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PART 1:
Circumstantial evidence
By
Charles Recknagel
PRAGUE - US Secretary of
State Colin Powell recently put Washington's
position toward Iran's nuclear activities in very
clear terms.
The evidence that has been put
forward so far demonstrates clearly that Iran
has been moving in the direction of creating a
nuclear weapon. And that is why the
International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] got so
involved, why the Russians have been careful
about providing fuel for the new reactor at
Bushehr, and why the European Union sent their
three foreign ministers in to get the Iranians
to stop. But Iranian officials,
including President Mohammad Khatami, say that
Tehran is only interested in nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. "We have made our choice:
peaceful nuclear technology - yes. Atomic weapons
- no. Not 'no' only for ourselves - no [nuclear
weapons] for the region, no [nuclear weapons] for
the world," Khatami said.
So who is right?
Analysts say that the only way to decide
is to weigh the physical evidence that has kept
the crisis at the center of the world stage since
2002. Much of that evidence emerged when an exiled
Iranian opposition group exposed a secret pilot
project to master the process of uranium
enrichment. The project included some 160
assembled gas centrifuges - plus equipment to
build some 5,000 more - hidden in reinforced
underground bunkers strong enough to resist air
strikes.
In the process, uranium is first
converted to uranium hexafluoride gas, a substance
that is fed into centrifuges used to enrich
uranium. Experts have expressed concern over
indications that Iran might have built some of its
uranium-enrichment equipment according to
blueprints acquired on the global black market for
nuclear secrets.
The discovery of the
sites was alarming because enriched uranium can be
used either as a nuclear fuel or - at higher
levels of enrichment - as material for nuclear
bombs. It also showed that Iran was violating
safeguards in the international Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), of which it is a
signatory. The treaty gives Tehran the right to
acquire nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but
also binds it to declare all such facilities to
the United Nations' IAEA and to open such sites to
its inspectors.
Later visits to the site
by IAEA inspectors revealed that some of the
centrifuges had been used to enrich two types of
uranium to 20% or more. That is far higher than
the usual 2% to 3% enrichment level required for
nuclear fuel.
Nonproliferation experts say
that uranium enriched to a 20% level is sufficient
to make a very cumbersome nuclear bomb. But it
falls well short of the enrichment levels - 90% or
higher - needed to produce the kinds of missile or
airplane-deliverable warheads that make a country
a nuclear power.
Fred Wehling, an
arms-control expert at the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California,
says the discovery of Iran's uranium-enrichment
activities made many nonproliferation experts
skeptical of Tehran's explanation that it was
seeking only to master the nuclear fuel cycle for
energy purposes.
"If Iran was to develop
an indigenous enrichment capacity, it could
eventually make its own fuel, which could then be
used in Bushehr," Wehling said. "But then if that
were really the case, you wouldn't need to go to
all the trouble of having a clandestine facility
and acquiring uranium under the table to test it
and so on."
Equally worrisome,
nonproliferation experts said, are indications
that Iran might have built some of its
uranium-enrichment equipment according to
blueprints acquired on the global black market for
nuclear secrets. The suspected source is the
trafficking network organized by Pakistani nuclear
scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. It is not known
whether the network also sold Iran information
about how to design a nuclear weapon, as it did to
Libya.
Since the discovery of Iran's
clandestine efforts, Tehran has sought to assure
the IAEA that it is now fully cooperating with
international inspectors to disclose all of its
nuclear work. But Tehran said it still insists on
its right under the NPT to develop its own nuclear
fuel cycle and will not give that up.
There are varying estimates of how long it
could take Iran to develop a nuclear weapon, if it
wished. Daniel Keohane, an international security
expert at the Center for European Reform in
London, put the timeline this way: "If you ask the
Europeans how far away are the Iranians from a
bomb, the general consensus seems to be four to
six years. And in Washington, I understand, the
consensus is closer to three years and possibly
even sooner, depending on how the Iranians behave
over the next year or so."
Keohane said
any progress Tehran might make in developing a
nuclear weapon will be determined by how much it
cooperates with current efforts by European states
to persuade it to give up programs related to
uranium enrichment in exchange for trade
incentives.
TOMORROW: Two-track
weapons program
Copyright (c) 2004,
RFE/RL Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave NW,
Washington DC 20036 |
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