Iraqi conference widens political
divide By Michael A Weinstein
The Iraqi National Conference, which concluded
last week, was meant to bestow legitimacy on the
transitional regime by providing broader representation
in state institutions and a check on the power of the
executive. It did not achieve its objectives and has,
instead, widened and deepened the crazy quilt of
political fractures in Iraqi society, sharpening
divisions, increasing the probability of intensified
conflict and drawing the country closer to the stark
alternatives of Middle Eastern-style dictatorship and
separation into mini-states.
The major business
of the conference was the election of an Interim
National Council with 100 members, 19 of whom had been
pre-selected from members of the governing council that
had been set up by the occupation's Coalition
Provisional Authority and who had been excluded from the
transitional government. To enhance the legitimacy of
the transitional government, the conference would have
had to elect a council representative of Iraq's
political forces, especially those outside the exile
parties that have thus far controlled the transition.
Those outside forces are divided into Sunni and Shi'ite
Arab rejectionists who oppose and will not participate
in the transitional institutions, and smaller parties,
civil-society groups, ethnic and religious minorities,
tribal leaders and independents that seek a greater role
in the transition.
That the conference would not
be fully or even significantly representative was
assured by the refusal of the rejectionists - most
notably, Muqtada al-Sadr's Shi'ite movement and the
Sunni Muslim Scholars Association - to participate. At
most, the conference could make a place for the many
groups in Iraqi society that desire to participate in a
peaceful transition to general elections. Their
inclusion would have signaled that interim Prime
Minister Iyad Allawi's regime was serious about
democratization, enhancing the legitimacy of the
transitional government in the sectors of Iraqi society
that are still opposed to the rejectionists, but are
skeptical about the occupation and suspect Allawi of
being beholden to US interests.
Rather than
moving toward inclusion, the parties that have
controlled the transition opted to shape the council in
their image, creating a body that will work in tandem
with the Allawi regime rather than holding it
accountable. Their choice consolidates their power in
the short run, but has alienated the forces that have
desired to play a part in the transition and has
increased the likelihood that the sectors of Iraqi
society that are skeptical of the transitional regime
will be driven in the direction of rejectionism.
In retrospect, the conference was a bid for
power by the Allawi regime and its coalition of factions
that took place on two fronts. Outside the meeting, held
in the heavily fortified Green Zone, Allawi and his US
backers initiated military action in Najaf, where
Muqtada's Mehdi Army had set up positions in the Imam
Ali Mosque - Shi'ite Islam's most sacred site. The aim
of the operation was to crush the core of the Shi'ite
insurgency against the transitional government, while
the conference was going on. Inside the meeting,
Allawi's coalition moved to override the opposition to
its list of candidates for the council. The transitional
government's two-pronged attack to eliminate both
military and peaceful opposition has had problematic
results that indicate the lack of even the most tenuous
consensus in Iraqi society on the country's political
future.
Najaf From its outset, the
conference was overshadowed in the world news cycles by
the confrontation in Najaf between the transitional
government, spearheaded by US military forces, and the
Mehdi Army. The decision to bring coercive pressure to
bear on Muqtada's movement in order to drive the Mehdi
Army out of the Imam Ali Mosque and disarm it came on
the first day of the conference when the government
broke off negotiations with Muqtada that were aimed at
ending the rebellion that he initiated on August 4 and
bringing his movement into the transitional process.
The government claimed that it had withdrawn
from the talks because they were not yielding progress,
whereas Muqtada said a deal was close to being reached,
with only some details left to be ironed out. Whichever
side was correct, it is clear that the government did
not have to break off the talks abruptly and could have
waited until the conference concluded.
Several
factors have been reported that entered into the
decision to substitute confrontation for negotiation.
The United States was pressing Allawi to adopt a
military solution and dispose of Shi'ite rejectionism,
which, in an insurgent phase, was exposing US-led
coalition forces to deadly attacks and was threatening
the transition itself. The two most powerful members of
the US Senate's Foreign Relations Committee - Republican
Richard Lugar and Democrat Joseph Biden - had publicly
urged Allawi to suppress the Mehdi Army, indicating a
bipartisan consensus on a coercive strategy. Allawi was
also determined for his own interest to suppress the
most serious threat to his regime - any legitimacy that
he might hope to achieve depends upon his providing at
least a semblance of order to Iraq. Finally, Allawi and
his coalition of exile parties might not have wanted a
spotlight on a conference that they were determined to
control.
When the conference convened, its
working program of discussions aimed at achieving a
broadly representative consensus list of candidates for
the council was immediately scrapped and the proceedings
were diverted to the Najaf crisis. Despite pleas by the
conference's organizers, representing the parties
forming the transitional government, to stay with the
program, the Shi'ite Political Council, which had helped
calm an earlier rebellion by the Mehdi Army, threatened
to walk out of the conference unless negotiations with
Muqtada were restarted and military action against the
Mehdi Army was suspended. The organizers acceded,
because of the negative effects that a walkout would
have had on the conference's legitimacy and the
sentiment among many delegates that the conference would
be a travesty if it were held in the context of civil
war.
Whether or not the conference organizers
were sincere in their initial insistence that the
conference proceed with its scheduled work, the
diversion of the proceedings to the Najaf crisis stopped
any attempt at consensus-building on the composition of
the council in its tracks. The second day of the
conference was taken up with debates over how it could
play a role in defusing the confrontation. Anti-regime
tendencies wanted the conference to insist that Allawi
withdraw military forces and enter negotiations with
Muqtada, pro-regime delegates backed Allawi's hard line,
and moderates urged that the conference intervene
directly and send a mission to Najaf to persuade Muqtada
to stand down.
The moderates won, providing a
brief possibility that the conference could pave the way
for an autonomous legislative body that would act
independently of the transitional executive. The final
plan, however, was to present Muqtada with a
non-negotiable proposal for his forces to leave the
mosque and disarm, in return for safe conduct and the
opportunity to form a peaceful political movement.
Although the proposal fell short of Allawi's maximum
aims, he accepted it.
The conference's third
day, which was supposed to be devoted to electing the
council, was instead taken up with the fate of a
delegation of eight conference members who were to
present the proposal to Muqtada in Najaf. Muqtada
refused to meet with them, citing security concerns
stemming from fighting in the neighborhood of the
mosque, but his representatives were encouraging to the
council delegation.
By the time the delegation's
mission was concluded, it was too late to elect
delegates and the conference was extended for another
day.
On the conference's fourth day, Muqtada
accepted the proposal to stand down, but it was not
clear that the crisis had been resolved, since he
quickly announced conditions, including the withdrawal
of US forces from Najaf and a guarantee that the mosque
would be placed under the control of Shi'ite clerics.
The next day Muqtada adopted a confrontational stance
and the situation returned to what it had been before
the conference's attempt at a peaceful solution, with
the government threatening to take the mosque by force
and Muqtada vowing that he would resist and, if
necessary, take the path of martyrdom. The conference
had failed to play a constructive role in resolving the
Najaf crisis.
Choosing the
council With the attention of the conference
focused on Najaf for its first three days, there was no
time for the intensive process of consensus-building
that had been envisaged by its US architects in the
Coalition Provisional Authority and that was necessary
to achieve its legitimacy and the legitimacy of the
council that it would elect. The way was open for the
forces in the transitional government to craft the
council in its image.
Even before the conference
convened, its legitimacy had been severely questioned.
Its opening had been delayed for two weeks by the United
Nations, which objected to its lack of inclusiveness and
sought to broaden representation of groups outside the
transitional government. In the days before the
conference met, there were still persistent claims by
small parties, civil-society groups and tribes that the
process for selecting delegates was not transparent and
was controlled by the parties in the regime coalition.
Nonetheless, of the 1,300 delegates finally chosen,
between one-third and one-half were not affiliated with
the regime.
The major divide in the conference
was between pro-regime forces who desired a council
controlled by them that would cooperate with the
transitional government, and non-regime tendencies that
pushed for a council that would function as an
independent parliament that would serve as an overseer
and a check on the transitional executive.
The
conflict played out as a procedural struggle over how
the council would be elected. Originally, there were to
have been broad discussions among the delegates that
would result in a single list of candidates and would be
voted in by a two-thirds majority. As the possibility
for consensus-building vanished because of the Najaf
distraction, the non-regime tendencies argued for open
voting by the entire conference on prospective
candidates, in order to avoid a list imposed on them by
the pro-regime elements whom they suspected of having
pre-selected candidates before the conference began. A
compromise was reached on the third day that a list
dominated by the regime partners would be contested by a
slate drawn up by the non-regime tendencies, and that
the list gaining a simple majority would compose the
council. The compromise was effected only after 450
delegates threatened to walk out unless there would be
competing lists.
The non-regime forces succeeded
in making up a list, despite time constraints, lack of
organizational experience and diverse interests, but
then abruptly withdrew it. One of the leading non-regime
figures at the conference - Aziz al-Yasseri, head of the
Iraqi Democratic Movement - explained that the
non-regime list was withdrawn to deprive the pro-regime
list of legitimacy. The non-regime bloc had concluded
that the conference had been too stacked by parties
allied to the regime to allow for broader
representation. As a result, 300 delegates are reported
to have withdrawn from the conference, at which point
the conference organizers quickly declared the
pro-regime list the winner without taking a vote,
prompting widespread expressions of dissent and
dissatisfaction, and a walkout by the Shi'ite delegation
from Basra. The pro-regime elements had engineered a
formal victory, at the cost of their legitimacy.
Conclusion The course of the Iraqi
National Conference symbolizes the present state of
Iraqi politics, which is becoming increasingly a polar
struggle between the transitional government and the
rejectionists. The conference had provided the
possibility for broader representation and with it
increased legitimacy for the transitional institutions,
but the regime and its allies chose to keep those
institutions in their own hands with the apparent
backing of the US. As a result, Allawi will work with a
compliant council and can be expected to continue with
his policy of confrontation with the rejectionists who
will persist in their intransigence. Allawi will attempt
to consolidate his power in state institutions, driving
the US to depend on him as its only recourse and
encouraging a drift toward a dictatorship threatened
increasingly by separatism.
Rather than
enhancing the legitimacy of transitional institutions,
the conference diminished it. Sectors of Iraqi society
that support neither the regime nor the Sunni and
Shi'ite Arab insurgencies have been cut out of their
only chance to pursue their interests peacefully and
institutionally. Their confidence in the planned open
elections has been compromised. Excluded from the
transitional process, they will be increasingly
alienated from the regime, less willing to support it
against its militant foes and more likely to place
themselves with separatist tendencies.
Published with permission of thePower and
Interest News Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
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