More than a year and a half
has passed since the US-led coalition's invasion of
Iraq, and yet little progress has been seen in the daily
lives of Iraqi people. Not only has reconstruction
stalled, but human-rights abuses by US soldiers at the
Abu Ghraib prison and the crackdown on political
opposition groups have undermined Washington's efforts
to emerge as a champion of democratic and human rights
in Iraq.
The United States' inability to control
the security situation and the rise of various Sunni and
Shi'ite insurgents have resulted in a dangerous
situation for Iraqis, along with added potential for
terrorism in the region.
This spring, the
administration of President George W Bush sought
international cooperation for a viable US exit strategy
from Iraq; without a clear vision for both political and
military exits, there were no takers. With war raging in
Iraq, the political process in shambles, and a dire
economic situation, a new plan is desperately needed.
In the latest outbreak of violence in the
country, ceasefire talks between Shi'ite militants and
the Iraqi government in the Shi'ite-dominated Sadr City
slum in Baghdad have broken down. Iraqi Health Ministry
officials say at least 34 people died on Tuesday and 170
were wounded in clashes with US forces. Three US
soldiers also died - more than 1,000 Americans have now
died since the invasion of the country last year.
The violence came after a suicide attack on a
military convoy outside the city of Fallujah killed
seven US marines and three Iraqi soldiers. In
retaliatory heavy raids in Fallujah, up to 100 Iraqis
were killed.
Perhaps the most significant
near-term challenge for a new plan is the question of
returning full sovereignty to Iraqis in the midst of
this ongoing unrest that daily targets US occupation
forces and Iraqis with ties to the occupation.
Key elements in this challenge include a viable
pluralist constitution, credible elections and
preserving Iraq's political unity. The immediate
question that no presidential candidate is discussing on
the US campaign trail is what transitional plan can
achieve such complicated goals, while providing the US
with a viable exit strategy.
The political and
social fragility of the emerging Iraq requires priority
planning to integrate and strengthen Iraq's
multi-ethnic, religious and secular fabric further. The
goals must be smooth system changes, nurturing both
indigenous and imported democratic forms, and saving the
country from shocking and radical changes that may cost
it and the entire region years of social, economic and
political upheavals. But for such plans to be
successful, Iraqis themselves, through negotiations
among their various factions, must inspire them, with an
emphasis on indigenous groups rather than former exiles.
Most important, the solutions need to be nurtured by a
supportive regional and international environment.
In contrast to developments to date, this
environment requires the establishment of a multilateral
international community highly reflective of
Arab-Kurdish-Iranian-Turkish regional interests. Saudi
proposals took a step in this direction, but failed as
they only addressed the military situation. A regional
conference called by the United Nations to adopt
economic, security and political plans to strengthen
cooperation among Iraq's bordering countries, and to
include European and Middle Eastern participants, would
appear to be an essential first step.
But to
establish full sovereignty, steps must be taken inside
Iraq as well. The first step must be a direct, popular
election where Iraqis as a whole, and not a minority or
a foreign neo-colonial power or powers, decide the
country's future. Enough damage and humiliation have
already been experienced to make such a move imperative.
Yet lurking in the background is Washington's
ambivalence about the ultimate outcome of democratic
reforms in Iraq, should for example a militant Islamic
faction, a nationalistic Shi'ite or Sunni party, or
Kurdish militancy emerge in the electoral process. The
ultimate turn to a former Iraqi military leader to help
negotiate and quell the insurgency in Fallujah in the
spring portends the lingering potential of a military or
strongman figure in Iraq's future.
If a
disrupted and conflicted state such as South Africa can
determine its political future based on an agreed power
transition and centralized authority without outside
interference, then Iraq's citizens also should be able
to select reputable leaders who can come to terms on a
much desired political-reform plan, and follow that up,
as South Africa did, with civic training for the masses
in participatory democracy and voting.
One set
of constitutional provisions that might foster a viable
political arrangement while preserving the country's
unity would be to adopt electoral and power-sharing
formulas that guarantee access to positions of power.
While the power-sharing models of states such as Lebanon
have been marred by internal war and external
intervention (by Syria, Israel, the Palestinians, Iran
and others), they nevertheless constitute regionally
appropriate strategies in divided societies.
Apportionment of top governmental posts by ethnic and
religious, ie, confessional, representation, with
inclusion of subgroups wherever possible, would allay
some of the concerns of those potentially shut out of
power.
Yet the key would still remain building
confidence in guarantees of ethnically and regionally
based rights and security. The Kurds continue to raise
concerns that local-autonomy provisions in the
transitional constitution might easily be eroded if a
dominant Shi'ite majority rule took effect. On the other
hand, Shi'ite leaders have expressed opposition to the
provisions that give the 20% Kurdish population an
effective veto. This would appear to call for concerted
diplomatic brokering of terms, which would reassure the
Kurds that their rights as a minority would not be
violated and would be protected by either domestic or
international guarantees, while allowing the Shi'ite
community the sense of majority rule that it seeks.
None of these communities is monolithic, as
subgroups and rival leaders exist. Since threat
perception tends to unify and polarize ethnic groups, a
more trusting environment with less pressing security
concerns and rivalries over power and wealth, as in
access to oil and water resources, presumably would
allow a greater chance for cross-cutting relationships
and networks to develop. Civic institutions, such as
service organizations and professional associations,
must be nurtured to include diverse membership bridging
the ethnic divide.
With a political solution in
place, a military or security solution is also needed.
The controversy about the relative authority of US and
Iraqi leaders in authorizing military actions indicates
that it is difficult to base US forces on Iraqi
territory for the long term and have the new government
emerge with popular backing and international
credibility. This was evident in the clashes between US
and Muqtada al-Sadr forces in the holy city of Najaf, as
US military commanders were often calling the shots on
the ground with little or no consultation with their
Iraqi counterparts. Ultimately an Iraqi-brokered
ceasefire and militia disarmament were necessary and
feasible.
In Najaf, as in countless other
battles inside Iraq, Washington and US authorities have
misread the military and political situation. The Bush
administration uses the fighting as justification for
the continued presence of foreign military forces. Yet
it is precisely the presence of foreign military forces
that, as a constant irritant, is a major cause of the
instability.
With the United States out of Iraq,
it would be better positioned with its substantial
resources, along with the international and surrounding
Arab and regional community, to play a more effective
role for reform by offering assistance in developing
moderate ethnic, democratic, and human-rights policies.
Washington's ability to influence states' domestic
policies can be greater as a superpower from the outside
than from the inside, playing kingmaker and attempting
to control a divided population while stimulating and
entrenching internal domestic disputes and uprisings.
The United States and the United Kingdom took on
themselves the responsibility to overthrow Saddam
Hussein's regime; now it is time to let the Iraqis
themselves take more fully the responsibility to choose
the alternative. This can best be achieved by fostering
multilateral policies and regional cooperation, and
reinvigorating regional organizations such as the Arab
League and the Gulf Cooperation Council to advance
democracy and security in Iraq and inevitably throughout
the Middle East.
Dr Imad Salamey is a
lecturer of political science at the University of
Michigan - Dearborn. Dr Frederick Pearson is a
professor of political science and directs the Center
for Peace and Conflict Studies at Wayne State
University. Both serve as analysts for Foreign Policy in
Focus.
