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The peace pipe's on the table
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
TEHRAN - In the current multilevel talks between Iran and the so-called
European Three - Germany, France and the United Kingdom - the fate of
Middle East peace may be hanging by a thin thread, notwithstanding the second
Bush administration's thinly disguised military threat to attack Iran's nuclear
facilities "should diplomacy fail".
A military strike by either the United States or, worse, Israel is bound to
slide the troubled Persian Gulf region into the vortex of a dangerous crisis,
with the potential to engulf the wider region, given the near certainty of a
stern Iranian response, perhaps triggering an escalating nightmare.
With Israel suffering from a "tyranny of distance" from Iran, to quote an
Israeli general, and Tehran sending a warning to its neighbors about severe
retaliation in case anyone contemplates allowing its airspace to be used for a
foreign air strike against Iran, the most likely scenario, then, is one by the
US military, relying on a combined assault by bombers and missiles, not to
mention sabotage by Special Operations forces.
Either way, many civilians would be killed, particularly in the population
centers crowding some of Iran's nuclear facilities in Tehran, Isfahan and
elsewhere, sure to cause a massive backlash among the mostly patriotic Iranians
who may not necessarily like the ruling clergy but, nonetheless, seem to pride
themselves on the rumored nuclear capability of Iran.
Already Muslim zealots have set up recruiting centers around the country,
mobilizing thousands of volunteers for suicide bombings in the event an attack
on Iran materializes; the latter would almost by definition finish off the lame
moderates in Iranian politics and give rise to an even more hardline, and
homogenous, ruling group, hardly the desired outcome for the future of
democracy in Iran.
Thus it is abundantly clear that war prevention merits our attention,
particularly by the European leaders now warming up to the second
administration of US President George W Bush, which has wasted little time in
targeting Iran as its next Iraq, more or less.
But Washington would be remiss to overlook the protean value of the Paris
Agreement, signed with Iran last November, whereby Iran agreed to freeze its
uranium-enrichment program and, in return, the European Union pledged to assist
Iran in various economic, trade, technology and even security matters.
As reports of stalled talks between the two sides indicate, there is a distinct
chance that they may break down and Iran may resume its nuclear fuel cycle, as
it is legally entitled to per Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Indeed, the legal basis for Europe's request that Iran scrap its fuel cycle and
look to the outside world for the necessary (low and medium grade) enriched
uranium for its reactor(s) is seriously lacking, which is why the Paris
Agreement is clear that the Iranian suspension is "voluntary" and not a "legal
obligation".
But another aspect of the Paris Agreement that deserves serious attention,
particularly from the Bush administration, is the part that calls for
"objective guarantees" that would ensure the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear
activities. Officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have
assured the negotiation parties in the Iran-EU3 talks that it is possible to
set up such a verification system that would be tantamount to objectively
ascertaining the absence of any diversion to weaponization.
The linchpin of this system would be the permanent placement of IAEA inspectors
in Iran, whose job would be to monitor tightly the goings-on at the various
nuclear facilities, such as the Bushehr power plant, slated to go operational
in early 2006. The extensive use of tamper-proof seals put on Iran's
centrifuges, as well as surveillance cameras, represents other similar,
and effective, means to fulfill the requirements of "objective guarantees"
whereby Iran would resume its uranium-enrichment programs while simultaneously
addressing the fears and concerns of the outside world.
From Iran's vantage point, it makes perfect economic sense to produce nuclear
fuel locally, at home, instead of being dependent on a more expensive foreign
source. Estimates are that the Russian import of roughly 27 tons of nuclear
fuel to Bushehr, for a one-year cycle, would cost more than double what it
would cost to produce it at home, ie, about US$25 million instead of $50
million. Nor is it prudent from the point of view of environmental safety to
rely on long-distance shipments of the nuclear fuel and or the return of spent
fuel, when the latter can be more safely deposited in Iran's vast deserts;
concerning the latter, Iran and Russia have finally resolved their remaining
differences over the return of spent fuel, and the agreement on this is about
to be signed after President Vladimir Putin's recent statement about the
peacefulness of Iran's nuclear industry.
Unfortunately, neither the economic nor the environmental, nor even the
security, dimensions nor the rationale of Iran's production of nuclear fuel
figure prominently in the US or European discussions of Iran's nuclear
programs. Increasingly, Europe appears to be leaning in the United States'
direction, calling for a permanent suspension of Iran's fuel cycle, without
taking into consideration the important considerations of Iran or the viability
of a workable system of verification under the rubric of "objective
guarantees".
Clearly, the US can make a substantial, proactive contribution to the current
nuclear talks in Europe between Iran and the EU, notwithstanding the Iranian
foreign minister's call on the US to join the dialogue. Sadly, for reasons only
known to the White House, Iran's call has gone unheeded so far, with the US
intent on constantly raising the stick of punishment to prevent the Iranians
from turning the switch of dialogue off and ending their uranium suspension.
Instead of such "stopgap" measures, the US should consider setting aside its
reservations and join Europe in direct and frank talks with Iran, not only on
the nuclear issue, but also on security, terrorism and other issues mentioned
in the Paris Agreement. Short of this, the US cannot in the future rely on a
make-believe "failure of diplomacy" for an Iraq deja vu, that is, making
recourse to brute force to settle the thorny issue of weapons of mass
destruction.
There is no empirical evidence to support the US allegation, stated by
President Bush in his State of the Union address, that Iran is actively seeking
weapons of mass destruction, given Iran's full compliance with the IAEA's
intrusive Additional Protocol and the IAEA's unfettered access to civil and
military sites.
In fact, the biggest contributor to a public debate on nuclear weapons in Iran
has been the role and importance of such weapons in deterring future US
aggression against Iran; the more the United States', and Israel's, threat of
"preemptive strike", the stronger, and more voluminous, the call for a nuclear
shield, such as what Pakistan has against the larger, and more
powerful, India.
Hence the US saber-rattling against Iran actually has the opposite effect of
fueling Iranian sentiments in favor of a nuclear deterrence against the US
"leviathan" running rampant after its victories over Russia and, more recently,
Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime.
As a result, a prudent US and European policy would be one that seeks to
assuage the national-security fears of Iran and to propose such security
formulas for the Persian Gulf region that would promote regional cooperation
and a common cause against the scourge of war and terrorism. Both the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and more so the OSCE (Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe) have a role to play here, and Iran would be wise to
consider cooperation with both organizations.
But above all, it is imperative, for the sake of the future of Middle East
peace, that both sides in the nuclear talks focus on the issue of "objective
guarantees" and reach a consensus on the nature of monitoring and verification
mechanisms necessary to this end. The US at present seems disinclined to follow
this path, which, if successful, would likely herald a significant new chapter
in Europe's trans-continental diplomacy and, perhaps, a precious lesson for the
White House in terms of alternative crisis resolution.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) and "Iran's Foreign Policy
Since 9/11", Brown's Journal of World Affairs, co-authored with former deputy
foreign minister Abbas Maleki, No 2, 2003. He teaches political science at
Tehran University.
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