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When losers are
winners
By Ehsan Ahrari
The less-than-spectacular
victory of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), which
received 48% of provisional votes in the Iraqi
elections of January 30, creates some problems for
the expected dominant role of the Shi'ites in
forming the transitional government. The Kurdish
coalition, which received 26% of provisional
votes, has demonstrated an impressive show of
unity, but might suffer a setback because of its
unrealistic demands for independence. Sunni
participation has been low. In Anbar province, for
example, turnout was reported to be less than 2%.
Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's group
garnered 13% of the vote. Still, the real
"provisional" winners appear to be Sunni Arabs and
insurgents, for different reasons. Now the ball is
very much in 
the court of
the UIA, not only to construct a unity government,
but also to disallow the insurgents - the true
enemies of democracy - from becoming victorious
through bloodshed and mayhem.
The 8.5
million votes for the UIA is somewhat of a
disappointing number. Even if the final tally were
to raise that number by half a million or so
votes, that alliance must think imaginatively
about offering the other victors - the Kurds, the
Allawi plank and even Sunni Arabs - a share in
power. It will be some time before the modalities
of Kurdish demands will finally emerge. In the
meanwhile, a possible UIA and Allawi power-sharing
arrangement would definitely mean that the
Islamist demands of assigning Islam primacy in the
new Iraq would either have to be lowered, or
considerably neutralized.
Allawi is
operating under two most discernable drives. The
first is his own personal will to become prime
minister in the new government, or at least be
offered the position of foreign minister or
defense minister. If he does not become premier,
he will have to implement the policies of an
Islamist-leaning prime minister. That would make
it difficult for him to keep his own group intact.
In addition, after serving as prime minister under
the interim Iraqi government, he might find it
difficult to remain a minor actor in terms of
carrying out the policies of the new prime
minister, even after obtaining the portfolio of
either the defense or foreign ministry. The second
drive that will be working on Allawi is from the
American Embassy in Iraq, which will ceaselessly
push him in the direction of secular policies.
Even after the expected emergence of the
UIA as the dominant governing party, the
administration of US President George W Bush will
not give up its own drive to lower the potentials
of the emergence of Islam as a primary force in
the new Iraq. Despite the willingness of Allawi to
remain the likely source of pushing the American
agenda, by calling it his own, there are
limitations on America's capabilities to influence
him. At some point, he will have to recalibrate
his association with the US, especially if he were
to perceive it as an obstacle in the way of his
political ambitions. For that reason alone, he
will have to show at least some palpable semblance
of independence from American influence in the
coming months.
Another complication that
the UIA will face is the growing maneuverability
of Ahmad Chalabi. He was the golden boy of the
Pentagon before and during the US invasion of
Iraq. As such, he was successful in feeding a lot
of lies and exaggerations to his American
interlocutors about the purported weapons of mass
destruction-related capabilities of Saddam
Hussein, and the fictitious linkages between the
Iraqi dictator and al-Qaeda prior to the US's
invasion of Iraq. Even though it might never be
proven conclusively whether Chalabi was fooling
the neo-conservatives of the Bush administration
or was merely telling them what they wanted to
hear, so that some semblance of rationale could be
developed for invading Iraq, Chalabi lost his
credibility with the Americans because of his
connections with Iran. In fact, as a remarkable
demonstration of falling out, American forces
raided his house last May, with the public
explanation that they were seeking evidence of his
alleged complicity in the leaking of secret
information to Iran. Now, he is being courted once
again by the Americans. Even that reality
underscores how none of them - the UIA, the
Americans, Allawi or Chalabi - are certain about
their future courses of action in Iraq. The sad
irony related to the awesome decision of the Bush
administration to topple Saddam is that, today,
America's choices are reduced to the UIA, Allawi,
and Chalabi.
Let no one forget the Kurds
and their role in the future of Iraq. However,
even after winning 26% of provisional votes, their
maneuverability might be limited, for at least two
reasons. First, despite their perfunctory denials
to the contrary, the Kurds really want an
independent Kurdistan, which no other parties in
Iraq - nor any Iraqi neighbors - want. That very
reality limits their clout in Iraq, since no one
wants its dismemberment solely to fulfill the
parochial aspirations of the Kurds for a homeland.
Second, now Kurds are reportedly posturing for the
presidency, a position the UIA has every intention
to use as a bargaining chip for re-engaging the
Sunni Arabs.
The less-than-spectacular
victory of the UIA might materialize into a
reality that should be welcomed by the Americans.
That reality would be assigning a lesser
significance to the Sharia (Islamic) laws as a
bargaining chip on the part of the UIA to engage
the Kurdish and Allawi planks. Both groups would
be happy if there is a palpable separation of
religion and politics for the same reason. They
want it because, aside from agreeing with such an
arrangement, they envisage it as a means of
remaining influential, especially if the Americans
were to remain engaged in the post-election Iraq.
Besides, as Chalabi and Allawi exhaust their
respective capital by outmaneuvering each other to
gain a major post in the new government, the Kurds
envision themselves as a real power that the UIA
must reckon with in order to establish a
government.
Finally, the Sunni Arabs and
insurgents have their own reasons to continue to
believe the great American "philosopher" Yogi
Berra's immortal words of wisdom: "It ain't over
until it's over." The UIA is likely to remain
focused on fully engaging the Sunni Arabs, both in
writing the constitution and in governing Iraq, by
offering them the presidency. At some point in the
near future, it is possible that the Sunni Arabs
will reconcile themselves with the less
significant political role in the post-Saddam Iraq
and start their own maneuverability for increased
political power. The most visible side-effect of
such a maneuvering might, once again, be the
enhanced role of Islam in the future governance of
Iraq, a variable that the Americans will be warily
watching.
The unknown factor, at least for
now, remains the role of Shi'ite cleric Muqtada
al-Sadr. He has let it be known that he will
support whoever emerges as the dominant party in
Iraq. The unstated assumption is that he is only
thinking in terms of supporting the Shi'ite group.
Still, Chalabi and the UIA are actively courting
him. The litmus test for gaining Muqtada's support
will be the willingness of the receiving party to
be visibly anti-American. Chalabi might be
attempting to persuade him in that regard
behind-the-scenes; however, the UIA is likely to
have an advantage over him as long as it maintains
its visible pro-Islamic credentials.
In
the meantime, the insurgency will continue its
long-standing strategy of spreading chaos through
a campaign of murder and mayhem. As nefarious as
its activities are, now it will add another
equally disgusting wrinkle of nullifying the will
of the Iraqi people by attempting to assassinate
elected officials. The most effective way to
undermine this campaign is for the UIA to engage
the Sunni Arabs as quickly and as meaningfully as
possible. In this sense, even by not participating
in the elections, the Sunnis of Iraq have not lost
their important political status. If they are
engaged, Iraq still has a decent chance of
emerging as a moderate Islamic democracy.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an
Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent
strategic analyst.
(Copyright 2005
Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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