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Why insurgents may be the
winners
By Ehsan Ahrari
General George W Casey, commander of US
forces in Iraq, admitted on Thursday that the
American military has underestimated the strength
of the insurgency in that country. The admission
was hardly surprising. Looking at the evolution of
any insurgency from top down, and especially from
the perspective of an occupying force, it is
considered a safe strategy not only to  underestimate it,
but also constantly to belittle it for propaganda
purposes.
As Iraq edges close to elections
on Sunday, the position of the insurgents will
receive a major boost from an unlikely source: a
potential one-upmanship that is likely to begin in
the aftermath of the general elections, involving
the Shi'ites and the Kurds. Other parties are also
likely to participate in these maneuverings.
When the Iraqi insurgency was in the
beginning phase toward the end of 2003, the then
commander, General Tommy Frank, and US Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were depicting it in
unison as consisting of "dead-enders". Apparently
that characterization was being used for
propaganda reasons: to transmit to the Iraqis that
any protest against the occupation of their
country was a lost cause. One wondered whether the
Shi'ites of Iraq - a section of population that
experienced regular brutality and suppression at
the hands of Saddam Hussein - were then envisaging
the option of revolting against the occupation of
their country as a futile endeavor.
It
appeared that during that time, the Shi'ites were
in the process of making up their minds about how
to deal with the occupation forces. They were
hoping that the result of the toppling of Saddam
and the foreign occupation of their country would
lead to the creation of a democratic system that
would give them political power based on their
sheer numbers. Of course, that perspective was
reinforced by the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
Consequently, the Shi'ites - for the most part -
decided to avoid confronting the occupation
forces.
The Kurdish population also
appeared to go along with the US depiction of the
insurgency as composed of "dead-enders", since
Kurds were also aspiring to emerge as victors in
the post-Saddam political order. On the other
hand, Sunni anger toward the United States was
expected only to rise, since they found themselves
the major losers in the post-Saddam era.
Well, a lot has happened since then. The
Iraqi Shi'ites still perceive themselves as
potential winners of the elections. So do the
Kurds, but they are getting bold in their
political demands. This reality has the potential
of further complicating things for the US, as it
continues to rely on Kurdish support in Iraq and
also counts on a sustained Kurdish-Shi'ite
cooperation.
According to a dispatch
issued by the Kurdish media on Tuesday, Noshirwan
Mustafa, an aide to the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK), stated, "Iraq's Kurds are not
actively seeking independence, but will be unable
to remain Iraqis if the Baghdad government fails
to observe their key demands." He added that there
are "three red lines" for the Kurds. If they are
crossed, "we will no longer be Iraqis". These
include: "if the Arabs do not accept the principle
of federalism"; "if they insist on a theocratic
regime"; and "if the Kurdish terrorists are not
returned to Kurdish officials". Everyone
recognizes the theatrical elements of this
statement; however, the US may not be able to
disregard it completely.
This seemingly
voluble rejection of a "theocratic" government by
the Kurds may be welcome news to the Americans. At
the same time, it is potentially problematic,
considering that the Shi'ites might opt for a
visible - if not an overwhelming - role of Islam
in the government that takes shape after the
elections. So there is the potential of a major
Shi'ite-Kurdish conflict on the role of Islam
alone. If a strongly pro-Iranian government were
to come to power as a result of
coalition-building, there is little doubt that the
Kurds would do everything to sabotage it. There
has never been any love lost between the Iraqi
Kurds and Iran.
As the Kurds remain wary
about the possibility of a Shi'ite-dominated
Islamic government, there is also a likelihood
that such a government would chisel away at the
rights of the Kurds. The latter, in return, would
start a campaign for rejecting the provisional
constitution of March 2004. The Kurdish advantage
stems from the fact that the provisional
constitution "stipulates that Iraq's new basic law
must be put to a referendum, which could declare
it invalid if two-thirds of the electorate votes
against it in three of Iraq's 18 provinces". Since
three provinces have a Kurdish majority, there is
a distinct possibility that the Kurds would
trigger a "no" campaign.
At the same time,
the Kurds are upset about the future control of
Kirkuk, which they want to remain Kurdish. To
nullify any Kurdish advantage emanating from their
numerical majority, Saddam, as a matter of
deliberate policy, flooded Kirkuk with Arab
residents. Now, Kurds want to regain control of
it. About 100,000 of them returned to Kirkuk and
wanted to register to vote, but were denied the
right to do so. They blame the US authorities for
buckling under the pressure of the Arab Shi'ites,
who oppose any special treatment or concessions to
Kurds.
In the final analysis, there
remains an uneasy truce between the Shi'ites and
the Kurds. That truce can be broken within no time
after the elections, if or when either party
concludes that its advantage stemming from the
post-election political arrangement is being
jeopardized or nullified by the other. (It should
be reminded that the possible strong reaction of
Turkey in the seemingly rising demands of the
Kurds is also a variable that is weighing heavily
on the US side. Turkey has made it known that it
will not stand by idly if Kurds are given control
of oil sources, or what Ankara would regard as
undue power in Iraq that would have a spillover
effect across the borders in Kurdish-populated
areas of Turkey.)
Precisely because of
these intricacies and the uneasy truce, the
current advantage of the Iraqi insurgents may
increase if there is an outbreak of violence
between Shi'ites and Kurds after the elections.
The entire Kurdish history has proved that they
are tempted to exploit short-term advantages,
thereby enabling other parties to exploit their
proclivity for risk-taking at the expense of
nullifying potential long-term gains.
Today's Iraq has become a place where all
the major actors have some advantages, yet those
advantages encounter serious limitations and
require cooperation from one or more major actors.
In the absence of such cooperation, one or more
main actors are likely to falter. To be specific,
the Shi'ites, the Kurds, the US and the Sunnis
enjoy discernible, though limited, advantages.
Shi'ites have a numerical majority, yet they must
have the US-backed elections in order to become a
dominant force. The Kurds have a comparatively
lesser advantage, but the US eagerly seeks their
support. The Kurds, in turn, are dependent on US
support and on the willingness of the Shi'ites not
to undermine the Kurdish advantage after the
elections. If that were to happen, the Kurds would
retaliate by starting a campaign to reject the
March 2004 constitution. The Sunnis, seemingly the
biggest losers, are on the sidelines, either
willing to boycott the elections or afraid to
participate because of insurgent threats. Still,
they are expected to be given a minority role in
the government. After their dominant status of the
Saddam era, they don't expect to emerge as a major
player, unless the Shi'ites and the Kurds were to
become embroiled in a protracted conflict.
The insurgents, on the other hand, are
emerging as potentially the most advantaged party,
since they have everything to gain if all other
parties lose their respective advantages. The
bottom-line implications for Iraq from this
intriguing one-upmanship appear to be a continued
cloudy future and prolonged instability.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an
Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent
strategic analyst.
(Copyright 2005
Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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