SPEAKING
FREELY Iran's need for nuclear
engagement By Kewmars Bozorgmehr
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online
feature that allows guest writers to have their say.
Please click hereif you
are interested in contributing.
Two
issues in their relations with Iran, both perceived by
many to be inextricably linked, sound alarm bells in
Europe and the United States: nuclear energy and the
bomb.
The pursuit of nuclear power in the
presence of ample hydrocarbon reserves is considered
foolish at best, so when Iranians speak of reactors for
peaceful uses most Western experts dismiss the notion as
an example of putting prestige before practicality. More
ominously, the US and others regard any interest in the
nuclear field to be a precursor to a sinister weapons
program. After all, here is the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries' second-biggest exporter
with enough oil and gas to last a century or more
digging in its heels to gain access to the forbidden
technology. "Why"? officials in Washington and US
representatives at the International Atomic Energy
Agency enjoy asking. "Why nuclear energy when the
country is swimming in oil?"
Yet that line of
reasoning is not always compelling, at least from
Tehran's perspective. Access to reliable sources of oil
and gas, Iranians say, has not dissuaded others from
developing nuclear technology for power generation. The
US, among the top three global oil producers, operates
over 100 nuclear power stations; Russia, which sits on
the world's largest gas reserves and is the
second-biggest oil exporter, has 30. At last count there
were 440 commercial reactors in 31 countries and a
further 284 research reactors in operation in 56
countries.
Thirty years ago, Iran had already
embarked on an ambitious nuclear power generation
program comprising some 20 reactors. By the time of the
Islamic revolution in 1979, when construction was
halted, eight plants had been approved and work on the
first reactor in Bushehr was well underway. In those
days, far from sniggering at "taking coals to
Newcastle", Western governments and firms were beating
down the doors to gain a slice of lucrative contracts.
Iranians claim the arguments in favor of the
nuclear option, even for a major oil producer, are
straightforward. Except for brief periods of political
uncertainty, they say, crude oil as a fuel remains
relatively cheap, though non-replaceable commodity.
Production of oil and gas derivatives, on the other
hand, leads to substantial added value. It also helps to
establish a range of downstream industries that will
create much-needed employment for a young and growing
work force. The exploitation of nuclear energy simply
makes it possible to divert crude oil into areas that
are more profitable. They would also argue that, as a
matter of principle, Iran is entitled to establish a
peaceful nuclear industry if it so chooses and, if need
be, to call on the cooperation of others in doing so, as
provided for under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT).
Much of the available data tend to
support Tehran's case. Iran's own requirements for oil
have doubled in recent years, forcing the industry to
siphon off nearly 1.5 million barrels per day from vital
exports to meet domestic needs. Within 10 years, local
demand will absorb nearly all of the production, leaving
little or nothing for export. Gas supplies, though
expanding rapidly, still account for only about half of
energy consumption. Meanwhile, electricity production of
34,000 megawatts per year already outstrips the world
average by a wide margin and demand is growing at
between 7-8% annually, a rate that stretches new
investment facilities to the limit.
Roughly 13%
of the national capacity is from hydroelectric power,
which has been steadily developed since the late 1950s
by harnessing the country's river waters. Over 100 new
dam projects, many having power generation potential,
are under construction or on the drawing board. A more
modest amount of electricity is expected to be generated
from minor rivers for local and community consumption.
In addition, plans are at an advanced stage to produce
250 megawatts of wind power, while solar and thermal
power plants are also being considered. Aside from
limited reserves of coal, which is used mainly by the
steel industry, nuclear power remains the only untapped
and viable alternative.
However, the real issue
in the ongoing tussle is Western suspicions that Iran is
developing the bomb, despite repeated and vigorous
Iranian denials. The NPT, the main instrument the West
has relied on to prevent an Iranian "breakout", aims to
restrict the spread of nuclear weapons to those
countries that had acquired them prior to 1968. Its
success, though less than complete, has been effective
enough to avoid the dire predictions of the 1960s, when
30-50 states were seen joining the nuclear club within a
decade or two.
When Iran signed the NPT in 1968,
only the Soviet Union, a superpower, possessed nuclear
weapons in the region. At that time even the Chinese had
managed to build a mere nuclear "device", as the Central
Intelligence Agency liked to describe Beijing's crude
early efforts.
Today, however, the region is
rife with such weaponry, with China, India, Israel and
Pakistan as well as Russia maintaining arsenals of
varying destructive power. Several former Soviet
republics also have access to weapons technology, if not
the actual hardware and means of delivery. It is this
incongruity and the West's open disregard of Iran's
security fears that rankle Tehran.
Why, they
ask, is their country being singled out for undue
attention when non-proliferation has clearly failed (or,
as some would darkly suggest, has been allowed to fail)
in the case of India, Israel and Pakistan? It should
come as no surprise that Tehran accuses the West of
using the NPT simply as an anti-Iranian mechanism. In
describing the mindset of the West, indeed of all
nuclear-capable countries, one recent column in the
English-language daily Iran News commented: "We have
nuclear weapons but you can't have any. If you try to
acquire them we will nuke you. But if you don't, you're
at our mercy anyway. Some catch, that NPT."
Furthermore, Tehran points to the string of
military bases the US has established in recent years
that virtually surround Iran from the Caucasus, across
the Caspian Sea to Central Asia, Afghanistan, the
Persian Gulf and Iraq, linking up with existing North
Atlantic Treaty Organization facilities in Turkey to
complete the encirclement. Given the current level of US
animosity, any government in Tehran entrusted with
providing adequate security against possible foreign
incursions could be open to accusations of negligence or
worse.
In the wake of the disastrous invasion of
Iraq, even Washington hawks may be less inclined to
mount another military campaign in the Middle East in
the near term. The only sensible policy, it seems, would
be one of engaging Iran in serious dialogue to allay its
legitimate security concerns, but also to gain its
cooperation where Western interests are at stake. The
European Union is committed to pursue such a course, and
the US should reconsider its 25 years of hostility and
join the process.
It is said that America has
not so much a policy as an attitude towards Iran.
Perhaps a change of direction would be less painful than
at first it might appear.
Kewmars
Bozorgmehr is a former editor of The Tehran
Journal.
Speaking Freely is an Asia
Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you
are interested in contributing.
