SPEAKING FREELY Evolution of the al-Qaeda
brand name By Jonathan Feiser with
comments by W Joseph Stroupe
Speaking
Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest
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The days when al-Qaeda
held the full and operational legitimacy - both in the
eyes of the global media and in its own right - of Sunni
extremism have now become a historical transition point.
However, there still remain lessons the United States
needs to relearn. In a Western sense, al-Qaeda operated
in a mode of granting only a limited sense of autonomy
to regional groups. In time, this line eventually became
one of friction resulting in the gradual retreat of
al-Qaeda's control mechanisms. In the present, these
various regional groups in and of themselves have became
both political as well as ideological extensions of the
core al-Qaeda group.
As witnessed in the present
tense, these regional groups struggled for their own
capstone of legitimacy to the point that their
"connection" to al-Qaeda became a very real liability
with regard to their own regional interests.
Additionally, the core leadership structure that was
al-Qaeda has now become geographically isolated in the
gray zone between Afghanistan and Pakistan's North West
Frontier Province. As a result, the inadvertent
emergence of decentralized leadership has now empowered
regional groups to initiate operations and visions that
remain hinged to al-Qaeda's novel ideological and
dialectical purists. The core blueprint that is pursued,
moreover, remains rooted in the political radicalism of
Sunni Islam - a variant of the religion that has become
poisoned by frustration, compromised interpretation, and
the quest for a manifested utopian vision lost to
history.
The radical political-Islamic nexus
observed today remains the product of philosophical
momentum passed on and enhanced by Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri
and Osama bin Laden. The transition from the pre-2001
shift that began as a centralized controlling mechanism
based on additional regional command structure has now
dissolved into the new model, one run locally by
regional bases of autonomous leadership. In this
context, the events of September 11, 2001, did not begin
this process of decentralization - they merely
accelerated it.
This new shift was manifested in
the attacks in Turkey and Spain. Both attacks were apart
of a broader-ranging and decentralized strategy.
However, such a reality is not evident on first glance.
These local nodes of leadership continue to act on the
ideological mandate that has characterized al-Qaeda's
goal orientation while at the same time emanating
indigenously based objectives. The misconception here is
allowing these footprints to appear as a linked and
deeply integrated plan of operations covering broad
geographical and political spans. Again, this conclusion
neglects a clear assessment of al-Qaeda's limitations as
a man-made organization that faces the same strains of
infighting, logistical failure and any number of
inherent weaknesses that exist within large-scale
coordinated efforts.
In this regard, the key
attribute of al-Qaeda's role at the moment and of the
future must rely on the illusive power of its
manufactured symbolism. This characteristic rests on the
empowerment gained from its Islamic message and the
emotional appeal to universal brotherhood via the
external process of jihad that rests on the success of a
powerful propaganda campaign. These elements are
essential to maintaining any true impression of
al-Qaeda's global power, both real and perceived.
Another example of al-Qaeda's transition exists
within the current jihad in Iraq. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
has demonstrated a break from the traditional fold by
initiating his own salvos of coordinated attacks against
coalition forces and, apparently, Iraqis alike. Although
abiding by the spirit of the original al-Qaeda mandate,
al-Zarqawi more realistically symbolizes a break from
the operational command structure that was once bin
Laden's al-Qaeda. The controversial political nature of
al-Zarqawi's alleged association with the former Iraqi
president Saddam Hussein's intelligence and security
services is not the issue here, but the fact that
al-Zarqawi openly operates with non-Sunnis and
non-Muslims is something that the devout intolerance of
bin Laden would never have stood for.
The
post-September 11 al-Qaeda has become a watermark that
is inevitably destined to be transcended. Outside of its
military implications, the codification of the "war on
terror" as an official policy of the United States
sought to undermine the intent, creation and ideological
make-up of al-Qaeda by politicizing the nature of the
group. Legitimized by President George W Bush's
administration's declaration of war, al-Qaeda has now
become a global phantom, plagued by its own reputation
and in need of solid ground. Indeed, the post-September
11 security environment finds al-Qaeda lacking not only
a physical safe haven as it had in Afghanistan, but also
the critical manpower and expertise that it had in the
moments prior to September 11.
This, by any
means, is not the end of al-Qaeda, however. The ultimate
power in such groups is not necessarily the leadership,
but always the cause that defines the legitimacy of the
group and the leadership that guides it. Bin Laden's
existence, perhaps as it always has been, is largely
political and symbolic - but will nevertheless remain a
powerful source of his straining influence on various
members of the global umma. Thus the "war on
terror", although controversial in many minds, has
undermined both the conventional and unconventional
abilities of al-Qaeda and its global entities. Divine
analogies need not apply to the legitimacy of bin Laden,
however, whatever his fate. Any glance through the
editorials of Arabic newspapers reveals the
controversial nature and prolific insincerity of the man
when compared to the likes of the Prophet Mohammed.
In sum, the power of the al-Qaeda cause, once
inherited and customarily altered from the Muslim
Brotherhood, has remained close to the political spirit
of many radical variations of Islam. The twist here is
that the elimination of the "physical" al-Qaeda nexus
and the resulting decentralization of its regional
elements into like-minded, local leadership groups may
ultimately prove more of stratagem advantage versus US
policy than a vulnerability.
Observations and
comments by W Joseph Stroupe Jonathan Feiser very
capably makes the point that "al-Qaeda" has become, in
effect, a trademark or a brand name, one that can be, so
to speak, stamped upon the front of mostly autonomous
regional terrorist movements that are indigenous - that
is, not necessarily imported literally from the ranks of
bin Laden's intimate followers or founded directly by
him or under his explicit instructions and guidelines.
Feiser points out that this "al-Qaeda" trademark
carries with it the considerable "illusive power of its
manufactured symbolism", notably by virtue of its
"ideological mandate", the "spirit of the original
al-Qaeda mandate", the "cause which defines the
legitimacy of the group". Consequently, widely
distributed terrorist movements draw on the power and
legitimacy of the trademark, while mostly retaining
their own autonomy and preferred characteristics,
organizational structure and regional goals. And as
Feiser points out, the "war on terrorism" as conducted
and codified by the Bush administration has
inadvertently and pointedly tended to legitimize the
trademark, attributing to it almost superhuman
abilities, reach and powers.
For example, when
Bush warns very emphatically, as he did recently, that
the "US is a nation in danger", he legitimizes or
validates the illusive, almost superhuman power of the
"al-Qaeda" trademark, a statement that portrays the
immensely strong United States as being in some
considerable measure of jeopardy. In effect, then,
"al-Qaeda" is now much less the physical
instrumentality, and much more the ethereal ideological
instrumentality, perhaps immune to corporal warfare
directed against it, and legitimizing the struggle
against "evil" and for a "righteous" new order.
The "al-Qaeda" trademark provides powerful
inspiration, while at the same time facilitating
dangerous autonomy and widely varied operational and
structural characteristics of regional terrorist
movements. Like a potent disease, it has morphed and
widely proliferated into something far more difficult,
if not impossible, to destroy, because there now exists
no corporal centralized command structure to attack.
Physical attacks against it have become much more
difficult, therefore. And the ideological attacks and
measures required to discredit, de-legitimize and
dissolve the trademark have barely been mounted.
Jonathan Feiser is a US Air Force
intelligence officer who works primarily with psy-ops
and Central Asia, and who is also heavily involved in
research and analysis on the subjects of al-Qaeda and
radical and political Islam, as seen both through, and
outside of, the eyes of the West. W Joseph
Stroupe is editor in chief ofGeoStrategyMap.com,
an online geopolitical magazine specializing in
strategic analysis and forecasting. He may be reached by
e-mail at editor_in_chief@geostrategymap.com.
(Copyright 2004 GeoStrategyMap.com and W Joseph
Stroupe. All rights reserved.)
Speaking
Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest
writers to have their say. Pleaseclick
hereif you are interested in
contributing.
