Muslim troops no guarantee for
Iraq By Ehsan Ahrari
Saudi
Arabia's recent proposal for the commitment of Muslim
troops to Iraq is a classic demonstration of how
different actors are maneuvering on this issue for the
promotion of their respective vested interests. Even if
materialized, the proposal is not likely to bring about
the highly desired stability in that troubled country.
Saudi Arabia, through this proposal, is making a
desperate attempt to get back in the good grace of the
Bush administration, which still maintains that Riyadh
is not doing enough to reform its political system. As
the Saudi autocrats envisage the issue, reforming their
polity - even if it were to be earnestly carried out -
will not produce palpable change in the near future.
More to the point, the Saudi government has not yet
developed an inclination - much less a consensus - for
reform.
That cannot be done as long as King Fahd
bin Abdel Aziz is alive. The Sudairi brothers (ie, full
brothers of King Fahd, Abdullah is their half brother)
will not be pushed in the direction of major reforms
until Prince Abdullah bin Abdel Aziz becomes King
Abdullah. Even though Abdullah is the de facto ruler,
the faction led by Prince Sultan has not entirely given
up on its own prospects of power and influence. After
Fahd's demise, the Sultan faction would want to secure
its own niche before agreeing to a managed course of
reform. At this point, no one really knows how far
Abdullah is willing to go in the direction of reforms
once he becomes king.
One also has to bear in
mind the fact that the compact between the Wahhabi sect
and the Saudi dynasty has deeply rooted support in the
Saudi polity. The notion of Islamic puritanism is
considered quite sacred and beyond reproach inside the
kingdom. Only when viewed from the American perspectives
- since that perspective is so excessively focused on
the militant doctrine of jihad at the expense of all its
aspects - the Wahhabi compact becomes a lightning rod of
controversy and censure.
To make any reforms
acceptable to the Saudi populace, a less than moderate
version of those reforms has to be developed for now.
Such a version will not only cause considerable
controversy within Saudi society, but it will also
become a source of tension between Saudi rulers and
American proponents of reforms. Thus, even those Saudi
officials who are sympathetic to the subject of reforms
have to tread extremely carefully regarding their
continued acceptance and legitimacy on the part of the
conservative Saudi religious establishment. They must
not antagonize that establishment, or else they might be
swept aside. So, even under the era of King Abdullah,
the Saudi polity and royal family, when sorting out the
modalities of this compact, would keep most of it
essentially intact, instead of discarding it altogether,
as preferred by American officials.
In the
meantime, Saudi rulers have found another topic -
stability of Iraq - in the achievement of which they may
be able to play a role, not necessarily because of their
self-perception of leadership of the world of Islam, but
because of the power of their purse, and also win the
goodwill of the US. Of course, Saudi Arabia cannot
commit its own troops because of a precondition of the
Iraqi interim government that no troops from neighboring
states will be allowed for that role.
Consider
the countries that are mentioned as possible sources of
troops for Iraq: Pakistan, Morocco, Jordan, Malaysia,
Algeria and Bangladesh. Every one of those countries,
save Algeria, is acutely dollar deficit and,
consequently, a primary candidate for persuasion through
substantial financial aid and under the facade of
creating an Islamic force presence in Iraq. It should
also be noted that the issue of commitment of troops to
Iraq remains highly unpopular in all Muslim countries at
the street level. But autocratic rulers of those states
also operate on the basis of long-established habits of
conducting their daily business by carrying out policies
that are highly unmindful, indeed contemptuous, of
popular support.
Saudi rulers are hopeful that
their success in persuading (or buying the willingness
of) a number of Muslim countries would create ample
bipartisan goodwill in Washington. The issue of the
stability of Iraq has remained at the top of the
American electoral agenda. In this sense, it will also
be noticed by John Kerry, the Democratic presidential
nominee, who has been a harsh critic of Saudi Arabia for
what he perceives as its refusal to bring about internal
reforms. Riyadh might be hoping that the emergence of
that Arab state as a major supporter of Muslim force
presence in Iraq would also lower the element of
stridency from Kerry's anti-Saudi rhetoric.
The
US has cautiously welcomed the commitment of Muslim
troops. It had previously broached that idea, but was
spurned. This time, Washington hopes that it will fly
because it is coming from a leading Muslim country, and,
most important, will result in the creation of the
direly needed legitimacy to its own continued occupation
of Iraq. Secretary of State Colin Powell has already
discussed the Saudi proposal with Foreign Minister Saud
al-Faisal during his recent stopover in the oil kingdom.
A US State Department spokesman originally issued a
controversial statement that "any Muslim troops that go
to Iraq would serve as a supplement to the US-led
coalition", but later retracted it by saying that Muslim
troops could help "lower the demand" for coalition
forces.
Even though the jury is still out on the
specific conditions ("rules of engagement" in military
parlance) of commitment of Muslim forces in Iraq;
however, placing them under the command and control of
the occupation troops would be a symbolic exercise of
the worst kind. Even the Saudi government was careful in
underscoring that troops from Islamic countries might be
part of a UN-endorsed multinational force, as is also
insisted by Iraq.
President George W Bush,
mindful of the political payoffs for his reelection bid,
is expected to depict the Saudi proposal to the American
voters as a direct outcome of his administration's
extant exercise of multilateralism, especially if it
were to materialize right before the November elections.
The Iraqi interim government would very much
welcome the introduction of Muslim troops, as is
apparent in its fervent advocacy for it. Prime Minister
Iyad Allawi campaigned for it during his recent trip to
Saudi Arabia. He, like the US, hopes that his own
countrymen will envisage the presence of Muslim forces
as a symbolic approval of the new government within the
world of Islam.
However, if one is looking for a
general "Arab endorsement" of the Saudi proposal, it is
sorely lacking right now. Egypt has thus far given it a
cold shoulder. But there is hope that Egyptian support
might evolve as a result of back-channel Saudi
maneuvering. In the aftermath of the US invasion of
Iraq, and Washington's voluble insistence of democratic
reforms in the Middle East, Cairo and Riyadh are drawn
together in their collective spurning of externally
advocated political change, and in their concern over
the implications of continuing instability of Iraq for
their respective polities.
Libya has also
publicly opposed the Saudi proposal, but will not have
any objection if Muslim troops are committed as a result
of UN actions. Arab and Muslim public opinion, since it
remains generally opposed to the US presence in Iraq, is
also likely to oppose the Saudi proposal. Consequently,
all Muslim countries will adopt a wait-and-see attitude
before making their respective positions on the issue.
One also must think about the general reception
of the "spoilers" - the Islamists, jihadis and insurgent
forces - of Iraq. They are also watching, but have
already made their attitude amply clear by now. They
have stated that anyone - Muslim or Christian - who
enters Iraq in order to democratize or stabilize it,
will be kidnapped, beheaded, or blown up. The recent
beheading of two Pakistani contractors has made it clear
that being a Muslim means nothing in the eyes of Iraqi
Islamists, insurgents and terrorists. In this sense, the
potential introduction of Muslim troops is not likely to
lower the element of insurgency and instability in that
country.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an
Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic
analyst.
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