SPEAKING FREELY Saudi Arabia: A nation in
turmoil By Swati Parashar
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Introduction Much has been said and
written about Saudi Arabia's role in the "war on
terror". The ruling family of the House of Saud has been
an unabashed US ally in the campaign to hunt out
terrorists. However, even a large-scale massive
crackdown on terrorists in the kingdom has not been able
to thwart attacks on foreigners, mostly Westerners. The
recent hostage crisis in the oil city of al-Khobar,
which left 22 civilians dead, including foreigners, and
the brazen attacks on British journalists and American
defense contractors highlight a need to understand the
nature of terrorism in Saudi Arabia and the complexities
that confront the state.
Beyond al-Qaeda
Recent events in Saudi Arabia, including
the beheading of Paul Johnson, an employee of a US
defense contractor, point toward an al-Qaeda
organization that is moving away from suicide bombings
toward sporadic guerrilla attacks on chosen targets and
kidnappings and which is desperate to establish its
credentials through media publicity. But most
important, it has lost some of its top leaders to
encounters with the Saudi forces.
Even the tightly policed state has not been able
to prevent terrorist operations against Westerners. However,
it is very important to realize that terrorism in
Saudi Arabia is not just under the aegis of al-Qaeda. Even
though 15 out of the 19 al-Qaeda hijackers of
September 11, 2001, notoriety were Saudis, there is insufficient
evidence of a centralized command of al-Qaeda operating in
the Persian Gulf kingdom. An Internet statement of
slain al-Qaeda leader, Abdul Aziz al-Muqrin, claimed that
al-Qaeda relied on "independent cells that
function without organizational cohesion". Most analysts believe that
al-Qaeda is a loosely knit organization of several
three-to-four-member cells that operate independently.
There
have been reports of some indigenous groups being
involved in acts of terror in Saudi Arabia, as was the
case of the June 25, 1996, truck bombing at the King
Abdul Aziz air base at Khobar Towers, which killed 19 US
servicemen. The Iranian-supported Shi'ite group, the
Saudi Hezbollah, has also been accused of terrorism in
the country. There have also been reports of individuals
who have carried out acts of terrorism claiming
inspiration from Osama bin Laden's teachings, but who
are not affiliated with al-Qaeda.
The Muqrin
factor However, the recent cases of the al-Khobar
attack and the beheading of Johnson that were claimed by
the "al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula", focus the
debate on al-Qaeda's presence in the kingdom. The man
behind these acts of terror was "Abu Hajir" Abdul Aziz
al-Muqrin. This ruthless tactician died in a shootout
with Saudi security forces hours after he and three
colleagues had disposed of the decapitated body of the
unfortunate Johnson.
Muqrin transformed
al-Qaeda's war against the Saudi state into a
pan-Islamic jihad against Westerners and other
"infidels". He often expressed his solidarity with
Muslims in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya,
and was even recruiting mujahideen for Iraq. For him,
the struggle of Muslims in these countries was as much
an issue for jihad as the growing "apostasy" of the
ruling Saudi elite.
Muqrin was a
dropout from the Saudi educational system who took the usual
path to terrorism through the Afghan jihad, where he
met his mentor, bin Laden, and trained under
him. He participated in several conflicts
in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bosnia, and the Horn of Africa in
Somalia and Ethiopia, and was sentenced to four years in
prison in Saudi Arabia in the late 1990s. He was
released after two years because of his effortless recitation of the Koran,
which he learned by heart while in jail.
He took over as leader of al-Qaeda
operations this March when the previous chief, a Yemeni national,
Khalid Ali Haj, and an accomplice were killed in a raid
by security forces after an aggressive anti-terror campaign.
Haj himself had succeeded Yussef al-Ayri, who was also
shot dead in June 2003, a month after the deadly
suicide bombings in Riyadh that May, which claimed more than 20
lives and in which 10 Americans died.
The author of "Al-Qaeda's Targeting Guidance", which
was released as a chapter in the seventh issue of
al-Qaeda's training publication, Camp al-Battar Magazine, released this
March 29, Muqrin identified categories of urban,
religious, economic and human targets on which future
attacks would be conducted. True to this document, the
al-Khobar attack was on an economic target, whereas
Johnson was the perfect human target, an American
"infidel" working for a defense contractor.
Muqrin had a flair for
media publicity and often released statements and pictures
on the Internet and appeared on videotapes. His media
propaganda was most evident in the Johnson case when he
posted grisly images of Johnson's severed head and
decapitated body on websites that have been used by al-Qaeda in
the past. In fact, he first appeared in
al-Qaeda's "Badr al-Riyadh" video released on February 8 as an
al-Qaeda field commander who had perhaps masterminded
the al-Muhaya housing compound bombing in Riyadh last November.
Media propaganda, as in the Johnson case, enhances the
impact of terror, and Muqrin understood this well.
Muqrin was a wanted man, but there were doubts about
his whereabouts. Some people believed he was not based
in Saudi Arabia and directed operations from a distant country,
but reliable reports claimed that he probably residing
in the al-Suweidi district of Saudi Arabia, which
has a long tradition of nurturing terrorists. The
British Broadcasting Corp journalist and a cameraman who were shot
at in al-Suweidi recently were working on a documentary
on Ibrahim al-Rayyes, one of the 26 most
wanted terrorists in the kingdom, who was killed in
a shootout last December. Figures reveal that 15 out of
the 26 most wanted terrorists, the list of which
was released by the Saudi Interior Ministry in December,
are from this notorious al-Suweidi area.
Muqrin was gunned down with three other al-Qaeda militants
on their escape route after dumping Johnson's body.
Police received information about the car license number,
which helped them chase the militants. It is significant
to note here the involvement of the al-Qaeda chief in
the basic planning and dumping of a body, which
suggests that the leadership is part of the execution of
the entire plan until its completion. Some analysts
have pointed out that this could imply that al-Qaeda
is running out of recruits, but the number of
militants detained and killed in the crackdown by the
security forces and the increasing frequency of attacks
suggest otherwise. The al-Khobar militants were young
men between 15 and 25 years of age, which suggests that for
the unemployed youth in Saudi Arabia, militancy is both
an economic as well as a political option to vent their
frustration at the "authoritarian, corrupt and apostate"
regime that is indifferent to their plight.
Muqrin's death was denied in a communique
by al-Qaeda posted on an Islamist website that
the organization uses regularly. The statement said the
news of Muqrin's death was intended "to undermine the
morale of the mujahideen of the Arabian Peninsula". This
message was perhaps an indication of the desperation of
the organization, completely taken aback by the
unexpected killing of its chief mastermind in Saudi
Arabia and a master strategist and planner just two
months after the previous chief was killed.
The
government, though, confirmed the death of Muqrin and
security experts declared Saleh Mohammad al-Aofi as the
successor of Muqrin. Some Islamist websites used by
al-Qaeda later issued a statement saying that Muqrin had
died "after having prepared sincere men from among the
combatants to succeed him and carry on the jihad,
equipped by God with everything needed to bring harm to
America and its agents among the tyrants". The
confirmation about Aofi's succession is still being
awaited from the information sources of al-Qaeda.
Challenges before the state Muqrin,
who had written in "Al-Qaeda's Targeting Guidance" that
the "targets inside the cities are considered a sort of
military diplomacy. Normally, this kind of diplomacy is
written with blood and decorated with body parts and the
smell of guns," has been laid to rest, but his death has
brought into focus several important questions related
to the nature of the Saudi state and its so-called "war
on terror".
The Saudi state, an
Islamic theocracy, faces antipathy not only from its
citizens but also from other Islamic countries in the
region because of its proximity to the United States and the
corrupt and authoritarian rule that seems to have benefited
the ruling few. The regime is a logical target of
attack from international Islamic terrorist groups who
consider the House of Saud unfit to continue as the custodian
of the Islamic holy places. In fact, before becoming a
global Islamic movement, al-Qaeda started its campaign
in Saudi Arabia against the government, calling for the
overthrow of the monarchy, the first step toward the
establishment of a caliphate to unite the Muslims. Their
repeated use of the term "al-Qaeda of the Arabian
Peninsula" seems a deliberate attempt to avoid the usage
of "Saudi Arabia", a name derived from the House of
Saud.
There are increasing reports about
possible linkages between the Saudi security forces and
militants. Pro-militant websites have reported that some
elements in the Saudi security forces helped in the
kidnapping of Johnson by providing the militants with
police uniforms, cars and a fake checkpoint at which
Johnson's car was intercepted by the kidnappers. This
claim was denied by the government.
The new
al-Qaeda chief in Saudi Arabia, Saleh Mohammad al-Aofi,
has worked as a prison guard and may have some
connections in the security establishment. Even the
al-Khobar terrorists were in army uniforms. In a heavily
policed state where there is a sustained crackdown on
terrorists, the probabilities of some police and army
personnel cooperating with the militants does not seem
misplaced, especially in the light of the increasingly
brazen terrorist attacks and ideological support for
al-Qaeda by some Saudis, including those in the royal
family who are against any kind of alignment with the
West. The security forces have succeeded in gunning down
three al-Qaeda chiefs, but the death in each case has
only resulted in a more ruthless and dangerous commander
taking over. Muqrin's successor, Aofi, is also
experienced and has a substantial following.
The
recent amnesty offer by King Fahd to militants who
surrender themselves in the next month is perhaps a
desperate attempt by the regime to establish its
credentials as a sincere ally in the "war on terror", at
the same time trying to make peace with the dissatisfied
elements who may have taken to militancy.
Nevertheless, the amnesty has had some
success. This week, a Saudi-born Islamic militant,
Khaled al-Harbi, who was seen in a videotape with bin Laden
several years ago, turned himself in to the Saudi
Embassy in Tehran and was flown back to Saudi Arabia.
Certainly, Muqrin's death is a loss to al-Qaeda,
but it is not a "victory" for the Saudi government,
which still faces a daunting task. Terrorism and
fundamentalism in the Saudi state are not imported
phenomena. Many Osamas have emerged out of the Saudi
political and religious system, which has a distinct
schizophrenic character. The Saudi state is a glaring
example of the religious and the political spaces
merging together, based on the principles of
fundamentalist Wahhabi ideology. Juxtaposed with this
Islamic theocratic nature of the state is the Saudi
elite's alignment with the Western world and especially
close ties with the US.
The struggle between
tauhid (monotheism) and taqarub
(rapprochement between Muslims and non-Muslims) is
reflected in the two factions that have emerged in the
royalty. Prince Abdullah, the de facto ruler, with his
pro-Western taqarub approach, faces challenges
from Prince Nayef, the interior minister, who is said to
be a favorite with the tauhid, advocating clergy
who are also sympathetic to the al-Qaeda ideology.
Conclusion The problem in Saudi Arabia
is not just the growing menace of terrorism but a
systemic collapse that is in urgent need of reform. The
power struggle in the ruling elite, coupled with the
fact that the regime has failed to address issues
affecting the common people, such as corruption and growing
unemployment, has distanced the ruling class from the
masses. The much-needed political and economic reforms
in favor of the common people hardly seem in the offing
as the regime continues to derive its legitimacy from
Western powers, and control vast oil wealth, which is
said to be adding to the riches of the 20,000-member
royal family.
This complex interplay of internal
and external factors has provided fodder for jihadi
terrorism based on the fundamentalist interpretation of
Islam advocated by the likes of al-Qaeda.
Swati Parashar is a post-graduate
student in international relations from the Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi, and currently a researcher
at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), associated
with the International Terrorism Watch Project. She is
based in New Delhi and can be contacted by e-mail:swatiparashar@orfonline.org
Speaking
Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest
writers to have their say. Please click hereif you
are interested in contributing.
