In an era of intense
global support for nuclear non-proliferation, Israel's unspoken possession
of a nuclear arsenal - euphemistically known as an
outcome of its policy of "strategic ambiguity"
- is coming under increased criticism and
limelight. Mohammad ElBaradei, director of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) - the United Nations' nuclear
watchdog - visited Israel on Tuesday to talk to the government
of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon about making the Middle East
a nuclear-free zone. Even though a spokesman of that
agency denied that ElBaradei's mission was to ask the
Jewish state to unravel its nuclear-weapons program, one is
hard pressed to know how else that region would ever become
a nuclear-free zone. According to the unclassified estimates
of the US intelligence community of the late 1990s,
Israel possesses between 75 and 130 nuclear weapons.
If
one were looking for a gaping example of US nuclear
non-proliferation policy double standards, that it lets
Israel continue to modernize its nuclear arsenal without
even a word of criticism would fit the bill. Not that
Washington was ever oblivious to the existence of such
Israeli capabilities. On the contrary, as the website of
the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) - a
prestigious nuclear non-proliferation group - notes, "The
United States first became aware of Dimona's existence
[a nuclear facility in the southern Israeli town of the
same name] after U-2 overflights in 1958 captured the
facility's construction, but it was not identified as a
nuclear site until two years later. The complex was
variously explained as a textile plant, an agricultural
station, and a metallurgical research facility, until
David Ben-Gurion stated in December 1960 that [the]
Dimona complex was a nuclear-research center built for
'peaceful purposes'." One should recall similar
explanations that India proffered in the aftermath of
its so-called peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, and
until it became a declared nuclear power in 1998. Iran
is currently using the very same rationale to pursue its
own nuclear program.
During
the 1960s, the US sent nuclear inspectors to
the Dimona nuclear facility seven times, but, according to
the FAS, "they were unable to obtain an
accurate picture of activities carried out there, largely due
to tight Israeli control of the timing and agenda of the
visits". The same source adds, "The Israelis went so far
as to install false control-room panels and to brick
over elevators and hallways that accessed certain areas
of the facility. The inspectors were able to report that
there was no clear scientific research or
civilian nuclear-power program justifying such a large reactor
- circumstantial evidence of the Israeli bomb program - but
found no evidence of 'weapons-related activities' such as
the existence of a plutonium-reprocessing plant." (Iraq used
a similar campaign of deception to hide its own nuclear
capabilities in the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1991.)
It is also worth noting that during
1961-73, which was a crucial period for Israel's nuclear-bomb
program, US ambassador Walworth Barbour envisaged his
job "as being to insulate the president from facts that
might compel him to act on the nuclear issue". Thus one
of the cornerstones of America's nuclear
non-proliferation policy was a deafening silence on
Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. Both Republican
and Democratic administrations are equally guilty of
upholding that silence.
But
there is another way to understand the United
States' silence on the issue. Establishing a
qualitative military edge - indeed institutionalizing that edge
- for Israel in the military arena over its
Arab neighbors has been a cornerstone America's
policy since the administration of the late president Lyndon B
Johnson. The decisive victory of Israel over the Arab armed
forces in the 1967 military debacle further persuaded
Johnson to view the Jewish state as an ally on which the
US should bank in the mega-conflict of the Cold War years.
The Arab states were perceived then, as they are envisaged
now, as too constrained by the upswings of
anti-Americanism in their polities to be counted on to remain on
the US side when the chips are down. This is one of
those enduring perceptions that was proved false, but never
ceased to shade the thinking in the uppermost echelons
of US government.
The US was
partially correct about the conclusion regarding the prevalence
of anti-Americanism among Arab masses. The chief
underlying reason was America's inability to resolve
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whether Washington really
had much sway over Israel was not important; however,
for the Arab side that perception has been one of
the constant realities of the Middle East. Even
the late president Anwar Sadat of Egypt in his
biography identified America's perceived influence over Israel
as his reason for breaking with the Soviet camp
and becoming a major Arab ally of the US. Whether
Washington did not resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict or could
not do so, at least from the Arab side, the
general understanding is that it is because of a pro-Israeli
(or an anti-Arab) bias. At the risk of
oversimplification, it can be stated that the US did not succeed in
being the peacemaker in the Palestine
Liberation Organization-Israeli conflict either,
and anti-Americanism prevailed on the Arab side,
thereby further convincing various US presidents about the
correctness of their policy of maintaining a qualitative
military edge in favor of Israel.
From the Arab side, there has been a sustained
endeavor to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone. Even though
it has been an uphill struggle, Arab states still view it
as a major - and perhaps the only - way of
putting pressure on Israel to unravel its nuclear-weapons
program. But their dilemma is summarized in the adage,
"Who'll bell the cat?" In this instance, the Arabs' side
also knows that the US is the only power that has some - in
fact a lot, in their assessment - influence
in initiating a meaningful dialogue with Israel
to materialize the emergence of a nuclear-free zone in their
area. Even though the extant tremendous advantage of
Israel in conventional military power over Arab
countries makes its possession of nuclear weapons well
nigh unnecessary, only Washington (at least in principle)
can successfully make that argument and persuade Israel to contemplate
dismantling those weapons.
The chief problem with the preceding is that there is
no conceivable way any US president would ask Israel to
unravel its nuclear capabilities in the era of a global
"war on terrorism". Yet Washington had no
compunction about putting similar pressures on India
and Pakistan immediately after their respective
nuclear-weapons programs came out of the closet in 1998, or
demanding that North Korea unravel its nuclear-weapons option, or
that Iran shouldn't even consider developing its
capabilities to produce nuclear weapons.
Still, ElBaradei's mission to Israel serves as
a considerable moral force, as the IAEA played a
highly visible role in Libya's active measures to foreclose
its nuclear-weapons option, and that agency is continuing to
put pressure on Iran to increase transparency in its
nuclear program.
The most
positive news from Israel is that, even though he has
refused to abandon his country's policy of nuclear
ambiguity, Sharon has agreed to discuss a nuclear-free zone in the
region as part of future peace talks. "That is the first
time I hear that from an Israeli prime
minister," said ElBaradei to reporters in Jerusalem on Thursday.
A spokesman of the IAEA's chief made an observation
that would go a long way toward opening a meaningful
Middle Eastern dialogue for the potential emergence of
that area as a nuclear-free zone. He said, "ElBaradei would
be happy to act as an informal bridge between the
Islamic world, which resents what it considers unfair
international tolerance of Israel's secret nuclear
capacities, and Israel, which sees itself as facing 'an
existential threat' from a far larger enemy." There is
also a minor development indicating that Israel is
edging - albeit by taking baby steps - toward nuclear
transparency. It has established a new Israeli Energy
Commission Website that contains a photo of Dimona.
There is no suggestion here that
Israel would seriously consider abandoning its
nuclear-weapons program in the near future. But at least it is
willing to talk about the issue. The only way it would ever
be persuaded to give up nuclear weapons is if the
US decides to speak the truth to nuclear Israel. And
that is also not about to happen in the short run. In
the meantime, the involvement of the IAEA promises to
serve as a compelling moral force in the potential
emergence of the Middle East as a nuclear-weapons-free zone,
especially if the issue remains under the international
limelight on a sustained basis.
Ehsan
Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based
independent strategic analyst.
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