COMMENTARY Iraq's transition to
dictatorship By Michael A Weinstein
One of the US war aims in Iraq that probably
will not be fulfilled is the establishment of a stable
market democracy. At present, it is impossible to
predict the form or forms - if the country splits apart
- that a future Iraqi regime will take, but it is
possible to sketch some plausible scenarios.
The
obvious obstacle to democratization in Iraq is the civil
disorder there, which is universally perceived and
judged to be of overriding significance. It is
impossible to hold credible elections in an environment
of insurgency, much less to permit the exercise of civil
liberties or to nurture a system of free enterprise
favorable to investment. Yet concentration on the
security issue in isolation from its social context
attacks a symptom rather than its cause.
Insurgencies and other kinds of extralegal
opposition do not occur unless a society is divided into
groups with conflicting interests on which they are
unwilling to compromise. Democracy requires a civil
society whose members agree that they should all live
together under a common system of rule making and
enforcement, despite their differences on any number of
particular issues. When such consensus is absent, groups
whose aims are thwarted will not obey the rules of the
game. That is the case in Iraq.
The roots of
insecurity in Iraq go back to the creation of that
country out of areas populated by distinct communities
with no common history and no shared vision of the
future by the European colonial powers after World War
I. Iraq never achieved genuine nationhood during the
period of indirect British rule through the Hashemite
monarchy or the era of Ba'athist rule that succeeded
Iraq's anti-colonial revolution. Saddam Hussein's
forceful repression of Kurdish and Shi'ite rebellions
spoke more to the ascendancy of communalism over civil
society in Iraq than it did to his brutality. That
Saddam failed to impose his view of Iraqi nationalism
based on a revival of the glories of ancient Babylon
indicates severe divergence in Iraqi society as much as
it does his inadequacies.
By removing the
Ba'athist formula of secular nationalism, the US
occupation has exposed the underlying divisions in Iraqi
society between Sunni Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Shi'ite
Arabs. Saddam was able to suppress the incipient
conflict among the three groups with a Sunni-dominated
dictatorship functioning through a draconian security
apparatus and deals with regional strongmen representing
tribal interests. As in any long-lasting dictatorship,
the Ba'athist regime in Iraq made enough of the
population dependent on its apparatus to allow it to
repress the rest. This is simply how states are held
together when communalism trumps civil society -
dictatorship is a symptom of social divergence, the
opposite side of endemic civil disorder.
It is
unlikely that a Ba'athist regime will reappear in Iraq,
but it is highly probable that some form of dictatorship
will arise in the country, or that it will break up into
undemocratic mini-states. If Iraq remains a single
state, it will either be a loose de facto confederation
of boss-ruled regions or a typical Middle Eastern
dictatorship like Egypt or Syria, perhaps disguised as
what Fareed Zakaria calls "illiberal democracy".
The future of Iraqi politics will in great part
be determined by the fact that the major groups in Iraqi
society are more interested in achieving communal aims
than they are in living in a market democracy. Although
it is correct that most Iraqis would prefer a democratic
government, they give their communal identities a higher
preference than they give an inclusive civil society,
creating the conditions for dictatorship. What form
authoritarianism will take in Iraq will be determined by
the interplay of the country's major political forces.
Iyad Allawi and the transitional
government The most likely possibility for the
emergence of a standard Middle Eastern dictatorship in
Iraq is the continuation of the present transitional
government, with Prime Minister Iyad Allawi as its
strongman, after a constitution is written and elections
are held, scheduled for early next year. Having taken
advantage of the United States' misplaced support of
Ahmad Chalabi and having outmaneuvered United Nations
envoy Lakhtar Brahimi's efforts to establish a caretaker
regime of technocrats, Allawi has positioned himself as
the only convincing national figure in Iraqi politics.
An ex-Ba'athist, Shi'ite, pro-Western secularist and
leader of the Iraqi National Accord during his exile,
Allawi now has at his disposal the machinery of
government, which permits him to make deals and utilize
state security forces. As the best that the US can hope
for, Allawi has the space to attempt to provide security
and form a winning coalition, with covert support from
the occupation.
Allawi, who has a reputation as
an authoritarian, has already instituted legislation
permitting the imposition of martial law and has begun
to use the security forces at his disposal to mount
raids on criminals and insurgents. Last Thursday he
announced the formation of a General Security
Directorate - a domestic intelligence agency with
policing functions - that will serve as a base of his
power if he is successful in building it up.
Having proved himself a successful politician by
playing on the interests of the members of the former
Iraqi Governing Council in preserving their power,
Allawi now has the opportunity to try to restore civil
order. If he is even moderately successful, he will
decisively gain the upper hand and will be poised to
become a figure like Hosni Mubarak in Egypt,
consolidating a political machine dependent on his
largess, with a security apparatus to protect it that
would have US aid and support in return for general
compliance with US policy. It is Allawi's distance from
communal politics and from Iraqi popular opinion that
makes him a possible strongman. He is beholden to
nothing but the deals he can make and the power that he
can deploy.
What makes Allawi's emergence as a
strongman problematic is the ineffectiveness of the
transitional government's security apparatus. He was
able to rush into the power vacuum created by the abrupt
handover of sovereignty by the occupation on June 28,
but he is now faced with having to work with only
limited US support. Allawi cannot identify himself too
closely with the United States, which in any case aims
to draw back from a proactive military role. He is left
with an embryonic security system and an array of
leaders of diverse groups - both within and outside the
transitional government - who have no strong bonds of
loyalty to him and who will collaborate with him only as
long as they perceive that their interests are being
served. Allawi has yet to build his machine and he has
an uphill battle ahead of him. Yet he is the only
current prospect for national leadership in Iraq.
The Shi'ites Making up 60% of Iraq's
population, the Shi'ite Arabs believe that they deserve
to play the dominant role in the Iraqi regime that
emerges after the transition. An oppressed majority by
Sunnis throughout Iraq's brief history, the Shi'ites are
now poised to achieve their place in the sun. They are
in a period of rising expectations that they will gain
power that they have never had before. They have been
generally compliant with the occupation and the
transition process, because they expect to gain
advantages for their community from it. If their
expectations are thwarted, they will become militant and
uncompromising, determined not to suffer a replay of the
aftermath of the first Gulf War of 1991, in which the
United States stood by while Saddam crushed their
rebellion, which the US had abetted.
Shi'ite
politics run the gamut of Islamism, from the moderate
stance of the Dawa Party to Muqtada al-Sadr's
confrontationalism. The failure of the occupation to
eliminate Muqtada, who had mobilized the poorest of the
Shi'ite community, from the political picture and the
willingness of moderate Shi'ites to bargain with him
indicates that the moderates are using him as a warning
of how the Shi'ite community as a whole will respond if
they are not the dominant force in a new Iraqi regime.
Shi'ite rule over a unified Iraqi state would
mean the dominance of one of Iraq's communities over the
others, repeating the familiar pattern of Iraqi politics
with a different group in charge, deploying its own
machine. Such a regime would face continuous resistance
from the other two communities, forcing a choice between
decentralization tending toward breakup, or the
imposition of a dictatorship with less flexibility than
the standard Middle Eastern bureaucratic and crony model
that Allawi would install.
Because of the
importance of religious leaders in the Shi'ite
community, a Shi'ite-dominated regime would have
theocratic tendencies, hindering compromise with the two
Sunni groups. Shi'ite ties to Iran, which sees itself as
a protector of Shi'ite interests in Iraq and a possible
dominant influence in the country's south, also would
contribute to resistance to Shi'ite rule.
Post-transition Iraq will almost certainly have Shi'ite
leadership, whether of secular or religious leanings.
That leadership will have to satisfy its constituency's
rising expectations of power, forcing conflict with the
other two communities.
The
Kurds Unlike the Shi'ites, who expect an improved
power position, the Kurds already have their place in
the sun and seek to defend and hold on to what they
have. Under the protection of the no-fly zone imposed by
the US after the first Gulf War, the Kurds achieved an
autonomy unparalleled in their modern history, creating
a mini-state controlled by their two nationalist
movements, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. They now face the prospect
of diminished power in a new Iraq and are determined to
keep what they have won.
With 20% of Iraq's
population, concentrated in the country's north, the
Kurds do not expect to dominate an Iraqi state. They
would prefer to have their own national state, but are
willing to settle for the autonomy they currently have,
which they perceive to be under attack. The failure of
the Kurds to occupy either of the two major offices in
the transitional government and the rejection of their
demand for veto power over provisions of the planned
constitution has placed them in a position of vigilant
defense.
That Kurdish interests must be reckoned
with is indicated by the fact that the transitional
government agreed not to apply its new security law in
Kurdish areas without the consent of local authorities.
Just as the Shi'ites are ready to become militant and
uncompromising if their aspirations are not fulfilled,
the Kurds are ready to resist if their autonomy is
threatened. Their nationalist movements are militarized
and disciplined after decades of guerrilla war, and
their bargain to share power will hold as long as the
Kurdish community perceives that it is under siege. The
Kurds have been more cooperative with the occupation
than any other community, but that is only because their
aims have been fulfilled so far. As attempts are made to
force compromises on them, the Kurds are likely to be
the community that resists national integration the
most. Kurdish nationalism has been beaten back by force
by Turkey and Iraq in the past. The same scenario is
likely in the new Iraq unless the divergence in Iraqi
society pulls toward a weak confederation.
The Sunni Arabs If the Shi'ites are
expansive and the Kurds are defensive, the Sunni Arabs
are seeking to win back what they have lost. The
dominant minority throughout Iraq's history, they are
now the weakest political force, divided between tribal
collaborators with the transitional government and
insurgent rejectionists. The appointment of Ghazi Mashal
Ajil al-Yawar to the presidency of the transitional
government indicates an attempt to placate Sunni Arabs
at the expense of the Kurds. Just as Saddam was
constrained to rule through tribal bargains in his last
years in power, the transitional government is trying to
do the same.
With 20% of Iraq's population,
Sunni Arabs have the advantage of disproportionate
representation in the professions and administrative
cadres necessary to run a modern state, but their
political organization is inferior to those of the other
communities. The formal destruction of the Ba'ath Party
has driven their potential leadership underground, which
has led to the insurgency. Whereas the Shi'ites and
Kurds are ready to fight if their demands are not met,
the Sunni Arabs are already fighting. The insurgents'
aim of regaining the power they once had is probably
doomed to failure, but their guerrilla war could force
concessions from a Shi'ite-dominated government, further
alienating the Kurds and frustrating the Shi'ite public.
The Sunni Arab collaborators with the
transitional government seek the best deals they can
make to secure their regional control. The insurgents
are attempting to destabilize Iraq to the point that
once the US withdraws there will be an opening for
restoration of a Sunni Arab ruling class. Which way the
Sunni Arabs will go depends on what the other
communities do - how much they are willing to concede.
Iraq is already in a state of limited civil war. The
insurgents would welcome its spread.
The
United States With Iraq's three communities on a
collision course and the only prospect for an effective
state a standard Middle Eastern dictatorship, the United
States has little choice but to play into the hands of
Allawi. He would promise to be an Iraqi Mubarak, which
would be acceptable to US interests.
Despite its
military commitment, its economic aid and its massive
diplomatic presence, the US has limited political
influence in the new Iraq. Any US moves that seem to
impose political solutions will impair the legitimacy of
the intended beneficiaries and will threaten to set off
resistance by those whom the policies would
disadvantage.
Those who believed that the
transition would be the occupation under another name
were mistaken. The future of Iraq is, indeed, falling
into the hands of Iraqis, and they are poised to create
forms of order and disorder that were never envisaged by
Pentagon planners.
Published with permission
of thePower and Interest News Report,
an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide
insight into various conflicts, regions and points of
interest around the globe. All comments should be
directed tocontent@pinr.com.
