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Iran's shadow over Turkey,
Saudi Arabia
By Jonathan Feiser
On January 1, Iran at last codified
that the Islamic Republic will hold presidential
elections this summer. One of the major policy
issues affected by this election will be Iran's
potential development and acquisition of nuclear
weapons. A nuclear Iran - regardless of its
intention - remains a clear and intrinsic threat
both to the United States and its regional
interests and allies.
If Iran were to
acquire nuclear weapons, then, from a strategic
standpoint, a "best case" scenario for US
interests would be an Iran that retains a
defensive stance and does not seek to expand its
influence in the region. That being said, even
defensive tactics can be affected in a world where
states possess variable and often wildly differing
notions of national security interests. Because of
this, Washington is working to take preventive
measures to slow Iran's quest for power. For
instance, one preventive measure - and a measure
that has been in place for years - is US economic
sanctions.
Washington's sanctions policy has not been
entirely effective. Iran's economic sectors remain
heavily reliant on energy resources. While
its energy industry is ineffectually managed
because of haphazard state control, questionable
oversight procedures, and murky forms of regulation, these
inadequacies and potential liabilities make little
difference to thirsty states such as China and
India, both of which have a growing demand for
energy resources.
Because of this, Tehran
is able to compensate for US economic sanctions
through its growing relations with China and
India. Further, in the case of China, it is not in
Beijing's present interests to see Iran weakened
and for the US to be strengthened, since increased
US influence in the Middle East and Central Asia
is looked on by Chinese policymakers as a threat
to China's growth as a regional power. These
geopolitical interests are intrinsically linked to
pipelines and other infrastructure investments
through Central Asia that have everything to do
with China's and India's interests in Iran.
In sum, the Iranian leadership
recognizes the energy-demand realities that limit the
consequences of US economic sanctions. Therefore,
Tehran's long-term solution is found within the
rudimental calculus of supply and demand:
regardless of US sanctions, countries experiencing
high growth rates and/or rapid industrialization
(China and India) or countries that have large
populations with no indigenous hydrocarbon
resources (Western Europe) will trade with Iran,
regardless of the ongoing "war on terror". In
addition, the current insurgency in Iraq, along
with the consistent insurgent tactic of targeting
oil pipelines there, has an impact on the markets
and will continue to place countries such as Iran
- regardless of the regime's nature or ideological
affiliation - on the preferred list of oil and gas
dealers.
Two regional US allies that are
affected by Iran's upcoming elections, and its
suspected drive toward nuclear weapons, are Turkey
and Saudi Arabia. On paper, both are allies of the
US, and depending on the terrorists caught in
their respective spheres of influence, ardent
advocates of the "war on terror".
Turkey's reaction to a nuclear
Iran
Turkey's reaction to a nuclear-armed
Iran is a complicated one at best. Turkey spent
its Cold War years under the nuclear umbrella
afforded by the US. For Ankara, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) has become more of a
symptom of the past than a solution to the future,
and Turkey's geopolitical and strategic situation
vis-a-vis a nuclear Iran capitalizes on this new
landscape.
In the face of a nuclear-armed
Iran, Turkey will not likely seek out nuclear
programs of its own because, at least for now, it
is perceived and perceives that Turkey is not the
reason Iran has sought to "nuclearize" in the
first place. However, Turkey's relations with
Europe - primarily through the auspices of its
long-awaited entrance talks with the European
Union - will affect its policies toward Iran. The
closer that it sticks to EU policy, the better
position it will find itself in the union - either
as an equal or shackled with new "requirements"
that would taint its relationship as something
similar to "separate but equal".
This is
where diplomatic decisions have strategic
consequences. Turkey's policy opportunities after
the Soviet Union lost control of Central Asia
remain dependent on Western states such as Europe
and the US for acceptance, while simultaneously
maintaining an easterly eye toward the
predominantly Turkic Central Asian republics as
hopeful horizons of uncertain opportunity. As
events on the ground begin to unfold both before
and after the Iranian elections this June, and the
reality of a nuclear-armed Iran becomes undeniably
clear, Turkish policy toward Iran will become a
matter of reaction rather than one containing a
slew of policy options.
In this context,
Turkey's value as a member of NATO, as well as its
present efforts to join the EU, will both become
critical variables vis-a-vis a nuclear Iran
"facing off" against a US and European regional
security consensus. Thus, Turkey's goal of
entering the EU will not merely rely on a series
of economic and humanitarian overtures of
submission, but also be based on what it chooses
to do in response to a nuclear Iran.
The
success of Turkey's venture to enter the EU, while
balancing the security and military concerns of
US, Israeli and European allies, remains
concurrent with its strategic disposition in
regard to a nuclear Iran. Ultimately, the economic
components of Turkish efforts toward membership in
the EU - and the reaction of its outcome - will
also be based on what Turkey will do in the face
of an Iran with nuclear weapons and the delivery
systems to match.
Lastly, Turkey's
internal political dimensions are important to
take into account when considering the
nuclearization of Iran. The primary Turkish issue
of conflict reflects a specific fault line evident
within Turkish society as well: the EU promise.
Although the Turkish National Security Council
(TBSC) has kowtowed to the theory of civilian
leadership - a precondition for entrance to the EU
- the essence of Turkish nationalism lies not far
below the surface. Attached to this powerful
notion of Turkish nationalism is the Turkish
military command structure and their Ataturk-based
mandate of guardians of a secularized Turkey.
The rise of a nuclear Iran would, in the
worst case, spark an internal strife between the
TNSC and the ruling reform-minded and
Islamist-tilted Justice and Development Party. In
spite of Islamic innovations within its platform,
the Justice and Development Party has worked
diligently to secure the hope of integration into
the EU.
In direct - yet quiet -
contestation to this, the TNSC has condemned these
reforms as a compromise tantamount to "selling
out" the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the
founder of modern-day Turkey. Thus, where the
Turkish military leadership would seek to meet
Iran with resistance, it would be highly probable
that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's party
would find themselves restraining a highly
nationalistic Turkish military, while seeking to
convince the Europeans that Turkey is yielding to
a more relaxed approach.
The dangers of
this dilemma, if it would occur, would be quite
serious. Turkey is still emerging from the Cold
War as a regional power. Indeed, its foreign
policy has sought to balance investment within
Central Asia with its security concerns with the
Kurdistan Workers' Party and the Konga-Gel at
home. The rise of a nuclear Iran would re-wire
already high tension between the Kurds and Turkey
over Turkish fears of Kurdish power in northern
Iraq.
Saudi Arabia reaction
It
would also be unlikely that Saudi Arabia would
nuclearize in the face of a nuclear-armed Iran,
certainly not because of economic factors, but
rather because of potential political problems
(although cost would nonetheless remain a very
real deliberating factor). Like Turkey, there
remain other factors that do, and would continue
to, motivate Riyadh to revert to more stringent
internal security policies versus attempting to
galvanize any tilt toward strategic or
medium-range nuclear technology.
Because
Saudi Arabia would likely not seek to build or
establish nuclear technologies, alternate means
could be considered to secure a similar strategic
end. More specifically, in regards to weapons of
mass destruction, the monarchy could seek to
increase clandestinely its chemical weapons as a
parallel deterrent. At present, the ruling regime
still has much to prove to its citizenry how it
can reform without breaking the perceived
interpretations of Islamic law. A nuclear Iran 10
or 15 years ago would have been a significant
threat to Saudi Arabia; today, however, it would
likely cause only a moderate change to the power
equation. Nonetheless, such change would greatly
benefit the Iranians with an advantage in current
bargaining issues - ie the treatment of Shi'ites
within Saudi Arabia - regardless of US sanctions
or rhetoric.
The closet analogy to the
US-Saudi relationship in regards to a nuclear Iran
exists more on political and economic paradigms
than on a reattribution of a de facto Cold War
scenario. In the modern sense, no one appears to
be pulling Iran's strings on the drive or meaning
behind its nuclear project. Indeed, the vision
herein is inherently based on internal and
historical factors that have fused themselves into
the perceived national security agenda of an Iran
that feels seriously threatened by a continued
perception of US military encirclement, in
addition to Israel's foreign policy strategy of
preventing an Arab or Persian regional hegemon.
In this same strategic conception of
US regional interests, Saudi Arabia owns
a significant amount of energy resources
that defines a large part of the industrial
dependency of the US. Since the virtual extinction of
known US hydrocarbon resources in the 19th
century, Saudi Arabia in the post-September 11 world
continues to maintain a role that would be deemed
somewhere along the line of "supportive ally in
the global war on terrorism" while utilizing this
relationship to do as little as possible - all
with the intended goal of maintaining power in
certain hands while balancing the internal power
of the Wahhabist clergy. A nuclear Iran would not
change this realpolitik balance unless it became
quite apparent that the US intended actually to
invade Iran.
Reacting to an aggressive
and nuclear-armed Iran
Both the Saudi
monarchy and the Turkish republic would face a
precarious dilemma in the face of a nuclear Iran
arm-twisting for conciliatory benefits. In such an
event, Saudi Arabia would face the possibility of
conceding limited regional influence to Iran - a
decision that would certainly heighten the chance
of increased US military aid to the Saudi regime
in order to rebuff potential unpleasant
developments that would tip the balance of power
against US regional interests.
Turkey,
however, would likely face a more complicated
dilemma in regards to an aggressive posture by a
nuclear-armed Iran. If this were to occur, there
would be an intensification of the political and
cultural/economic competition throughout the
Central Asia states - regardless of their ethnic
composition. Specifically in regard to Central
Asia, Turkey would likely attempt to balance
particular regional interests by tightening its
present relationship with President General Pervez
Musharraf's Pakistan.
Turkey continues to
re-establish better relations with the US since
Operation Iraqi Freedom. The rise - and perception
of the apparent rise - of a nuclear Iran has and
will continue to expedite an increase in mending
diplomatic and economic relations. This tactic
would not only prepare Turkey for Iranian nuclear
cards being played in the future, but would also
seek to reestablish a possible deterrence for
Iran. In the interim, however, it remains unlikely
that a nuclear Iran would be any less dissuaded
than a non-nuclear Iran.
Overall, Saudi
Arabia would likely maintain its present stance
because it would be in the best interests of its
own internal status quo. An Iran with nuclear
weapons would, in the best interests of the
al-Saud monarchy, not change, alter, confirm or
deny any shift of foreign relations with the
Islamic republic, Europe or the US.
Conclusion
A nuclear Iran would
alter the Middle Eastern balance of power as well
as create a risk for policymakers and military
leaders in the US and Israel. Key regional states
such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey have become more
neutral over time in regards to Iran. Some
balances, however, are all too often more temporal
than permanent.
The likely result of US
allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia pursing a nuclear
Iran with a "neutral course" remains an option
defined by both internal domestic consensus and
fear of being perceived "too close" to the US or
its "war on terrorism" for political and/or
ideological reasons. Such a course, however, in
the face of a nuclear Iran will cause the US and
its allies to consider a variety of responses,
ranging from sabotage to, in the worst case, some
form of US-acknowledged Israeli military response
that could possibly lead to some degree of direct
or indirect US military intervention.
Published with permission of the Power and Interest News
Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest
around the globe. All comments should be directed
to content@pinr.com. |
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