The
deal struck between the old guard, Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani, and the young guard, Muqtada al-Sadr, on
Thursday over the custodianship of the Imam Ali Shrine
is also a continuation of the struggle for the future of
Iraq.
The old
guard is unwittingly giving the US occupation a little
space to maneuver, with an understanding that the young
guard will not be harmed. Muqtada has apparently agreed
to hand over the custodianship of the shrine with a more
than tacit understanding that he will be allowed to
participate in the Iraqi elections down the road. A
five-point plan calls for foreign troops to leave the
city and
for the
Iraqi government to compensate victims of the unrest.
What the US may not have realized is that the real
struggle about the future of Iraq has just entered
another phase.
Through Muqtada, Iran is emerging
as a potent power in the political maneuvering with the
US over whether Iraq will become some sort of a secular
or semi-secular democracy, or an Islamic democracy.
Through this, the chances of Iran's preference for the
emergence of an Islam-based Iraqi government seem to
have perceptibly improved.
The shock and awe
aspects of the Bush doctrine in Iraq suffered a serious
setback because of the deteriorating security situation,
but US aspirations to transform the shape of the
political map of Iraq and the larger Middle East remain
undeterred. That is one reason why Washington made a
very crucial tactical shift from an overall preference
for unilateralism to selective application of
multilateralism in Iraq, and allowed the United Nations
to play a limited role in the formation of the interim
government. However, a potent competition between the US
and Iran is currently taking place, not only to maintain
control over the shape of events in Iraq, but also to
determine whether the future elected government there
will have a heavy presence and influence of the Islamic
or secular elements.
The Bush administration
invaded Iraq with a whole slew of shifting strategies
and rationales. Ultimately, it settled on the grounds of
implanting democracy in that country, and then using
that as a "shining" example for the rest of the Middle
East. Another explanation was that the road to
settlement of the Palestine Liberation
Organization-Israeli conflict passed through Baghdad.
Once Saddam Hussein was toppled, argued President George
W Bush and his national security officials, violence and
suicide acts in the occupied Palestine were going to
subside. Iran affected all these rationales one way or
another, albeit in some instances, its influence was
somewhat indirect.
Even the US outlook of
implantation of democracy in Iraq went through several
versions. First, there was the Pentagon's version of it,
whereby the coronation of exile Ahmad Chalabi was to
take place as president, right after the cessation of
hostilities. Since Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz - the official part of the
Pentagon - and Richard Perle (aka "Prince of Darkness")
- the unofficial player, who then served as chairman of
the powerful Defense Advisory Board that counsels the
Pentagon on defense matters - got most of their
first-hand knowledge and a substantial part of their
intelligence on Iraq from Chalabi, they bought
lock-stock-and-barrel his description of the outcome of
the US invasion. According to that portrayal, the
invasion of Iraq would be a cakewalk, that the Iraqi
troops would lay down their arms and would not fight,
and that the American troops would be given a welcome
reception of sweets and rosewater.
But when the
US invasion was met with stiff resistance - whose
intensity kept only escalating with the passage of time
- other haphazard measures were introduced. The option
of implanting Chalabi was quickly abandoned, and
discussions of secular democracy and elections surfaced
within the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) of
Iraq. Then the Iraqi Governing Council was packed with
expatriate Iraqis, with the clear intention of using
them as leading proponents for secular democracy for
their country. Finally, a sort of "exit strategy" was
settled on in Washington, whereby a handpicked interim
Iraqi government was to take charge leading up to
general elections in early 2005. Throughout that course,
the American purpose was implantation of a secular
democracy, one of whose raison detre was to allow
the presence of US forces for an unlimited period. Iraq,
under this vision, was to emerge ultimately as a
friendly state, even legitimizing the current regional
dominance of Israel. Considering that Iraq was a major
Arab state, such a cowing of post-Saddam Iraq was to be
envisioned as an unstated, but a capstone, achievement
of the Bush administration.
Iran, the Iraqi
Shi'ite clergy and the Shi'ite populace had entirely
different agendas. The Iraqi Shi'ites were in favor of
having a democratic setup, since such an arrangement
promised to give them an unprecedented opportunity of
becoming a dominant ruling group, as they are the
dominant group, ahead of Sunni Muslims. However, their
own perspectives of democracy were marked by a lack of
clarity from the very beginning. They did not seem to
know whether they preferred a secular democracy or a
government based on Islam. Second, and more important,
the reason for their bewilderment on the issue is that
even the Shi'ite clerics are led by proponents of two
schools of thought: the Islamists and the quietists.
The Islamist groups - now led by Muqtada - want
an Iran-style Islamic government in Iraq. Whether it
would be another vilayat-e-faqih (rule of the
learned cleric) a la Iran, or a pale resemblance of it,
is not quite clear. But this perspective is very much
present, and is likely to become a visible player during
the elections of 2005. The chief weakness of this school
in today's Iraq is that it is led by a young cleric,
Muqtada, who doesn't carry impeccable religious
credentials (compared to Sistani), but makes up for it
many times over in charisma. Considering that
charismatic leaders in the Middle East - indeed in the
Muslim politics at large - usually carry a larger sway
than sedate moderates, no one should rule out a major
voice for the Muqtada brand of religiously alluring
leaders in the post-Saddam Iraq.
The quietist
school - which advocates keeping politics and religion
separate - is led by Sistani, an ardent promoter of
Islam-based democracy in Iraq. In his vision, Iraq is to
be governed by a Shi'ite-dominated democracy, where
moderate Islam will play an important role. It was
Sistani's insistence on holding elections in the near
future, and his deeply rooted suspicion of the former
CPA, that forced the Bush administration to abandon its
obsession with unilateralism in Iraq, and allow the
participation of the UN. The participation of the world
body also initiated a highly desirable phase of
multilateralism governing the US presence in Iraq. The
continued insurgency and terrorism inside that country
also played a vital role in forcing the US's hand in
that direction.
Sistani's prestigious and
powerful presence has ensured that elections will be
held in Iraq within the next six months. At the same
time, he serves as an equally potent source of the
participation of Islamic candidates in the Iraqi
elections.
Iran's role in the Shi'ite side of
the power equation in Iraq is extremely calculating and
multidimensional. Iran has strong theological ties with
Iraq; it served as an important source of anti-regime
protest even during the heyday of Saddam's rule; and
continues to play a similar role regarding the presence
of US forces in its neighboring state. Iran's influence
on Iraq's underground economy has remained substantial.
As such, it is expected to influence the future course
of that country's politics. One can be assured that Iran
will - to the chagrin of the US - handpick many
candidates in the forthcoming Iraqi elections.
It should be pointed out, however, that the
chief obstacle that Iran faces in Iraq is the
uncertainty of Iraq's Shi'ites about the future course
of their democratically elected government: whether it
should be modeled after the Islamic Republic of Iran or
a moderate Islamic democracy, with a limited role for
the clergy? The chief reason for this uncertainty is
that the Iraqi Shi'ites are not at all impressed with
the ostensibly sustained inertia inside Iran as a result
of the enduring struggle between the hardliners (led by
the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) and the
pragmatists (led by President Mohammad Khatami). In all
probability, the Iraqi Shi'ites don't want to implant
that inertia in their own polity by adopting the Iranian
model. Sistani will play a crucial role in resolving the
dilemma of the Iraqi Shi'ites, by promoting a sui
generis Iraqi democracy based on moderate Islam.
Regardless of the outcome, Iran's influence on Iraqi
politics is not likely to dissipate in its neighboring
state. This reality continues to frustrate the Bush
administration.
Muqtada envisions an Islamic
Iraq, with no influence or presence of the US. Sistani
would prefer a moderate Islamic democracy dominated by
Shi'ites. He has no use for the US either, once Iraq
becomes a Shi'ite-dominated Islamic democracy. Actually,
these two visions may not be that much apart, if they
are not to get entangled in the personality differences
between these two individuals.
However, from
Muqtada's side, it is well nigh impossible to minimize
the element of personal aspirations. Muqtada is very
much interested in seeing the creation of some sort of
vilayat-e-faqih. In principle, such a concept
emphasizes the exercise of power by a high-powered
ayatollah, like Sistani. In reality, since Sistani
belongs to the quietist school, he is not interested in
such a role, as was adopted by the late Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamic Revolution in
Iran in 1979. Muqtada, on the contrary, despite his
lesser religious credentials, definitely aspires to such
a role. In the past three months or so his popularity
among poor Shi'ites and even among hardline
anti-American Sunni Iraqis has gone way up. Whether or
not he can translate that popularity into votes will be
determined during the next elections.
If Iraq
were to become an Islam-based democracy, Washington
would envision it as a setback for its own larger vision
of democracy in the Middle East. If Bush were to be
reelected, the tug-and-pull between the US and Iran over
the future political course of Iraq would only
intensify. Iran will play its hand to the hilt; that
includes exploiting its theological connections, and
utilizing its economic power in order to make its
presence felt in Iraq.
At least for now, Iran
does not seem to be overly apprehensive about America's
larger designs to democratize the Middle East,
especially if there is a second Bush administration.
Bush has created so much ill will through his invasion
of Iraq and through his perceptibly overly one-sided
policies on the PLO-Israeli conflict that his
credibility in the Middle East - indeed, in the entire
world of Islam - will not be reestablished any time
soon. So Iran does not feel compelled about responding
to America's mega-designs toward the Middle East. It
knows if it can maintain its sway in the future course
of power politics inside Iraq that would be a major
achievement for now. Iran appears convinced of the
powerful linkages between the creation of Islam-based
democracy in Iraq and the failure of the US in its
larger designs to implant secular democracy in the
Muslim Middle East. Fortunately for Iran, a number of
Middle Eastern states have a jaundiced perception of
Washington's democracy-related activities and vision for
their region.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an
Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic
analyst.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
for the
Iraqi government to compensate victims of the unrest.
What the US may not have realized is that the real
struggle about the future of Iraq has just entered
another phase. 
