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COMMENTARY
Black
holes and rogue states
By
Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - Was the Iraqi
war worth fighting? History is not made of "ifs"
and "buts"; however, as many people in America,
and in Europe, are playing with the idea of
fighting a new war in Iran, or even throwing
around plans for intervention in North Korea, one
should first reflect on what happened in Iraq.
The January 30 elections in Iraq were a
great success. Nearly 60% of eligible voters went
to the ballots, and given the present climate in
the country, this could be interpreted to mean
that the bulk of the population rejects the
violent insurgency. Despite this, suicide attacks,
bombings and kidnappings are part of daily life,
and it will take years, if not decades, to restore
normal life.
In the meantime, US troops
have no realistic possibility of being withdrawn
without further endangering security, and hundreds
of billions of US taxpayers' money will have been
spent by the time the last troops leave. At the
same time, Iraq has become a training ground for
thousands of restive youngsters who, once peace is
established, might lend their experiences to the
next terrorist leader or druglord.
The US
in particular and the West in general are in a
large quagmire that keeps energy prices high,
imposing an additional burden on global
development; this spreads waves of instability in
Central Asia and the Middle East and forces huge
expenditures that possibly could be better placed
for growth at home.
The focus on Iraq
overshadows the fact that Afghanistan also needs
attention. Since the US kicked out the Taliban in
late 2001, the old warlords have re-established
their rule, financing themselves with the drug
trade. Now, more opium is planted and sold in
Afghanistan than ever before, and much of this
money is used to finance the destabilization of
the economies and societies of Central Asia and
some Eastern European countries. If some of this
money is used to finance terrorists, it may well
mean a slow death for the West. By the time Iraq
is at peace again, billions of dollars of drug
money could already have polluted the region.
In theory, criminal activities are easier
to tackle than ideological threats:
Fundamentalists are revolutionaries bound to
destroy their enemy, they are not interested in
the market. However, history tells us that the
boundaries between criminal and terrorist
activities are often tenuous, overlapping is
historically the rule, and al-Qaeda and the
Taliban have in the past thrived on the proceeds
from drug trafficking.
The arguments do
not dismiss the reason for the war in Iraq, which
was to eliminate a dangerous rogue state. Yet it
is the very idea of a rogue state that is wrong.
This concept derives from the old pirate
wars, and in part from a Cold War mentality. In
the 16th and 17th centuries, Spain, Britain and
Holland fought proxy wars by supporting pirates.
Francis Drake, the most famous pirate of all,
saved Britain from an invasion by the "invincible"
Spanish armada of Philip II, and was knighted by
the Queen for his efforts. During the Cold War,
the USSR ordered Czechoslovakia to train "red"
terrorists from Western countries, and Libya and
Lebanon became training grounds for attacks aimed
at destabilizing Europe.
In all of these
instances, there were "rogue states", such as
17th-century Britain and 20th-century Libya, whose
existence made possible the proxy war of pirates
and terrorists.
Spain tried to wage war on
the "rogue state" by invading Britain, but failed.
Libya was to be taught a lesson when the US sent
planes to bomb Muammar Gaddafi's house, but
Washington did not go as far as to mount a
full-fledged invasion, lest it provoke a larger
conflict with the USSR, then the "super rogue
state".
When the USSR faded into history,
the difference in power between the US and other
minor states was enormous; however, the threat
they posed to the US was out of proportion to the
size of their power. Therefore, the US started
thinking that they were "rogue states", and that
their threat could be easily removed by waging
war. The pros were much larger than the cons, a
war, say in the Gulf, would cost the US money, but
would pose no larger threat to US security. And
the US's image would be boosted, projecting itself
as a power beyond the limits of the war itself.
And this would bring home additional bounties in
kind - ie, oil and crucial transportation routes.
This was true before globalization. It is
a different matter in a world with the Internet,
mobile phones and air transport that can take
anyone anywhere for a few thousands dollars. One
could set up a criminal or terrorist headquarters
in a garage next to the White House. Trafficking
opium or amphetamines, or any other criminal
activity, can provide all the hidden cash
necessary to finance any kind of terrorist
activity. The only thing globalization can't
provide is a safe haven, a geopolitical black
hole, where militants can be trained and possibly
even recruited.
A rogue state, whose power
is vastly smaller than the US's, could be cowed
into submission, as occurred with Libya. Even the
most recalcitrant ones, like North Korea, will be
very careful about shooting off their weapons, as
their leaders will be afraid of US retaliation.
North Korea, the rogue state par
excellence, is the classic example. It has nuclear
weapons and delivery capabilities that could
target Tokyo, and possibly even San Francisco. It
has the political madness to act - as it did in
the invasion of the South in 1950 - and has proved
many times that it will use any action, such as
kidnapping Japanese citizens. Yet North Korea is
largely under control, and it has not exported its
domestic crisis into launching a war.
Importantly, though, the attack on Iraq,
and the fact that coalition forces remain in
control of only a small portion of the country,
has provided terrorist organizations a safe haven,
a geopolitical black hole, to train their people.
Not only that: the arrival of foreign troops and
the disruption of former institutions have
provided fertile ground for the recruitment of new
militants. In a black hole, no leaders are
threatened or cajoled. The leaders are in hiding
and difficult to catch, and even if caught, others
will take their place because behind the leaders
as there is no solid institution responsive to
pressure and afraid of disruption; behind the
leader the organization is in hiding, and it is
often very loose and poorly coordinated. It is
very difficult to bring such a situation under
control.
One may be reluctant to admit it,
but rogue states can easily be brought into the
normal political order, as happened to one country
which until recently was considered the worst of
all - Libya.
In the 1990s, the US went
into Somalia to try to re-establish order there.
It found that there was no state, no country, but
only a loose cluster of tribes constantly at odds
with one another. The US first had to impose a
state on them, and then re-establish order. But
organizing a state from scratch is a very long and
cumbersome process. The US preferred to leave
Somalia to its mess.
The question then is,
are we certain that rogue states are worse than
geopolitical black holes? The perception is that
an organization like al-Qaeda could be easier to
face if it were some kind of old-style Leninist
structure, with a definite place. Now, al-Qaeda
finds it convenient to fight its war in Iraq,
where it doesn't have to search for enemies - the
enemies are there to be targeted.
However,
al-Qaeda might decide to move to Africa. With a
satellite phone, a lap-top and the electricity
generated by the engine of an automobile it could
coordinate its actions while moving through this
vast continent, where groups of militants could
train themselves at ease. What it would not have
in Africa are the facilities and the ease to move
around through delicate spots in Europe and Asia,
(what al-Qaeda had in Afghanistan, conveniently
located at the center of the Eurasian continent),
and there would be a shortage of recruits as
Africans are at war with themselves and bear
little grudge against Westerners, and even less
against Asians.
In Afghanistan, 10 years
of war against the Russians provided enough hatred
for anything Western, be it materialist communism
or materialist capitalism.
However, if
another rogue state were to be hit, and its
institutions were to be destroyed, like Iraq, this
would add a new geopolitical black hole. That
might avoid the risk of a geopolitical threat such
as Iran or North Korea, armed with nuclear
weapons, but it would create a bigger, long-term
problem.
This could be life-threatening to
the US. September 11 was launched from and by a
geopolitical black hole, Afghanistan, not a rogue
state. In fact, as it is fully clear now, Iraq had
nothing to do with September 11.
One can
raise many points to argue that North Korea now is
much less of a problem than even de-Talibanized
Afghanistan, which is pumping tons of drugs and
billions in drug money into all of Eurasia.
Francesco Sisci, based in
Beijing, is Asia Editor for the daily La Stampa.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd.
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