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    Middle East
     Feb 26, 2005
SPEAKING FREELY
Defeating Islamic fundamentalism
By Mark N Katz

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.

Will Islamic fundamentalism eventually fizzle out the way Marxism-Leninism did? While Western - especially US - military force played an important role in containing Marxism-Leninism, it did not defeat it. The downfall of Marxism-Leninism came about instead through its being discredited as a failed ideology among those who had ruled in its name.

While (primarily US) military force has undoubtedly played an important role in containing Islamic fundamentalism after September 11, 2001, there is strong reason to believe that the use of force alone will not defeat Islamic fundamentalism. Indeed, even the successful use of US military force does not appear to discredit this ideology among its adherents, but to strengthen their belief in it. If the death or capture of Islamic militants leads to others - however misguided - willingly stepping forth to replace them, then the "war against terrorism" will be endless.

But if Islamic fundamentalism cannot be defeated from without, can it be discredited from within the way Marxism-Leninism was? It is impossible to predict when, or even if, something like this might occur. There are signs, however, indicating is has begun to happen:
  • The Taliban, for all its internationalist revolutionary rhetoric, was a predominantly Pashtun movement that forcibly extended its domination over most of Afghanistan's non-Pashtuns. Part of the reason the US-led intervention in Afghanistan was able to succeed so quickly was that non-Pashtuns (and even some Pashtuns) were eager to collaborate with the United States to get rid of the Taliban. This is consistent with other cases where a transnational revolutionary ideology failed to overcome narrow ethnic or national differences.
  • The oldest Islamic revolutionary regime - Iran - has been undergoing a chronic crisis of legitimacy. Anti-American rhetoric cannot hide the regime's own failings. Young, educated Iranians have become increasingly cynical about the wisdom of the regime's self-appointed leadership. They want the country to be run by elected leaders instead. Whatever the appeal Islamic fundamentalism may have in countries where it has not yet come to power, Iran's experience suggests that popular support for it declines the longer it has been in power.
  • Some Muslims reportedly welcomed the attacks of September 11, 2001, as "blows against imperialism" that enhanced the legitimacy and prestige of those who launched them. But as al-Qaeda and its associates have increasingly launched attacks on fellow Muslims, doubts and fears arise about its ultimate intentions. A Muslim world free of Western influence may appeal to the emotions of many. But what would such a world be like for Muslims themselves? This question becomes more urgent as it becomes increasingly clear that al-Qaeda is not simply opposed to the West, but to Muslims whom it deems insufficiently religious. As Muslims come to fear what the implications for their own lives might be like afterward, optimistic assumptions about the benevolent nature of an Islamic fundamentalist revolution will erode.

    What can the United States and its allies do to increase the prospect that Islamic fundamentalism will become discredited within the Muslim world? One thing should be clear: military means alone will not accomplish this task. Other means, then, will be needed if Islamic fundamentalism is to be discredited within the Muslim world. What might these be?

    Transnational revolutionary ideologies such as Islamic fundamentalism link many localized conflicts (such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, Kashmir and Chechnya) together into an overarching narrative that points to a common cause for their grievances, identifies common allies, and proposes a common solution. To the extent that specific Muslim-vs-non-Muslim conflicts can be resolved, the incentive to join a transnational revolutionary movement will be reduced for those to whom these conflicts are most salient. For example, if the Arab/Israeli, Kashmiri or Chechen conflicts could be resolved peacefully, Palestinians, Pakistanis and/or Chechens would presumably have far less incentive to join forces with Islamic fundamentalists in conflicts that are still being fought elsewhere.

    There are those who are attracted to the Islamic fundamentalist revolution because they see it as the only means available for overthrowing US-backed authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world. US and other Western support for democratization in the Muslim world might serve to undercut the desire for revolutionary change. And as Islamic fundamentalists participate in elections and government, many (if not all) of them might become more moderate. This already appears to be happening in Afghanistan as a result of the first presidential elections held there in late 2004 and in Iraq as a result of the National Assembly elections held on January 30.

    Resolving intractable Muslim-vs-non-Muslim conflicts and democratizing pro-Western regimes will, of course, be extraordinarily difficult. Failing to accomplish these tasks, however, may only serve to increase the likelihood that Islamic fundamentalist revolutions will occur in more countries.

    Like Marxist-Leninist regimes during the Cold War, these regimes may well become discredited internally over time, and enthusiasm for Islamic fundamentalism is likely to die out among those who have direct experience of life under it. There are important signs that this process has reached an advanced stage in Iran. But this is a time-consuming process that is highly costly in terms of human lives. Muslim nations - as well as the rest of the world - would be better off if they could avoid this process through a combination of conflict resolution and democratization. If we can help Muslim nations accomplish this, we will do much to discredit Islamic fundamentalism - something that will help both the Muslim and the non-Muslim worlds.

    Mark N Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University. His writings on revolution include Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves (St Martin's Press, 1997), Reflections on Revolutions (St Martin's Press, 1999), and ed, Revolution: International Dimensions (CQ Press, 2001).

    Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.

    (Copyright Mark N Katz, 2005)



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    Islam: Religion or political ideology? (Aug 10, '04)

    9-11: The big question remains unasked (Apr 20, '04)

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    Islamism, fascism and terrorism (Nov-Dec, '02)
    A series by Marc Erikson

     
     

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