|
|
|
|
Iraqi polls and exit
strategies
By Erich Marquardt
Less than 10 days away from Iraq's general
elections on January 30 that decide who will sit
on the 275-member national assembly, Baghdad's
course toward that end grows more perilous each
day. Attacks on US forces have grown deadlier;
ambushes of Iraq's budding security forces are
increasingly successful; the marginal stability
that presently exists is being further threatened
by the lethal insurgent targeting of politicians
and government figures; intelligence reports show
that the insurgency is growing stronger with each
passing day.
The electoral quest has
proven to be so messy that it is difficult to
conclude that the elections will bring enough
peace and stability to alter significantly the
present dynamic in Iraq.
Attacks on US
troops and Iraqi security forces
Since the
beginning of the insurgency in 2003, attacks on US
forces have swelled, increasing in deadliness and
effectiveness. Each day, attacks are initiated
throughout the country, highlighting its
instability. On January 3, a suicide car bomber
drove his vehicle into a checkpoint near the
Baghdad offices of Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad
Allawi's political party, the Iraqi National
Accord. Hours later, another explosion brought
casualties at a checkpoint entrance to the Green
Zone, the most heavily fortified area of Iraq
containing the headquarters of the Iraqi
government and the United States embassy.
Just a few days later, on January 6, a
suicide car bomber exploded his vehicle outside a
police academy near Baghdad during its graduation
ceremony, killing 20; that same day, a suicide
attacker killed five policemen, and insurgents
also assassinated a police colonel on his way to
work. The following day, a roadside bomb took the
lives of seven American soldiers. On January 10,
Baghdad's deputy police chief, General Amer Ali
Nayef, was gunned down outside of his home.
In the midst of these incidents, executed
bodies of Iraqis have been turning up all around
the country, with one recent discovery in Mosul
where the bodies of 18 civilians were discovered,
executed because they sought work at an American
military base. That same day, three Jordanian
truck drivers were found near Ramadi, executed and
left with a note attached to their bodies,
warning, "This is the fate of anyone who
cooperates with the Americans."
Without a
clear enemy to fight, US forces have been thrust
into a situation where they are targeted by unseen
enemies who use explosives to strike at US convoys
covertly. When these enemies are seen, it is often
during a suicide mission where an insurgent drives
a car bomb into a US checkpoint. These attacks are
not meant to cast serious blows on the US
occupation, but are intended to erode slowly the
resolve of the Americans.
Along with the
targeting of American soldiers, the killings of
Iraqi security forces continue to take a toll on
those Iraqis fighting on the side of American
troops. According to Iraq's Interior Ministry,
more than 1,300 policemen were killed during the
last four months of 2004. These soldiers have
become easy targets for Iraqi guerrilla groups
that realize one of Washington's central aims in
the country is to create viable, indigenous
security forces; when compared with US forces,
these units are often easier to kill and to defeat
due to their questionable dedication and
substandard training.
Iraqi security
forces have fallen prey to many different methods
of attack, from suicide car bombings to mass
executions by insurgent forces. Just recently,
insurgents practiced a modified method of attack
and packed a beheaded corpse with explosives,
blowing apart the policeman who arrived to
investigate the scene. Indeed, in November,
insurgents attacked police and national guard
units in Mosul, successfully taking control of
certain parts of the city. Because of these gains,
US forces have now been assigned to every police
station in Mosul in order to prevent another
situation where Iraqi security forces desert when
attacked by insurgents.
Insurgency
creates heightened instability
The surging
attacks by guerrillas in the past months are part
of a strategy to create massive instability
throughout Iraq in an effort to prevent or
discredit the January 30 general elections. The
other element of the insurgent strategy is the
targeting and killing of politicians and
government figures participating or working with
US forces. A series of assassinations and
assassination attempts has made the prospect of
participating in the US-fostered political process
extremely risky, a reality that grows more and
more precarious with each passing day.
For
instance, on January 4, the governor of Baghdad
province - Ali al-Haidari - while traveling in a
three-vehicle convoy in the northern Baghdad
neighborhood of Hurriyah, was assassinated by
insurgents. The murder of al-Haidari is
significant since he is the most senior figure to
be assassinated by insurgents since the killing of
the former president of the Iraqi Governing
Council, Abdel-Zahraa Othman, in May 2004.
The assassination of al-Haidari
accentuates the ability of insurgents to launch
carefully planned, strategic attacks aimed at
crippling the political process. Furthermore, the
assassination of such a significant figure speaks
to the ability of the insurgency to receive inside
information provided by members of the Iraqi
security forces. The head of the Baghdad division
of the Iraqi National Guard, Major General Mudhir
Abood, told reporters that members of his
paramilitary police force have leaked classified
information to insurgent groups.
This type
of behavior is a trend that is often observed when
outside powers attempt to build indigenous
security forces in a country facing an insurgency.
It was best witnessed during the US intervention
in Vietnam, when US-trained members of the Army of
the Republic of Vietnam supplied both classified
information and military equipment to the
insurgent forces that made up the Vietcong.
In addition to attacks on Iraqi
politicians, insurgents have also attempted to
exploit the sectarian rifts within Islam. Attacks
against Shi'ite power groups participating in the
upcoming elections have been pervasive; the
motives behind these attacks lie in the interests
of the Sunni Arab minority who aim to prevent
Iraqi Shi'ites from using their majority status in
the country to consolidate political power in the
upcoming elections. Assassination attempts against
Shi'ite political leaders occur frequently, such
as the December 27, 2004, Baghdad car bombing
directed at the offices of Shi'ite leader Abdel
Aziz al-Hakim, head of the Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in Iraq, one of the most
prominent Shi'ite political parties. More
recently, on January 12, gunmen killed Sheik
Mahmoud Finjan, a representative of Shi'ite leader
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
All of
these attacks by various insurgent groups are
meant to create a heightened level of instability
to prevent the January elections from occurring,
or, if this is not possible, to create conditions
where the turnout for the elections is so poor
that their results cannot be considered
representative of the population. While the
elections are still scheduled to proceed, the
insurgents have been fairly successful in their
strategy. On January 6, Lieutenant General Thomas
Metz, the commander of American ground forces in
Iraq, admitted that vital areas of four of Iraq's
18 provinces are not secure enough for citizens to
vote; the provinces - Al Anbar, Nineva, Salahadin
and Baghdad - are all Sunni-dominated areas and
contain 50% of the country's population. Indeed,
the continuing violence and Washington's
recognition of its lack of control is leading many
Iraqis to question whether the dangers inherent in
voting are worth the end result.
Insurgency steams ahead
These
developments speak to Washington's failure to
quell an insurgency that is rapidly growing in
depth and size. In November 2003, US General John
Abizaid, commander of US Central Command,
estimated that the insurgency "does not exceed
5,000" fighters. Now, in January 2004, new
estimates place the insurgency at more than
200,000 fighters and active supporters - a major
increase from Abizaid's previous claims of 5,000.
General Muhammad Abdullah Shahwani, the director
of Iraq's new intelligence services, said on
January 3 that "the resistance is bigger than the
US military in Iraq ... I think the resistance is
more than 200,000 people."
The growth
within the insurgency's ranks was foreseeable in
the months after the initial US invasion ended,
when US forces failed to create levels of
stability acceptable to the bulk of the Iraqi
population. Partly due to inadequate troop levels,
Washington failed to eliminate the lawlessness
that arose immediately after the ouster of Saddam
Hussein and his Ba'ath Party. In addition, basic
services such as electricity were not restored at
a quick enough pace to inspire confidence in the
occupying forces. As summarized by Shahwani,
explaining the motivations behind many of the
insurgents, "People are fed up after two years
without improvement. People are fed up with no
security, no electricity, people feel they have to
do something."
Another factor that likely
contributed to the growth of the insurgency was
the Shi'ite rebellion led by Muqtada al-Sadr in
April 2004. Al-Sadr's Mehdi Army engaged US-led
forces and, while greatly outmatched by US
firepower, managed to expose the weakness of
Iraq's security forces, which were largely unable
to repel attacks from al-Sadr's militia. Al-Sadr's
uprising, which did not even have the active
support of a majority of Iraq's Shi'ites,
dramatically revealed the power that Iraqi
Shi'ites could choose to exercise should they feel
that their interests are being violated. This
ominous development, which emboldened the
insurgents, accelerated Iraq's instability by
raising doubts over Washington's level of control.
Finally, another important factor
explaining Iraq's present instability is one that
came into existence in March 2003, when the
initial invasion was set in motion. By choosing to
invade Iraq, the Bush administration decided to
intervene in a country that suffers from broad
sectarian rifts that have existed since its
creation. Iraq's political questions have yet to
be answered, for there is still no understanding
on how the three main power groups within the
country - Sunni Arabs, Sunni Kurds, and Shi'ite
Arabs - will share power. In fact, the only factor
that has kept Iraq from falling into some form of
serious civil war during the past 84 years is the
country's historical legacy of authoritarian
governments that suppress all forms of dissent.
With the elimination of Saddam Hussein and the
Ba'ath Party, the failure to immediately construct
a new government that was either accepted by the
bulk of the population or acted authoritatively to
quash dissent resulted in the sectarian violence
surfacing today.
The preceding factors
help to explain why insurgents were not
immediately marginalized by the bulk of the Iraqi
population and have been able to grow in strength
and effectiveness. Some insurgents are supported
out of Iraqi nationalism and anger over the
actions of the US government in invading and
occupying Iraq, while others are supported because
they are pursuing the interests of their
particular religious/ethnic sect.
These
conditions impose an almost impossible hurdle for
the US to jump. As stated by James Dobbins of the
Rand Corporation and printed in the January
edition of the influential publication Foreign
Affairs, "The beginning of wisdom is to recognize
that the ongoing war in Iraq is not one that the
United States can win. As a result of its initial
miscalculations, misdirected planning, and
inadequate preparation, Washington has lost the
Iraqi people's confidence and consent, and it is
unlikely to win them back."
Exit
strategies
The present conditions in Iraq
are turning more and more undesirable for US
interests. Troop losses are turning American
public opinion away from the conflict, with 50% of
Americans now saying it was a mistake to send US
troops into Iraq; the economic costs involved are
skyrocketing, with the war costing thus far US$130
billion, well above the Bush administration's
initial estimates of $50-$60 billion; and the
military is overextended and has therefore
inadvertently decreased the potential threat of US
military action elsewhere in the world, which
works potentially to weaken US power. As a result
of deteriorating conditions, the Pentagon
announced on January 6 that it would be
dispatching retired four-star Army General Gary E
Luck to Iraq in order to carry out a review of the
military's entire Iraq strategy. In light of all
these developments, Washington needs to
concentrate on both short-term and long-term exit
strategies that will scale back its level of
present involvement.
Exit
strategies
Washington will find difficulty
in discovering exit strategies that do not damage
US interests. One potential exit strategy is a
mass influx of US troops into the country. This
strategy has been pushed by members of Congress,
in addition to former presidential candidate John
Kerry. Much of the instability that reigns today
is a result of the initial Bush administration
decision to use as few troops as safely possible
to occupy post-Saddam Iraq. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld assured in February 2003, before
the invasion, that "the idea that it would take
several hundred thousand US forces I think is far
from the mark." However, in that same month,
General Eric K Shinseki, the former chief of staff
of the US Army, advised that "Something on the
order of several hundred thousand soldiers, are
probably, you know, a figure that would be
required. We're talking about post-hostilities
control over a piece of geography that's fairly
significant with the kinds of ethnic tensions that
could lead to other problems."
But the
decision to use as few troops as possible for the
occupation created conditions where insurgents
were better able to plan and execute scattered
attacks on US forces, testing to find weak points
in the American military's defenses. Insurgents
were also able to execute attacks on politically
significant targets, such as oil pipelines and
crowded market squares; these attacks weaken
confidence in the occupying troops and create
heightened levels of instability.
Nevertheless, while in 2003 more troops on
the ground may have prevented the rapid growth of
the insurgency - by giving it less freedom to
organize and plan attacks - it is doubtful that it
would have the same effect now. The insurgency has
grown so large that an influx of troops could
merely mean more targets for the insurgents to
attack. Furthermore, present troop levels in Iraq
are already straining the US military to a degree
where any increase in deployment could damage US
interests and defenses elsewhere.
US Army
Reserve and National Guard soldiers already make
up 40% of US troops in Iraq, soon to be increased
to 50%. Both of these military divisions have seen
a shortfall in recruiting targets during the past
few months, as many Americans are hesitant about
making a decision that could cause them to be
mobilized for two straight years. The exhaustive
use of the military led Lieutenant General James
Helmly, head of the US Army Reserve, to announce
that that the reserve was "rapidly degenerating
into a 'broken' force". Retired four-star Army
General Barry McCaffrey agreed, saying in early
January, "The army's wheels are going to come off
in the next 24 months. The data are now beginning
to come in to support that."
The Pentagon
has already pulled some of its troops from South
Korea to redeploy them to Iraq, and military
officials are now mulling over whether to increase
permanently the active duty army force from
482,000 to 512,000 - an increase that will cost an
additional $3 billion a year; on top of these
proposed changes, the Pentagon is also debating
whether to change its National Guard and Reserve
mobilization policy to allow reserve soldiers to
be mobilized for more than two years of active
service.
Yet, as stated earlier, even with
these changes and an influx of troops to Iraq, the
US will have difficulty overcoming the insurgency.
Dr Max Manwaring, a research professor of military
strategy at the US Army War College, recently told
the Power and Interest News Report that, barring a
significant change of events, the insurgents will
eventually "take control of the state". Manwaring
argues that his studies of post World War II
insurgencies show that "the more intense and
voluminous the military actions of the intervening
Western power, the more likely the incumbent
government was to lose to the insurgents", and
that "the more the intervening power escalated the
numbers of its forces in response to a
deteriorating situation, the worse [the situation]
got".
Another exit strategy - one that is
presently being employed by the Bush
administration - is to create viable Iraqi
security forces to replace US forces quickly in
establishing stability. This policy, already
coined "Iraqification", is similar to the failed
"Vietnamization" policy of the 1960s and 1970s
employed during the US intervention in Vietnam.
This strategy is a must in order for the United
States - at some point in the future - to begin to
shift its forces out of Iraq; even if Washington
is still set on a long-term commitment in Iraq, it
must generate for itself the option of pulling
troops out of the country to deploy them
elsewhere.
Furthermore, the cold reception
that US troops received by the bulk of the Iraqi
population means that a high-profile American
presence should be avoided for risk of fueling the
insurgency. As explained by Dr Steven Metz,
chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning
Department of the US Army War College, to the
Power and Interest News Report, this "argument is
based on the assumption that it is the American
presence itself that fuels support for the
insurgency, so the less that presence, the less
support for the insurgency."
It appears
that Washington is coming to terms with this
necessity. General George W Casey, the top US
military commander in Iraq, is now considering
expanding a program where US military personnel
act as advisers to Iraqi security forces. As was
the case during US involvement in Vietnam, when US
advisers are present during engagements between
Iraqi security forces and insurgents, the security
forces are more effective. The drawback to this
expansion, however, is that it takes American
troops away from units that could be used to
launch offensives on insurgents.
Nonetheless, enhancing the effectiveness
of Iraqi security forces is of utmost necessity
for the United States. Speaking to the New York
Times, commander of US forces in northern Iraq,
Brigadier General Carter Ham, explained, "The
development of Iraqi security forces is, in my
view, necessarily the main effort." Ham commented
on the proposed adviser expansion program,
arguing, "It's time to apply it on a larger scale.
It seems to me that this is something we want to
start doing in the immediate post-election
period."
But, while the "Iraqification"
strategy is imperative, there is no guarantee that
it will be any more successful than it was during
the Vietnam intervention. The success of this
policy hinges on whether the US can marginalize
Iraqi guerrilla forces and prevent them from
gaining further support among the civilian
population.
Once again, this strategy had
a better chance for success early into the
intervention, before the rapid growth of the
insurgency. Now, the situation somewhat resembles
failed US attempts in Vietnam, where US-trained
indigenous forces were less resolute and poorly
trained when compared to their enemy counterparts;
for instance, in Iraq's most violent provinces,
desertion rates among US-trained Iraqi security
forces are growing. In a December 19 interview
with the American television program "Meet the
Press", Senator John W Warner, the Republican head
of the Armed Services Committee, warned that the
"raw material is lacking in the willpower and
commitment after [Iraqi security forces] receive
this training to really shoulder the heavy
responsibilities". Indeed, the Bush
administration's quarterly update to Congress on
Iraq stated, "While Iraq's security forces have
shown considerable progress during this last
quarter, the overall performance of these forces
has been mixed when put to the test."
The
one major difference between the situation in
Vietnam and Iraq - which is a positive sign for
American efforts - is that in Iraq the only
fighters threatening Iraqi security forces are
that of guerrilla forces, with limited
organizational cooperation between the different
militias; unlike Vietnam, there is no organized
state military that presently threatens Iraqi
security forces comparable to what ARVN faced from
the North Vietnamese Army. Without an organized
army to face, the situation in Iraq appears to be
less challenging than in Vietnam; Iraqi security
forces and the US military can concentrate solely
on preventing an internal revolution.
The
final exit strategy is the withdrawal of US troops
from Iraq's cities, allowing the different Iraqi
factions to work out a power-sharing arrangement
themselves. As part of this strategy, a greatly
reduced number of US troops would still occupy a
small number of fortified bases in order to
protect Iraq from attacks by outside states, along
with preserving the ability to launch quick
strikes against critical targets. Pressure for
this strategy is building; outgoing Secretary of
State Colin Powell is now arguing that American
troops will begin leaving Iraq this year, provided
that Iraq's security forces are able to take on a
larger security role.
On withdrawal, a
number of outcomes could occur. One such outcome
could result in the division of Iraq into three
separate autonomous regions, with the Sunni Kurds
inhabiting northern Iraq, Sunni Arabs controlling
central Iraq, and Shi'ite Arabs ruling over
southern Iraq. This outcome would cause a series
of problems: Turkey, and other neighboring states,
would be agitated over Kurdish autonomy; central
Iraq would crave the rich oil fields to its north
and south, and the Shi'ites of southern Iraq may
gravitate politically toward Iran. Such an outcome
could result in tumultuous civil warfare
throughout Iraq for years to come.
On an
American withdrawal, there is also the possibility
that a dominant power group within Iraq would be
able to consolidate control over the entire
country. While the Kurds have little capability
for this, the Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs do. A return
to Sunni Arab-based rule would result in a major
uprising by the Shi'ites in light of the country's
current power vacuum. And control by the Shi'ites,
which would be violently resisted by Iraq's
Sunnis, would likely seek assistance from Iran.
Conclusion
The United States is
facing an increasingly complicated intervention in
Iraq. Washington is presently focused on creating
as much stability as possible before the upcoming
general elections on January 30. Nonetheless, a
heightened level of violence is occurring and
there are still doubts over whether the elections
will be able to proceed as scheduled. For
instance, on January 3, Iraqi Defense Minister
Hazim Shalan advised that the elections could
still be delayed, provided that such a delay would
result in a higher participation rate from Iraq's
Sunni Arab population. Until this is decided, or
until the elections occur, little will change in
regards to the Bush administration's Iraq policy.
After the elections, however, the
administration will have to examine its viable
exit strategies critically. While the best case
scenario is the creation of a popular democratic
government, the odds of this occurring are now
highly unlikely. While it would be disadvantageous
to US interests for Washington to completely
withdraw from Iraq, it may be even more
disadvantageous to remain. In the words of former
secretary of state Henry Kissinger, "We will have
to decide to what extent we want to be involved in
what may become a civil war [after the
elections]."
While one potential exit
strategy is increasing US troop levels in Iraq to
foster conditions of stability, the overarching
present strategy is to create viable Iraqi
security forces. The failure to create viable
Iraqi security forces will mean the failure of the
intervention. If Washington's best exit strategies
are unsuccessful, then, for the sake of its
interests in the Middle East, the United States
must withdraw the bulk of its forces and
reluctantly offer support to whichever Iraqi
powerbroker has the best ability to stabilize
Iraq, even if that stabilization takes place
violently.
Published with permission of
the Power and Interest News
Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest
around the globe. All comments should be directed
to content@pinr.com |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
|
|
|
|
|
All material on this
website is copyright and may not be republished in any form without written
permission.
© Copyright 1999 - 2005 Asia Times
Online Ltd.
|
|
Head
Office: Rm 202, Hau Fook Mansion, No. 8 Hau Fook St., Kowloon, Hong
Kong
Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
|
Asian Sex Gazette Middle East Sex News
|
|
|
