Increasingly desperate to find a winning formula in Iraq,
US Vice President Dick Cheney and other
Bush administration officials are promoting Lebanon as a political
model. Agreed, the situation in Iraq is looking more and
more like Lebanon - but not the "Lebanese model" Cheney
talks about. The vice president appears to have in mind
a pre-1967 Lebanon in which an elite of notables
presided over a pluralistic republic, open to foreign
capital and free enterprise. Beirut in those days was
known as the Paris of the Orient.
The Lebanon I
have in mind is the one I worked in for several years in
the late 1970s and early 1980s after the collapse of the
Lebanese political system in the 1975-76 civil war. Torn
by ethnic strife and bloody struggles for power,
communally based militias presided over sectarian murder
and other acts of terror. Foreign powers intervened to
turn the conflict to their own strategic advantage as
all sides abducted outsiders as bargaining chips.
National pact Like Iraq, Lebanon
was a Great Power creation after the implosion of the
Ottoman Empire during World War I. Lebanon was ruled
after the war by France under a League of Nations
mandate, finally achieving independence in 1943.
Composed of widely different secular and religious
groups, the Lebanese elites negotiated among themselves
an unwritten National Pact in 1943, which proved far
more significant than the written laws of the country.
It provided for a sectarian political system designed to
minimize conflict among religious confessions or
communities.
The National Pact was based on a
census conducted in 1932 that established the numerical
superiority of Christians over Muslims in Lebanon.
Consequently, the Maronite Christians of Lebanon, the
single-largest confessional group, were guaranteed the
presidency of the republic. Sunni Muslims, the
second-largest group, were given the office of prime
minister. In turn, the Speaker of the unicameral house
of parliament was a Shi'ite Muslim, his deputy a Greek
Orthodox, the defense minister a Druze, and the
commander of the armed forces a Maronite Christian.
The president of Lebanon occupied the single
most powerful political position under the National Pact
because he was both chief executive and the head of the
largest single faction of a highly pluralistic society.
Both the chief executive and the legislature were
empowered to propose legislation; but in the absence of
parliamentary approval, the president could declare
emergency legislation. He was also responsible for
naming a prime minister from the Sunni community
after consultation with its traditional leaders. The
president could dismiss the prime minister and other
ministers; however, this option in practice proved
complex and difficult to exercise given the plural
nature of the Lebanese political system.
Shortcomings of the Lebanese model If
the Lebanese model were applied to Iraq, a Shi'ite would
presumably be guaranteed the presidency, since that
community constitutes about 60% of the
population. Representatives of the Sunni and Kurdish
minorities would occupy the much less powerful positions
of prime minister and Speaker of the national assembly.
Whether a Sunni or a Kurd were guaranteed the prime
ministry would depend on the outcome of a national
census, since both communities constitute roughly 20% of
the population. Lesser components of Iraq's religious
and ethnic patchwork would be guaranteed even less
powerful positions in the political system. Regardless
of how power was distributed, the Iraqis would soon face
many of the same problems that eventually throttled the
sectarian system adopted by Lebanon.
First of
all, the Lebanese political system proved inflexible.
Based on a census completed in 1932, it froze political
power in a highly dynamic society at a specific point in
history. Over time, Shi'ite Muslims came to outnumber
the Maronite Christians; however, there was no process
in the National Pact to accommodate and adjust to
shifting power balances. With the Kurdish and Sunni
communities in Iraq enjoying roughly equal numbers, at
least until an authoritative census is completed, a
similar situation would likely develop in Iraq. The
population problem in Lebanon was compounded in 1948-49
by the emigration of some 140,000 Palestinians refugees,
most of whom were Muslim. A growing Palestinian military
and political presence in southern Lebanon threatened by
the 1970s to result in a state within a state. Kurdish
demands for autonomy in Iraq, coupled with large Kurdish
populations in neighboring Turkey and Iran, could
eventually produce a related situation in northern Iraq.
More to the point, the National Pact was
based on a political consensus negotiated by competing
parties in 1943. No such consensus exists in Iraq today.
The Kurds remain concerned that local-autonomy provisions in
the transitional constitution would soon be eroded if
majority Shi'ite rule took effect. Shi'ites oppose a
provision that gives the 20% Kurdish minority an
effective veto. In central Iraq, the insurgency is
driven in part by the desire of the long dominant Sunni
minority to retain some vestige of power. It is also
fueled by cross-currents of Arab pride, Iraqi
nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism and the tribal
loyalties long cultivated by Saddam Hussein. The
tendency of US occupation forces to cut separate deals
with Kurds, Shi'ites and Sunnis in a fruitless effort to
keep the peace and project an image of consensus where
none exists has only exacerbated the problem.
In
Lebanon, post-independence prosperity was not shared
equally among competing groups, aggravating existing
socioeconomic disparities. With strong ties to both East
and West, the Christian community was the primary
beneficiary of the transformation of the country into a
banking, trade and tourism center. The Sunnis benefited
to a lesser degree from economic development; however,
the Shi'ite community became something of a permanent
underclass in Lebanese society. The Shi'ites in Iraq
were also the underclass under Saddam, but they would
become the privileged political and economic community
if the Lebanese model were applied to Iraq. The Sunni
minority, which has dominated Iraqi politics since
independence, would likely find this intolerable. In
turn, the Kurdish minority, in conjunction with demands
for autonomy, has shown interest and determination in
preserving some element of control over the oil
resources in northern Iraq.
The competing political
forces in Lebanon, unable to accommodate conflicting
demands with the existing political system, eventually
turned to outside forces for assistance in maintaining
or enhancing their domestic political positions.
Both Israel and Syria intervened in Lebanon, and
the US and Western Europe later participated in a multilateral
peacekeeping force. Iran and Iraq also supported
proxy forces in the country. After the US Embassy
and US Marine barracks were targeted by suicide bombers
in 1983, the United States withdrew its forces; but Syria
remains today a dominant player in Lebanese politics. A
Balkanized Iraq would present similar threats to and
opportunities for the vital interests of Arab states
(Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria) and non-Arab
states (Iran, Israel, Turkey), together with Great
Britain, the Soviet Union and the US. An extensive
period of foreign intervention in the domestic politics
of Iraq would destabilize the entire region.
Iraqi solution needed The sectarian political system
adopted by
Lebanon in 1943 is not a viable model for Iraq.
It is the wrong system in the wrong place at the
wrong time. The White House's suggestion that it might
help bring order out of chaos is simply another disheartening
example of the absence of Middle East experience
and understanding within the administration of President George
W Bush. The Iraqi people need to work out a
political solution for themselves, a solution that
includes the active participation of opposition elements
within the country. And Washington needs to stop
intervening in the Iraqi political process and be
prepared to accept the formula the Iraqis decide to
adopt. That's called democracy.
Ronald
Bruce St John, an analyst for Foreign Policy in
Focus, has published widely on Middle Eastern issues.
His latest book on the region is Libya and the
United States: Two Centuries of Strife (Penn Press,
2002).
