On October 29, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden
released a new videotape, revealing the first images of
the leader in more than a year. The video offered proof
that bin Laden is alive and healthy with access to
modern technology. The resurgence of bin Laden
emphasizes the threat still posed by Islamic
revolutionaries to the United States and its interests.
Bin Laden applauds US response to September
11 attacks Bin Laden is undeterred by the Bush administration's
response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the
United States. Washington's destruction of the Taliban
government in Afghanistan and its increased influence in
the Middle East gained through the invasion and
occupation of Iraq have not, according to bin Laden,
adversely affected al-Qaeda in any significant manner.
In fact, bin Laden's video quoted him as saying that the
results of the September 11 attacks - results that
include the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, in
addition to US attacks on Islamic revolutionaries
worldwide - have been "positive and enormous, and have,
by all standards, exceeded all expectations".
At first glance, there are many reasons bin Laden's
statement is questionable. After the invasion of Iraq,
the US destroyed the Taliban's hold over Afghanistan, a
government that gave safe haven to bin Laden's al-Qaeda
network. Along with this attack, the US was able to
scatter the al-Qaeda command center and increase
pressure on the organization's operations. Nevertheless,
while the attacks must have caused setbacks to
al-Qaeda's operational capability, bin Laden is correct
in arguing that Washington's response to the September
11 attacks has proved beneficial to his cause.
Even though the US
invaded Afghanistan, many al-Qaeda figures escaped into
Pakistan. Moreover, the Taliban themselves were not destroyed - only removed
from power, where they then filtered into the local
Afghan populace and are now primarily responsible for
the pervasive guerrilla attacks against US-led troops
and other security forces aligned with the
central government in Kabul. Furthermore, the US never
captured the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, and bin
Laden himself managed to escape. The one-month delay it
took the US to attack Afghanistan after September 11
afforded bin Laden and other top leaders of his network
the time to put into effect contingency plans that would
allow for the continuation of their organization in a
new atmosphere subject to heightened US surveillance and
potential attack.
With Iraq, bin
Laden has argued that the invasion and subsequent
occupation have been major benefits to his cause. Iraq, because of its past
secularist nature, had little to do with Islamic
revolutionary movements; the government in Baghdad was
actually scorned by bin Laden. Yet the removal of Saddam
Hussein furthered bin Laden's aims since it removed a
leader whom bin Laden had already labeled a socialist
"infidel", and who had been persecuting Islamic
revolutionaries for decades. By removing the secular
Ba'athist Party from power, the forces of Islamism have
been uncorked in Iraq; this is apparent through the
growing Shi'ite demand for the institutions of Islamic
law and Islamic governance. The removal of the Ba'ath
Party and the resulting instability ripened the ground
for al-Qaeda and other Islamic revolutionaries to
recruit and expand operations since, in the past,
Saddam's security apparatus would have captured and
killed any Islamic revolutionary that posed a danger to
his regime.
Additionally, the invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq have given al-Qaeda more
opportunities to attack US interests. With US troops
patrolling Afghanistan and Iraq, al-Qaeda has less
distance to travel to strike at US military targets and
interests. The invasions have also increased the ability
of al-Qaeda sympathizers - groups or individuals who
identify with al-Qaeda's central political themes
without actually being in regular contact with the
organization - to launch their own attacks on US
interests. The many beheadings in Iraq are a good
example of this, where, by striking fear into the West,
militants are able to increase the chances of ending the
occupation while also heightening the perceived threat
of Islamic militancy. In the words of al-Qaeda adviser
and founder of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Ayman
al-Zawahiri, broadcast in September 2003 on the
al-Jazeera satellite network, "We thank God for
appeasing us with the dilemma in Iraq after Afghanistan.
The Americans are facing a delicate situation in both
countries. If they withdraw they will lose everything
and if they stay, they will continue to bleed to death."
Finally, as clearly stated in
bin Laden's speech last month, the September 11 attacks
have caused the US to spend unprecedented levels of
financial capital on combating the threat of terrorism.
Because the use of terrorism as a tactical military strategy
is so difficult to defend against, it has caused the
Bush administration to spend billions of dollars in
attempts to counter every potential threat to US interests.
Bin Laden, recognizing this favorable situation, stated
in his October address, "All that we have to do [to
provoke the United States] is to send two mujahideen to
the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on
which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make the generals
race there to cause America to suffer human, economic
and political losses without their achieving for it
anything of note than some benefits for their private
companies."
Striking the US
economy Bin Laden understands the tremendous
effect that fear - a byproduct of the use of terrorism
as a political and military tactic - has on the
population of the US. As argued by bin Laden in the
past, "Terror is the most dreaded weapon in the modern
age ... It can add fear and helplessness to the psyche
of the people of Europe and the United States ... You
can understand as to what will be the performance of the
nation in a war, which suffers from fear and
helplessness."
It appears that bin Laden will
continue to pursue this strategy in the hopes of
bringing severe financial hardships to the US economy.
Aware that the US cannot be defeated through direct
military confrontation, bin Laden's central strategy -
most vividly depicted through the September 11 attacks
that hit the financial heart of the US - has been to
undermine US security and, therefore, the US economy. In
his address, bin Laden, after commenting on how the
mujahideen in Afghanistan successfully "bled Russia for
10 years" to end its occupation there, is now practicing
a similar strategy on the US, "continuing this policy in
bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy". Indeed, in
October 2002, bin Laden said on al-Jazeera television,
"God is my witness, the youth of Islam are preparing
things that will fill your hearts with fear. They will
target key sectors of your economy until you stop your
injustice and aggression or until the more short-lived
of us die."
Bin Laden's strategy is feasible.
The US budget deficit stands at US$413 billion, and shows
no sign of decreasing. Much of this money comes out of
the costs of waging the "war on terrorism", including
the invasion of Iraq. Indeed, the invasion of Iraq will
not only cause financial hardship to the US, but will
further bin Laden's ambitions as long as it continues
down the course it has thus far. Unless Iraq is
transformed into a stable country generally in line with
US interests, it will continue to act as a drain on the
US economy and persist in helping al-Qaeda and other
Islamic militant groups find willing recruits to pursue
al-Qaeda's agenda.
Al-Qaeda's recruiting
prospects The
major reason the occupation of Iraq, provided it continues
along its present course of instability,
will accelerate al-Qaeda's political agenda is that Washington has failed to address
the motives behind al-Qaeda's attacks on the US and its
allies. Bin Laden has repeatedly stated his reasons for
starting and continuing his attacks against US interests.
As stated by Michael Scheuer, the former head of
the Central Intelligence Agency's unit on bin Laden,
bin Laden's attacks are meant to advance his clear,
focused, limited and widely popular foreign-policy goals: the end
of US aid to Israel and the ultimate elimination of that
state; the removal of US and Western forces from the
Arabian Peninsula; the removal of US and Western
military forces from Iraq, Afghanistan and other Muslim
lands; the end of US support for the oppression of
Muslims by Russia, China and India; the end of US
protection for repressive, apostate Muslim regimes in
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, et cetera; and the
conservation of the Muslim world's energy resources and
their sale at higher prices.
Along these lines,
bin Laden argued that US influence in the Muslim world
demonstrates "an ocean of oppression, injustice,
slaughter, and plunder carried out by [the United
States] against our Islamic [community]. It is therefore
commanded by our religion that we must fight back. We
are defending ourselves against the United States. This
is a 'defensive jihad' as we want to protect our land
and people." Since this is the crux of bin Laden's
argument, and an argument that is extremely popular
among Muslims, Scheuer warns, "The choice we have is
between keeping current policies, which will produce an
escalating expenditure of American treasure and blood,
or devising new policies, which may, over time, reduce
the expenditure of both."
Bin Laden has vividly
described how he will persist in attacking the US in
response to its policies, saying, "... if [Muslims] do
not have security, the Americans also will not have it.
This is a very simple formula ... This is the formula of
live and let live." Further to this point, bin Laden
declared that the division between Americans living in
peace and Muslims living in conflict is "unfair" and
that the "time has come for us to be equal. Just as you
kill, you are killed. Just as you bombard, you are
bombarded."
Bush administration maintains
past policies After the September 11 attacks, the
administration of President George W Bush made a decision not
only to remain steadfast in its pursuit of traditional
US foreign policy, but to escalate it. For example, the
US has not only continued to support the State of
Israel, but has remained especially silent on
Israel's controversial treatment of its Palestinian
population and its continued violation of United
Nations-sponsored demands to release territory that is
considered occupied. While the US has removed its troops from Saudi
Arabia, it has not removed them from the region; the US
command center that was in Saudi Arabia simply relocated
to Qatar, and the presence of US military personnel in
the region is astronomical as a result of the US
invasion of Iraq.
Washington shows
no sign of ending its occupations in Afghanistan and
Iraq and the Bush administration has continued its
mute policy with regards to Russia's, China's and
India's harsh treatment of its Muslim populations. Washington
has not been critical of the dictatorships in
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt and Jordan, and it has shown no
desire to accept oil being sold at higher prices; the only
reason oil prices are high now is the instability
brought to the global scene mainly due to the
intervention in Iraq, but also due to supply concerns in
Venezuela, Nigeria and other oil-producing countries.
Therefore, in this light, it becomes clear that
bin Laden's potential to recruit disaffected Muslims
enraged over US foreign policy has improved as a result
of the Bush administration's failure to alter the
aforementioned policies. This will result in more
Muslims alienated by the US and more Muslims who will
subsequently find leadership in bin Laden's militant
rhetoric.
This result is quite evident by
subsequent polls taken in Muslim-majority countries that
show how the United States' image has plummeted to levels
never recorded before. According to the Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press, in its "What the World
Thinks in 2002" poll, resentment toward the US grew
tremendously between 2000 and 2002. In 19 of the 28
countries polled, attitudes toward the US became more
negative. In Muslim-majority countries, America's
positive standing fell sharply, as many Muslims
perceived the "war on terrorism" to be a war on Muslims.
In Indonesia, where 87% of the population is
Muslim, in a matter of two years, the US dropped in
favor by 14 percentage points. In 1999/2000, 75% of
Indonesians had a favorable view of the US; in 2002,
that number had fallen to 61%. Turkey, with 98% of its
population Muslim, saw 22% of its population lose favor
with the US between those two years; in 1999/2000, 52%
of its population had a favorable attitude toward the
US, compared with a meager 30% in 2002. Pakistan, too,
saw a 13% drop in favor toward the US; by 2002, only 10%
of Pakistanis had a positive attitude of the US.
These numbers have not fared better since 2002.
In its latest report, "Views of a Changing World 2003",
the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press
found that from 1999/2000 to June 2003, the number of
Indonesians that had a favorable view of the US dropped
from 75% to 15%; Turkey down from 52% to 15%; Pakistan
remained relatively unchanged, standing at 13%.
This sinking level of support for the US depicts
how bin Laden has been able to tap into widespread anger
and resentment held by many Muslims toward US foreign
policy. The political grievances aired by bin Laden and
his deputies resonate among many of their
coreligionists, who, like al-Zawahiri, believe that
"Muslims have suffered the worst and most serious
disasters, for more than a century. Their lands are
occupied either by foreign forces, or through political
influence. Their resources are deemed lawful and
plundered. They are deprived of free will. Their rights
are thrown away and stolen. Their sanctuaries are
surrounded and taken over."
To demonstrate this,
the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press
found that, in 2003, 58% of Indonesians had "confidence"
that bin Laden would "do the right thing" in world
affairs. That number stands at 55% in Jordan, 49% in
Morocco, 45% in Pakistan and 71% among Palestinians.
Bin Laden's grievances All of the above
grievances about US foreign policy held by the al-Qaeda
leadership are central pillars of US interests. Because
of this, it will be very difficult for the Bush administration
to alter any of them. These policies are very
much responsible for the United States' status as a
superpower and for its success as a state.
For instance, Washington supports the
State of Israel for a variety of reasons, but one of
the central ones is Jerusalem's success in preventing
any one Middle Eastern country from dominating
the region and threatening the price or flow
of energy resources. US troops are stationed in the region to
protect the conditions that foster a stable supply of
energy resources, a critical component to the global
economy. Also, in line with the need to protect energy
resources, the US has thrown its support behind many
Middle Eastern dictators; US interests demand that these
leaders keep stability and control over their countries
in order to prevent instability within their domain and
within the region as a whole. Finally, being an
oil-dependent country, the US would like to see
below-market oil prices since low oil prices help to
accelerate economic growth in oil-dependent countries.
Since all of bin Laden's complaints are key
components in US interests, it will be difficult for the
US to compromise on any of them. The dilemma, however,
is that these important US interests are affecting
Muslims in adverse ways. Through US support of Israel,
Muslims in Palestine are oppressed, in addition to Arab
and Persian aspirations for regional dominance. Through
the proliferation of US troops in the region, Muslims
see themselves weak in the face of superior US
technology and control. US support of regional
dictatorships has resulted in these leaders having the
financial and political support to crack down on
dissidents, often imprisoning or torturing those
individuals who care to exercise democratic rights -
whether through violent or peaceful means. Finally, US
demand for below-market oil prices is seen by Muslims as
theft of their oil resources. Indeed, thus far, the US
has not compromised on any of these interests, which
explains why al-Qaeda still considers the US a threat
and a target, and demonstrates why Muslims continue to
hold a negative view of the US.
This fundamental
clash of interests, which is only heightened by the
difference in cultures, exemplifies why the US and
Islamic revolutionaries have not been able to find
common ground on issues that affect them both.
Bin Laden's military plan Since
September 11, bin Laden's al-Qaeda network has not
attacked the US directly. Nevertheless, there have been
regular attacks on US interests abroad, in addition to
the interests of countries that support US policy. There
are two explanations behind the lack of attacks on the
US homeland: either al-Qaeda is preparing for a future
attack and waiting for the right opportunity to strike,
or it lacks the operational capability to do so.
Bin Laden is aware that he cannot defeat the US
militarily. His key to victory will be in persuading the
American people to change the policies of the US
government by convincing them that certain US policies
in the Muslim world are not worth the violent reaction
that will result. Indeed, from the start, bin Laden has
tried to explain to the American people what needs to be
done to prevent attacks from the al-Qaeda network. He
stated, "Many people in the West are good and gentle
people. I have already said that we are not hostile to
the United States. We are against the system [US
policies] which makes nations slaves of the United
States, or forces them to mortgage their political and
economic freedom."
He has said that it is up to
the "American people to check the anti-Muslim policies
of their government ... They should play the same role
now that they played during the Vietnam War. The
American people should prevent the killing of Muslims at
the hands of their government." Bin Laden has been
steady in this argument. In his latest address to the
American people, released shortly before the US
presidential elections, bin Laden warned Americans that
their security "is in your own hands. And every state
that doesn't play with [Muslim] security has
automatically guaranteed its own security."
With
this information in mind, the recent re-election of
President George W Bush has demonstrated that his
administration received an endorsement from the American
people for its policies in the Middle East and the
larger Muslim world. US Vice President Dick Cheney
stressed this fact, saying that Bush ran "forthrightly
on a clear agenda for this nation's future, and the
nation responded by giving him a mandate". Because these
policies are perceived by Muslims as negative, bin
Laden, the al-Qaeda network, and others in the Islamic
revolutionary movement will come to the conclusion that
the US will not alter its foreign policy, at least not
in the next four years. Therefore, if bin Laden was
playing a waiting game, to see if Americans would work
to change US policies in the region, that wait is now
over.
If al-Qaeda has the
operational capability to attack the US or its major interests abroad,
it will now do so once the right opportunity arises. The
form of this impending attack and future attacks
will likely follow al-Qaeda's established military
strategy of utilizing the tactic of terrorism. This has proved
to be the most effective tactic of choice for
al-Qaeda and other Islamic revolutionary groups. To
demonstrate why al-Qaeda will not deviate from its use
of terror tactics, witness bin Laden's comment in
October 2002: "The American people have the ability and
choice to refuse the policies of their government, yet
time and again, polls show the American people support
the policies of the elected government ... This is why
the American people are not innocent. The American
people are active members in all these crimes [against
Muslims.]"
If no attack is seen in the months after
the re-election of Bush, then it can be reasonably argued
that bin Laden's al-Qaeda network, in addition to the
Islamic revolutionary movement as a whole, lacks the organizational
and operational capabilities to launch significant
attacks against the US and its interests. While
bin Laden has proved himself to be an experienced military
strategist, witnessed through his involvement in
the struggle against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, he
may lack the resources necessary to launch significant
terror attacks against the US and its interests.
Especially now, in light of the United States'
heightened defense against Islamic terrorism, the
ability to strike the US homeland, and even US interests
abroad, is difficult.
Furthermore, the
intelligence community of the US and its allies has been
extremely focused on detecting and capturing bin Laden
and other members of his network. This intense manhunt,
using the most sophisticated technology available, has
had a major impact on al-Qaeda's ability to operate
freely. With the US military involved in an assortment
of countries, giving it the capability to launch quick
tactical strikes, one mistake by any member of the
al-Qaeda leadership could be deadly to both that leader
and the organization as a whole.
Nevertheless, while it may be difficult for al-Qaeda and the
larger Islamic revolutionary movement to attack high-value
targets in the US or elsewhere, it is not difficult for
them to attack targets that will affect the interests of
the US and its allies. As al-Qaeda articulated in late
2002, "The enemy's tourist industry ... includes easy
targets with major economic, political and security
importance. This is because the impact of an attack on a
tourist facility that cannot be protected equals, and
sometimes surpasses, the impact of an attack against an
enemy warship." Also, as CIA officer Michael Scheuer
writes, "Of the 20 nations al-Qaeda threatened, 18 have
been attacked, a 90% correlation." This shows how the
al-Qaeda network has been very successful in attacks
against the West, and in light of its statements over
its list of potential US targets, should have little
difficulty finding potential sites to attack, even in
the face of heightened US vigilance.
Conclusion The threat to US interests
posed by bin Laden, the al-Qaeda network and the Islamic
revolutionary movement as a whole is a reaction to US
foreign policy in the Muslim world. The US has pursued
relatively static interests in the Middle East for
decades, interests that are central pillars in America's
present status as a superpower. These interests are now
clashing with the aspirations of the Islamic
revolutionary movement, which seeks to resist US
policies in the Muslim world that are perceived as
discriminatory to Muslims, whether as an intentional or
unintentional result of US policies.
Islamic
revolutionaries
such as bin Laden are well aware that the
US cannot be defeated militarily. Their goal, then, is
to effect political change inside the US in order to defeat
the country's will to sustain its involvement in the
Muslim world. The persistent attacks on US interests,
culminating in the September 11 attacks on New
York and the Pentagon, are intended to bring about
this change of policy.
With the support of the
American people, the Bush administration has resisted
these attacks, and has amplified the very policies that
have caused so much angst among Muslims. If the Bush
administration is unsuccessful in its interventions of
Afghanistan and Iraq, it will fail to marginalize the
Islamic revolutionary movement and will find itself in a
poor strategic position when faced with popular Islamic
revolutionaries utilizing the military tactic of
terrorism to achieve their political ends. Overstretched
and exhausted, Washington could be forced to retreat
back to its core and inadvertently deliver on many of
al-Qaeda's demands.
Therefore, for the US, it is critical to
rebuild Afghanistan and Iraq in a manner that wins
the support of its people and helps to boost the United
States' image in the Muslim world. If the US fails to stabilize Afghanistan
and Iraq, and if it is unable to alter the
perception of itself favorably, the Islamic revolutionary movement
will grow and become ever much a threat to
the US homeland and its interests abroad. Unfortunately, Washington's
ability to stabilize Afghanistan and
Iraq may prove impossible to reach, bringing the
instability of these two peripheral countries to the
core of the United States.
Published with
permission of thePower and
Interest News Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
globe. All comments should be directed tocontent@pinr.com.
