COMMENTARY
Muqtada fighting a
losing cause By Jonathan Feiser
Regardless of the recent political overtures
offered by Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mehdi Army, the
leader appears willing to continue his course of violent
struggle against US-led coalition forces. It is through
this struggle that Muqtada claims to see the protection
and freedom of the Iraqi people. Clearly, the removal of
Muqtada from the Imam Ali Shrine by any hostile powers
of authority - whether it be the Iraqi interim government
or, especially, the United States - is out of the
question.
In the latest development,
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's leading Shi'ite
cleric, was on his way by auto from Basra
in the south to Najaf to try
to end three weeks of fighting in the city between Muqtada's militia and
US-led troops. Basra lies 400 kilometers south of Najaf. Sistani intended
to present a plan to end the fighting
in terms of which the spiritual leader wants
non-Iraqi soldiers to leave Najaf, Iraqi police to take over security and
the Iraqi government to pay compensation to
people who have been affected by the fighting. By mid-morning
on Thursday, Sistani's convoy had progressed about 100km and
was traveling slowly because of large crowds along
the route. A 24-hour ceasefire was to be declared
once Sistani arrived at Najaf. He was expected late
Thursday.
Nevertheless, there should be a
legitimate concern over the consequences Muqtada may
have - and indeed thus far has inflicted - on the
Shi'ites of Iraq. At present, many Shi'ites, while
disappointed with Muqtada for his garrisoning of the
Imam Ali Shrine, do support his position and feel that
the cleric has yet to be given the legitimate
opportunity to join the political government of Iraq.
That being said, there is a question concerning the
forces that are currently working within the Shi'ite
political arena. Thus far, other Shi'ite political
groups have bided their time with the intention of
possibly allowing Muqtada to undermine his own position
of legitimacy and trust within the minds of Iraqi
Shi'ites.
Three primary Shi'ite groups make
up the ideological political landscape of
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The first group is the Hizb
al-Dawa. Historically, this party held and continues to hold
the highest confidence and legitimacy among Iraqi
Shi'ites. Al-Dawa was founded in 1958 by Muqtada's father,
the late Ayatollah Baqr al-Sadr - executed in 1980 by
Saddam - with an original mandate of countering
secularization in government. Today, the party makes up a collage
of factions with differing agendas and questionable
allegiances - many that, in one form or another,
transcend the borders of Iraq.
Regardless of the
outcome at the Imam Ali Mosque, ruling factions of Dawa
will retain their political influence in the development
of the Iraqi state. However, the group will continue to
be plagued by its internal divisions and its sources of
loyalty.
The last
two groups are Muqtada's Mehdi Army and the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI). Since
the fall of Saddam's Ba'athist regime, the two have
maintained an uneasy relationship, which in the past year has reverted
into a series of serious accusations and
violent exchanges. Last year, the SCIRI blamed Muqtada for the
murder of the formerly exiled ayatollah Baqr
al-Hakim, an allegation that was followed by numerous
attempts on Muqtada's life in December. Nevertheless, at
least temporarily, the old Middle Eastern maxim that
"the enemy of my enemy is my friend" found relevance in
the relationship between these two Shi'ite groups in
their efforts to counterbalance the influence of US-led
coalition forces.
But a closer look reveals that this
suggestion may be critically flawed. The SCIRI possesses
a political platform that reveals a vested interest in
the functionality of the interim government that may
lead to some form of stable government for Iraq. In the
meantime, Muqtada has yet to manifest any form of a
long-term political message, much less any realistic
vision short of the struggle he continues to fight
today. Thus while Muqtada seeks to utilize this armed
struggle using the notion of an Islamic revolution as
the surrogate for progress, the SCIRI, despite its
controversial Iranian relations, may yet reap political
benefits.
Like Macedonia and Kashmir, most
Iraqis in general and Iraqi Shi'ites in particular have
no desire for a neighboring power to represent or
dictate their native interests. The poisoning effect of
foreign influence has not faded with the dusk of
colonial empires; indeed, it has flourished in the
contemporary status quo of global geopolitics. Evident
in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the use of proxies by
foreign entities has sown local rivalry by not only
exporting foreign agendas, but also fusing the causes of
local groups into ever-expanding international
rivalries. It is important to note that in Iraq, none of
the three Shi'ite groups mentioned here are innocent of
this association.
On the other hand, one
particular dangerous - and increasingly realistic -
scenario that threatens Iraqi sovereignty may not reside
in the success and eventual "politicalization" of
Muqtada, but instead in his failure. On Muqtada's
failure, the group that would likely be in the position
to be perceived as a likely alternative to his power
faction is the SCIRI and its power arm, the al-Badr
Corps.
The al-Badr Corps answers directly
to the SCIRI and is charged with the establishment of
support cells and operations networks throughout Iraq. The
primary mission of the al-Badr Corps remains to
facilitate the SCIRI political blueprint through
subversion, intelligence gathering and establishing
local support. These unconventional forces possess the
linguistic, tribal, familial, and political connections
to Iraq and have capitalized on these advantages now and
before the US invaded the country. Indeed, this group's
ranks remain predominantly composed of ethnic Iraqis who
fled during the era of Saddam.
In addition,
political intrigue remains at the center of predicting
where the friction between Muqtada and the SCIRI will
develop. Since before the invasion of Iraq, the theme of
polarization for Iraq's Shi'ites was centered in the
struggle for legitimacy between the SCIRI and the Mehdi
Army. In this context, it has always been Muqtada who
has held the cards. But despite this and other
advantages, he continues to marginalize his long-term
influence - the very influence that would be a
tremendous asset in the growing pains to come.
In the early 20th century, British Field
Marshall Horatio Herbert Kitchener became convinced that
his strategy against the Ottoman Empire was hinged to an
Arab rebellion that would ultimately lead to the
possession of the Islamic caliphate. To Kitchener, the
caliphate was one-dimensional and whoever controlled it
controlled Islam. Like Muqtada's, Kitchener's conclusions
were incorrect because they were based on his limited
perception of a world he only thought he could
comprehend. As a result, Lord Kitchener's strategic goal
of overthrowing the Ottoman Empire - which he ardently
believed was under the influence of Zionists - never
materialized because of the lack of popular support for
the contending forces of the Allied-backed Shariff
Hussein.
In this same approach, Muqtada may have
made the same fateful error. His analysis of current
events remains stridently confined, and thus
increasingly limited, by the present struggle. It is in
this context that although Muqtada's appeals to the
current military struggle still contribute to his own
legitimacy, these same appeals also inevitably box him
in over the long run. In sum, it is where these two
themes meet that Muqtada has succeeded as a transitional
figure, but failed as a post-occupation leader.
It is also in this moment that groups like the
SCIRI, reacting to their own political instincts, would
likely move to secure the shift of power and confidence
in the vacuum left behind. As a result, what began in
Iraq as a war against neo-colonialism with clearly drawn
lines has evolved into a revolt based on an acceleration
of the "Afghanistan model" where resistance initiated in
response to a foreign occupation has now begun to
collapse violently inward, with old divisions becoming
new.
Sistani's mission Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty reports that Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani's return to Iraq on Wednesday is described by
his aides as a last-minute bid to spare Najaf and the
Imam Ali Shrine from a final assault by US-led forces.
Sistani had been in London undergoing medical
treatment for almost three weeks, during which time
Najaf has become the center of clashes between US-led
forces and fighters loyal to Muqtada. The Iraqi
government is threatening a final showdown with
Muqtada's fighters, many of whom are holed up in the
shrine.
Sistani's return comes as Iraqi
government forces backed by US soldiers, tanks and air
power tighten their grip around the shrine and the
militia holed up inside.
The moderate Sistani,
often described as Iraq's most influential Shi'ite
cleric, crossed into Iraq overland from Kuwait in a
caravan accompanied by Iraqi security forces. Aides to
the bearded, 73-year-old cleric say he is headed to
Najaf and has called on Shi'ites from across Iraq to
march on the "burning city" in a bid to spare it from
destruction.
Sistani's departure for England
coincided with the rebellion by fighters loyal to
Muqtada, who is challenging the leadership of the Najaf
clergy headed by Sistani. Reports say Sistani's dramatic
return may in fact be a bid to regain political ground
lost during the uprising to Muqtada, who has depicted
himself as the face of anti-US resistance.
Factbox: The holy city of
Najaf Where is Najaf? Najaf lies
165 kilometers south of Baghdad in Iraq's central plains
on the western bank of the Euphrates River. It is the
capital of the Najaf governorate. It was founded in the
Western calendar's 791. Before becoming a battleground
in 2004 for US-led forces and the Mehdi Army, it was
home to an estimated 900,000 people. Najaf, Karbala and
Kufa are Iraq's main Shi'ite holy cities.
Why is Najaf a holy city?
It is the site of the tomb of Ali, the first imam
of the Shi'ites. It is also the locale of the
Wadi-us-Salaam, or Valley of Peace, the world's largest
Islamic cemetery and one of the largest cemeteries overall.
Thousands of prominent Shi'ite Muslim figures are buried
there. For 1,000 years it has been a destination
for Shi'ite pilgrims, second in importance only to Mecca
and Medina in Saudi Arabia, holy destinations revered
by all Muslims. Many Shi'ites also make special
pilgrimages to lay their dead there.
The
ancient prophet Abraham - recognized alike by
Muslims, Christians and Jews - is said to have visited the
place. There's a legend that one of Noah's sons refused
to enter the Ark and took refuge instead on a mountaintop
there. The mountain is said to have crumbled and the son
to have drowned in the flood. For two centuries before
Saddam's rule, Najaf was also an Islamic center for
scientific and theological studies.
Who
was Imam Ali? He was Ali Ibn Abi Talib, cousin
and son-in-law to the Prophet Mohammed. When Mohammed
died in the Western calendar's 632, a schism developed
in Islam. Islamic scholars named Mohammed's friend and
follower Abu Bakr as his successor. But others insisted
that Mohammed had said in a sermon that the successor
should be Imam Ali. Imam Ali did become the fourth
caliph of Islam. A militant sect assassinated him after
a brief reign.
Today's 150 million Shi'ites are
the followers of Imam Ali. Worldwide, Shi'ites make up a
relatively small minority of Muslim believers, the vast
majority of whom are Sunni. But in Iran and Iraq,
Shi'ite Muslims are in the majority.
What's special about Imam Ali
Shrine? First of all, its symbolism. It stands
as Imam Ali's tomb. It is a beautiful structure with a
large central dome constructed of 7,777 gold panels. The
dome tops an ornate square structure with two minarets.
It is of shining gold color on the outside and inlaid
with blue, white, gold and red-rust mosaic within.
Despite vandalism, invasion and thefts over the years,
it is a repository of many treasures left there as
offerings by pilgrims over the years.
Jonathan Feiser's report is published
with permission of thePower and
Interest News Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
globe. All comments should be directed tocontent@pinr.com
.
