The US retreat from
democratization By Erich Marquardt
An important motive behind the Bush
administration's intervention in Iraq was the goal of
fostering democracy in the Middle East. This motive,
recognized as critical to United States interests
following the September 11 attacks, is based on the
belief that autocratic, non-democratic states have a
higher potential to create disaffected individuals who
join political groups that seek to use violence to
exercise their political grievances. This pattern is
especially prevalent in the Middle East, where autocracy
is the norm and where most of the militants attacking US
interests are located.
Therefore, following the
September 11 attacks, the Bush administration argued
that the successful formation of democracy in Iraq would
serve as an example to other Middle Eastern states. For
one, it would provide a warning that the creation of a
functioning market democracy in the region is possible,
even through the use of force by an outside power.
Additionally, by transforming Iraq from a country ruled
by a dictator to one ruled by a democratically elected
government, Washington hoped that citizens of autocratic
states in the region would no longer stand by obediently
while they were forced to obey an unpopular and
autocratic regime.
While this was an important
motive behind the intervention in Iraq, it has now lost
the support of Washington policymakers, in addition to
many insiders within the Bush administration. The reason
behind this loss of support has been the continuous
failure to transform Iraq into a market democracy. While
it is still possible to arrest Iraq's present downward
trend, until that moment occurs there will be little
support for further test cases of democratic
transformation in the Middle East.
Democratic
transformation With the 2000 election win of
President George W Bush, the administration appointed a
select few individuals among the neo-conservative class
of the American political spectrum. These officials -
with the most prominent neo-conservative represented by
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz - were branded
with a certain sense of idealism, believing that a
democratic transformation of the Middle East was very
possible through outside intervention, explaining why
this political class has been labeled "democratic
imperialists".
For example, before the invasion
of Iraq began, influential members of the American
Enterprise Institute - one of the leading institutions
of neo-conservative thought - released repeated
statements arguing the positive effects that an invasion
of Iraq would bring. Joshua Muravchik, a resident
scholar at the Institute, stated in August 2002, "Change
toward democratic regimes in Tehran and Baghdad would
unleash a tsunami across the Islamic world."
In
September 2002, Michael Ledeen, a freedom scholar with
the institute, called for the US to begin "a vast
democratic revolution to liberate all the peoples of the
Middle East". Ledeen succinctly argued the critical
point of this theory, announcing that "it is impossible
to imagine that the Iranian people would tolerate
tyranny in their own country once freedom had come to
Iraq. Syria would follow in short order." Bush himself
stated in his 2004 state of the union address that "...
we will finish the historic work of democracy in
Afghanistan and Iraq, so those nations can light the way
for others, and help transform a troubled part of the
world."
Theoretically, a democratic
transformation of the Middle East could occur following
the successful implantation of a market democracy there.
However, the reason that this theory is hinged too much
on idealism is that it exaggerates the ability of an
outside power to create such a structure. Furthermore,
the difference in culture and values between the
implanting power - the US - and the recipient states -
predominately of Islamic culture - also works negatively
against the success of such a theory.
Iraq:
The first test case These doubts were manifested
in the US intervention of Iraq. While it only took weeks
to eliminate the Ba'athist regime, many months have
passed and there is still little stability throughout
the country. Indeed, there is no evidence to
definitively state whether progress is being made or
lost. According to US senator Lincoln Chafee, who just
returned from Iraq, and a member of the Bush
administration's Republican Party, the situation has
become worse in the last year. Speaking to CNN, Chafee
said, "It's a very tenuous security situation. I'd been
there a year ago - what a change ... in the Green Zone a
year ago we felt very secure. Not so this time."
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has also
questioned the viability of the Iraq intervention. The
New York Times reported on December 7 that it had
received a classified cable from the CIA's station chief
in Baghdad warning that the security situation in Iraq
will soon deteriorate further unless some major
successes are scored.
Until it can be determined
whether progress is being made or lost in Iraq, the
intervention will do nothing to encourage other Middle
Eastern political leaders and citizens to push for a
democratic transformation in their countries; indeed, as
of now, it has done the very opposite and has
demonstrated the potential anarchy that can erupt
following the weakening of a central government or the
creation of a temporary power vacuum.
Furthermore, the intervention of Iraq
demonstrated the political, military and economic toll
that can affect the US negatively if an intervention
goes awry.
For instance, while the Bush
administration won the 2004 presidential election, it
has lost a lot of support from the American people, and
the population itself is split almost evenly into two
political camps. Much of this national divergence can be
blamed on the impact of the Iraq intervention to both
the US military and economy.
The US has lost
over 1,000 soldiers in Iraq, and it has been forced to
keep over 100,000 troops in the country, with the total
troop commitment presently hovering around 150,000. This
sort of troop obligation has stretched the US military
to the point where its present global commitment is
simply unsustainable. The ramifications of the extended
troop commitment to Iraq are already evident, seen
through the May 2004 decision to withdraw an army
brigade from the US Army's 2nd Infantry Division in
South Korea to Iraq.
Finally, the funds required
to sustain present operations in Iraq are exorbitant,
helping to swell the US budget deficit to US$413
billion. Over the long term, continued high spending in
Iraq could bring economic problems, such as an extended
trade deficit and high inflation.
All of these
factors explain how the intervention of Iraq has given
the US little ability to engage in future interventions,
whether for another test of democratic transformation or
even for legitimate national security concerns. The
troop commitment and financial costs being usurped by
the Iraq intervention have weakened the ability of the
US to project its power in the world.
If the
Bush administration were to have seriously considered
all the likely scenarios involved in the intervention in
Iraq - including worst case scenarios - it is doubtful
that it would have carried through with the invasion.
The success of the neo-conservative vision of democratic
transformation hinged on the realization of a best-case
scenario, which was a reality that failed to occur. As
clearly argued by Wolfowitz before the invasion, "I am
reasonably certain that they will greet us as
liberators, and that will help us to keep [troop]
requirements down."
Instead, the US hasn't yet
had the luxury to work on a true democratic
transformation in Iraq because it is still trying to
foster some sort of stability in the country. As stated
by retired army Colonel Raoul Alcala, who served as an
advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, "Plan A - what
the US actually did - failed, and Plan B - the
adaptations since the end of 'major combat' - hasn't
worked either, so far." This leaves the US in the
awkward position of not being able to resort to a viable
military and political strategy.
Retreat from
the transformation theory The Bush
administration's retreat from its vision of a
transformation to market democracy for Middle Eastern
states is evident in the lead-up to the December 11
summit meeting in Morocco intended to promote democracy
across the region. US officials have made clear that
they will not demand the region's leaders to reform,
instead coming with a package of financial and social
initiatives - plans that will not create much discomfort
in the region's autocracies. Middle East analysts Tamara
Cofman Wittes and Sarah Yerkes of the Brookings
Institution point to the problems of this strategy,
"Economic reform is something for which nearly all Arab
governments are willing to accept assistance, regardless
of the donor, but whether economic change can contribute
to the degree of liberalization that the United States
sees as necessary to reduce political extremism is
uncertain."
Discussing the upcoming meeting, US
Secretary of State Colin Powell said in a radio
interview that he hoped the Middle Eastern states
attending the Morocco summit meeting would "come to an
understanding of the need for reform and modernization
in the broader Middle East and North Africa region".
This is far from the administration's stance in January
of 2004, when Bush announced, "As long as the Middle
East remains a place of tyranny and despair and anger,
it will continue to produce men and movements that
threaten the safety of America and our friends. So
America is pursuing a forward strategy of freedom in the
greater Middle East. We will challenge the enemies of
reform, confront the allies of terror, and expect a
higher standard from our friend."
Conclusion One of the prime motives
for the intervention in Iraq was to test the
neo-conservative theory of democratic transformation in
the Middle East. This theory's chance for success was
questionable from the very beginning, since there are
few historical examples of an outside power intervening
in a country with vast cultural differences and
successfully implementing a market democracy there.
Additionally, Iraq was a very poor choice for the
execution of this theory to begin with, considering that
the country has never settled the question of how power
will be shared between its three main ethnic/religious
groups (Shi'ite, Sunni and Kurd); creating a power
vacuum in such a state is a sure way to pull the
intervening power into the center of civil strife and
potential civil war.
The Bush administration and
the US have discovered all of these difficulties in Iraq
and are struggling to create some sense of stability.
The overbearing cost of the Iraq intervention - in terms
of political, military and economic costs - has demanded
the full attention of the Bush administration, and it is
unrealistic to expect the administration to push for
further democratic transformations elsewhere in the
region.
Instead, the administration can be
expected to cut its geostrategic losses and try to
preserve the gains it has made. A retreat from Iraq
would be a devastating development to the image of the
US in the eyes of its detractors, and would likely act
as a huge boon for al-Qaeda's recruitment ability,
similar to the effect that resulted from the Islamist
victory over the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It would
also have the potential of weakening US power in the
world, although this could be easily prevented by strong
shows of force by the US in regional hotspots.
Nevertheless, because retreat carries such
negative connotations, the Bush administration will
isolate itself from policies that have as their
potential outcome further political, military and
economic pressure brought to bear on the US. For the
time being, and until conditions turn favorably in Iraq,
the Bush administration can be expected to shelve any
serious designs at democratic transformation in the
Middle East.
Published with permission of
thePower and Interest News Report,
an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide
insight into various conflicts, regions and points of
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