This does not mean jumping to the conclusion
that Iran should forego its various misgivings about
NATO and contemplate joining its PFP programs; such rosy
predictions are not realistic and overlook the
ideological antipathy of Iran toward NATO, which stands
somewhat at odds with Iran's strictly national security
interests. A modification of the official ideology is
therefore necessary as a prelude for a structural
adjustment of Iran's foreign policy in the direction of
cooperation with NATO. This would be a gradual process
requiring a steady confidence-building process between
Iran and NATO.
In the long run, Iran may resort
to the NATO card in its diplomacy toward Russia, which
as of late has displayed certain hegemonic tendencies in
the Caspian Sea, irrespective of the solid ties of
friendship between the two countries. Iran's perceived
weakness, by the "axis of evil" offensive by the White
House, has been exploited by Moscow in the Caspian Sea,
and Iran's "Gramscian maneuver" vis-a-vis NATO may prove
a timely corrective to this unwanted situation.
What is certain, however, is the pro-NATO
proclivity of several of Iran's neighbors and the
eastward drift of the "new NATO", illustrated by a
recent remark by Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld that
NATO's "center of gravity is shifting to the East". NATO
countries are keen on gaining and maintaining access to
the region's energy resources, which is why NATO has
been working with the GUUAM Group (Georgia, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldavia), and offering to
secure East-West pipeline(s). In the post September 11
milieu, NATO is likely to play a growing role in the
security environment of Eurasia and, hence, it would be
rather unwise for Iran to continue its hitherto passive
or indifferent approach toward NATO. In conclusion, by
playing a skillful diplomatic vis-a-vis NATO, Iran is
likely to harvest both short-term and long-term benefits
for its foreign policy goals and objectives.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author
of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign
Policy (Westview Press) and "Iran's Foreign Policy
Since 9/11", Brown's Journal of World Affairs,
co-authored with former deputy foreign minister Abbas
Maleki, No 2, 2003.
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