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SPEAKING
FREELY
Democracy, act 1
By Bashdar Ismaeel
Speaking
Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows
guest writers to have their say. Please click here if
you are interested in contributing.
The much hailed and maligned milestone for
the staging of democratic elections in Iraq on
January 30 has now passed. On the surface, a
remarkable milestone has been set. This represents
the first democratic election in Iraq for more
than 50 years and signifies a glimmer of hope that
a true democracy, seemingly a traditional taboo in
the Middle East, can prevail, even in the face of
the conspicuous ethnic mosaic in Iraq. Just as
important for the US in particular, the
elections convey a strong message against the
fight on terrorism, that the will of the people
can overcome insurgency, oppression and
trepidation. For many Iraqis, with a newfound
feeling of freedom and optimism, going to the
polls was too good an opportunity to turn down,
even in the face of possible death.
The elections were organized to
select a 275-member National Assembly and
choose local governorates for each of Iraq's 18
provinces. For the autonomous Kurdish area in
the north, elections were also undertaken to
elect a 111-member Kurdistan parliament. The job
of the transitional assembly is to draft a new
Iraqi constitution by August, a deadline that is extendable
by a further six months if an agreement has
not been reached, and then to hold
a constitutional referendum in mid-October with a view
to staging full constitutional elections for
a full-term parliament in December.
However, with the current violence and instability
in Iraq unlikely to change overnight
and Iraq's reconstruction and path to prosperity
long elusive, many questions on the future and fate
of the Iraqis are still open to debate. For a
start, how more than 12 party groupings represented
in the new transitional assembly can be
patched together and united is as difficult to estimate
as any. It is clear that for democracy and unity
to prevail in Iraq, some relatively unheard-of
concepts in Iraq must be realized - compromise,
ethnic co-existence and the establishment of a
united vision. Where democracy in the traditional
sense would mean that the post-ballot cake is cut
according to electoral opinion, this is somewhat
different in Iraq. Even though the elections have
now been held, the dispute over the share of the
"piece" of the cake will rage on - some fear even
violently.
Polling success
The
Iraqi elections were hailed as a great success:
more than 8 million people, or about 58% of the
electorate, turned up at the polls, including
thousands of expatriates in a number of other
countries, with comparatively low violence and
electoral violations. The turnout for the
elections was in the eyes of many surprising and
the determination to vote in some areas quite
remarkable. This was particularly gratifying for
the United States and Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's
interim government, which in the face of intense
pressure remained defiant on staging these
elections. Quite extraordinary security measures
were in force to ensure the success of the
elections and the safety of the electorate.
For many of the Kurdish and Shi'ite
voters, they had endured countless losses and
systematic terror to bear the fruits of this
historic day and were evidently defiant to
participate in the polls, highlighted by the
significantly high turnouts in these areas. In
contrast, however, there was a much lower turnout
in Sunni-dominated areas. Ironically, as the Sunni
clerics were urging a widespread boycott of the
vote, the Shi'ite clerics were issuing
fatwas (religious decrees) for the
obligation to vote. The Sunnis clearly had the
most to lose in the staging of these elections, as
election day in Iraq rubber-stamped their
transition to a newly found minority status from
decades of total dominance.
Election
results
With the significantly high turnout
in the Kurdish and Shi'ite areas, the results were
perhaps as expected, with the Kurdish and Shi'ite
groups attaining almost 90% of the total vote. The
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) won 50% of the total
votes cast, a principal majority but crucially,
and to relief in some Western circles, not the
overall two-thirds majority required to dominate
government. The Iraqi List, spearheaded by the
secular-minded Allawi, won 14% of the vote,
leaving the Kurdistan Alliance to emerge as one of
the prime benefactors of the elections and the
runners-up with 26% of the overall vote.
The low gains in the main Sunni-dominated
areas were ominous, with Shi'ite lists even
claiming victory in traditional Sunni heartlands
such as Salahuddin, where many polling stations
did not open and in some areas were blown up even
before election day. In Anbar province, a
stronghold of the Sunni insurgency, voter turnout
was only 2%, with other areas not faring much
better. For the majority of the population in
these areas, the fear of attack or oppression was
too great, but many also heeded the call for a
boycott. A Sunni cleric claimed that the lack of
representation of the Sunni regions meant that
elections were void. However, as the election
results became clearer, some Sunni groups
seemingly began to express reservation at calls
for a boycott with neither a significant boycott
to bring illegitimacy to the election nor an
effective insurgency to disrupt the election.
For the Kurds, the decision to award votes
to those former Kurdish inhabitants of Kirkuk who
were forcibly displaced under the infamous
"Arabization" campaign, represented an endearing
success and a turn of fortunes. They emerged as
the clear winners of the provincial election in
Tammim, home to Kirkuk and a large proportion of
Iraq's oil wealth. The political jostling for the
much-coveted oil-rich lands of Kirkuk did not go
unheard in Turkey, which aired deep regret and
claims of undemocratic moves in the
Kurdish-dominated areas of northern Iraq. Turkey
is long fearful of Iraqi Kurdish motives to claim
Kirkuk as the capital and economic hub of a future
independent Kurdistan - a nightmare scenario for
Iran and particularly Turkey, which has a
significant and restive Kurdish population.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan hit
out vociferously at the United States for failing
to contain Kurdish moves in northern Iraq, which
he argues could throw the entire region into
turmoil.
Composition of the National
Assembly
Even before the results were
formally announced, Allawi appealed for unity
among Iraqis. Allawi's drive for "a new national
dialogue" with the goal of Iraqis setting aside
their differences can now begin. With no party or
coalition claiming the necessary two-thirds
majority to control the assembly, the passage of
classic diplomacy, comprise and power sharing must
now begin. How the coalitions will take shape is
crucial in the success of the transitional
assembly and its primary responsibility of
drafting the new constitution.
If the Transitive Administrative
Law (TAL), a mini-constitution signed
last year, is anything to go by,
then negotiations and compromise for the full thing
will take many months, especially if uneasiness to
make concessions is expressed by any one party.
The TAL took months of negotiation, was signed days
after the original planned ceremony and was
even nullified to an extent when United Nations Resolution
1456 failed even to mention it. Days after
its signature, particular uneasiness was felt
by the Shi'ites, who felt that as the majority,
they compromised far too much and ceded too
much to the Kurds, who were in effect granted
veto power in the three northernmost
provinces.
The Kurds, with 75 seats and
the second-largest representation at the National
Assembly, are anticipated to provide sufficient
leverage between the cosmopolitan mixes in Iraq
and will be confident of acting as a power broker
between the two main Shi'ite parties; The UIA,
spearheaded by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and
masterminded by the influential and much-revered
Shi'ite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,
who won a clear 140-seat majority, and the
Democratic Alliance fronted by Allawi, who
attained 40 seats. The Shi'ites, and particularly
the UIA, as the majority population in Iraq and
biggest winners of the seats at the National
Assembly, will be eager to consolidate their
long-sought grip on power and have the biggest
influence and input to the composition of the
Iraqi constitution.
Many groups within
Iraq and even the US to a great extent are fearful
of the potential desire for some Shi'ite political
groups to enforce a religious curriculum in the
new Iraq and side closely with the Iranian
theocracy across the mountainous plains. Sistani
himself is said to be a strong advocate of
ensuring that Islam is the official religion in
Iraq, as is the case with most of the bordering
countries. However, crucially, the UIA now needs
to seek a coalition partner to form a two-thirds
majority and new cabinet.
The anticipated
choice, as a major holder of seats and the
necessary number to form a majority, would be the
Kurds, who would be willing to support a Shi'ite
program in return for a deal on the return of all
Kurdish lands, including Kirkuk, to the Kurdistan
area and enforced by a guarantee of a federal and
secular region in the north. In fact, an alliance
between the Kurds and the Shi'ite parties is
highly likely, even in the appointment of the top
positions in the new cabinet. The Kurds would back
the UIA candidate for the more powerful role of
prime minister as a reflection of their majority
status, with the UIA in return supporting a
Kurdish candidate for the less powerful but
nevertheless iconic position of president.
After much negotiation, the UIA has chosen
Ibrahim Jaafari of the Da'wa Party as candidate
for prime minister. Jaafari will now face Allawi
for the post, the latter having announced on
Monday that his party had nominated him for the
position. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan head Jalal
Talabani is reportedly widely favored for the
presidential appointment.
Of the numerous
challenges posed in the formation of the National
Assembly and its subsequent function, possibly the
most arduous and intricate challenge is how to
unite Iraqi society, and more precisely bring the
Sunni population to the negotiation table. The
leader of the main Sunni-dominated alliance
represented by the Iraqi Independent Democrats
Party, Adnan Pachachi, emphasized that it is
crucial that those Sunni parties who boycotted the
elections be involved in writing the constitution.
"If that can be done, I think we will have paved
the way for a much more inclusive election before
the end of the year," said
Pachachi.
Analysts have warned that a lack
of Sunni representation in the government will
result in sectarian strife and ultimately a costly
civil war. Wamidh Nadhmi, the leader of the Arab
Nationalist Trend and a spokesman for a coalition
of groups that boycotted the election, called for
a new conciliatory line for fear of being
side-stepped in the new Iraqi constitution, a sign
of a back-down from the pre-election stance.
Nadhmi claimed, "The two sides have come to a
conclusion that they have to respect the other
side if they want a unified Iraq."
However, how likely those coalitions are
to accept Sunni participation this late in the
game is unclear. After all, how can democratic
results and the opinion of the greater voting
public be that easily changed? The main Shi'ite
coalition winners have tried their best to
reassure their Sunni brethren and have emphasized
that the "participation of all" is essential for
the new government. However, if the Sunnis feel
that their status within the Iraqi demographic
network is misrepresented, they are unlikely to
settle for views imposed by so-called lesser
minorities than themselves. It is clear that
without Sunni support and subsequently the
potential veto power wielded by any three
provinces, the constitution may prove to be an
elusive and arduous task.
The Iraqi
mosaic
Coalitions, federations and
political deal-making may work in the short term,
but unlike in many traditional democracies, if
these temporary political bonds fall, the effects
will be much greater. The reason for this is
simple: whereas in most modern Western-style
democracies there is a general census or common
identity, this is not true of Iraq. Iraq is a
British-fabricated state carved out of the
remnants of three former Ottoman provinces that is
represented by two main ethnic groups, Kurds and
Arabs, and two main religious sects - Sunni and
Shi'ite Muslims. If the Iraq mosaic ever needed
further complicating, in addition to this there
exists a significant minority of Christians,
Turkmens, Assyrians and Chaldeans. Many of these
groups, and particularly the Kurds, found
themselves imposed within the boundaries of the
newly found state. They have been long oppressed
and denied a say in the formation of Iraq.
The Kurdish public expressed its desire in
an unofficial poll held in parallel with the Iraqi
elections for secession and even the leadership
have indicated that in an ideal world free from
intimidation from its neighbors, they would prefer
independence. In the new Iraq, some groups are
very suspicious of secession attempts by the
Kurds. Nerchivan Barzani, the current prime
minister of the Kurdish regional government, is
under no illusion that for many months to come
Kurdish desires for federalism would be seen as
separatism and he agrees that it would take time
to change that mentality and culture.
However, with the strong desire noted for
independence and a virtual autonomous status for a
future Kurdish administration, it becomes evident
that either a breakdown in a coalition between the
Kurds in the National Assembly or if the Kurds are
denied a major say in the formation of Iraq, this
would lead to a strong threat of secession. For
many groups within the Iraqi political landscape,
these persistent threats may be unacceptable and
some Shi'ite groups in particular would directly
oppose a veto-status for the Kurdish north. When
the time comes for real negotiation over
oil-sharing revenues, the internal security
matters of each federation and the exact nature of
the implementation of federalism, this is where
the political jostling will really begin. Simply
agreeing to a democratic, plural and federal
society does not constitute the finer details of
its application.
Unlike traditional
democracy, groups will demand a say regardless of
the proportional representation in the National
Assembly. The Sunnis, of whom many chose not to
vote, will still demand a say in the constitution.
Likewise, for a separate ethnic group such as the
Kurds, even if they had won a small fraction of
the seats, they would still have demanded equal
citizenship and rights in the new Iraq.
Conversely, the Shi'ites, although constituting
about 65% of the assembly, will be prevented from
making a strong mark on the constitution.
Political harmony and reaching a true democratic
age will take more than just the elections that
have just passed, or even full constitutional
elections later this year. In fact, for many the
elections were nothing more than an ethnic census
based on temporary and loose coalitions to
maximize the gain of each group. The fear,
suspicion and at times oppression experienced
between the Shi'ites, Kurds and Sunnis will not be
patched overnight nor over the negotiating table
in a matter of months. Unfortunately, the true
fruits of the Iraqi elections will only be felt in
a number of years to come. However, Iraqis can be
proud that they have at least sown the seeds for
that day to come.
Conclusion
It is clear
that however difficult and costly the run-up and
staging of the elections actually were, this was
the easiest part of the transition to democracy. For
now the real decision-making and political jostling
must begin. Far too many issues have been
left to one side and the resolving of these issues
to the satisfaction of the general Iraqi ethnic
landscape may prove to be much fiercer than
the violence and bloodshed that has become synonymous
with the liberated Iraq since the US
invasion of March 2003. Although the elections were
much heralded by the US, it would be unwise
to believe that this is the turning point for
which it has been yearning. The administration of US George
W Bush, clearly jubilant but taking
nothing for granted, stressed that there was still
much to do before Iraq could endure a free and
stable society in which Iraqi forces could ensure
their own security. Such views were echoed by
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who
remarked that "as impressive as that election was,
Iraq still faces a difficult road ahead ... this
is not a time to sit on our hands and congratulate
ourselves".
It is very likely that the
violence in Iraq for the foreseeable future may in
fact increase rather than cease. It is even more
unlikely that every party and ethnic group around
the negotiating table can be kept satisfied and
assured that their best interests have been
catered for. What level of happiness and
compromise the three main groups within Iraq will
settle for is integral to the future success of
the embryonic democracy in Iraq. Crucially, for
many the new Iraq represents as much classic
compromise as a time-delayed bomb. In the short
term at least, Iraqi political groups can be
encouraged by the recent post-election
conciliatory line taken by the mainly Sunni
groups, many of those who were initially opposed
to the elections. Sunni willingness to take part
in writing the political framework for Iraq and
Shi'ite readiness, at least in some circles, to
accept their Sunni brethren, may be just the note
required to get the National Assembly of to a
positive and productive start.
However,
all this rhetoric over power jostling and
political championing should not throw the US and
the international community away from reality.
There is clearly an evident lack of food, medicine
and construction in Iraq - the basic needs of man
above any ethnic and political grappling. Perhaps
the best summary of what the Iraqi population
advocates was made at a polling station: "I am
here to vote for peace, freedom and bread."
Bashdar
Ismaeel is a
London-
based freelance writer who also holds first-class bachelor
of science degree honors. The focus of his work is
primarily on
Iraq
,
the Kurds and Middle Eastern current
affairs. He can be contacted at
bashdar@hotmail.com.
Speaking Freely
is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest
writers to have their say. Please click here if
you are interested in contributing.
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