Damascus puts Syria first
By Sami Moubayed

DAMASCUS - Some indicators show that Syria has finally started to reconcile with the United States and the rest of the world. The road to normalization is still very long, however, and Syria needs a lot of pragmatism if it wants to stick by its convictions, yet appease Washington to avoid a head-on-clash.

Over the past two weeks, former friends of Damascus, such as British Prime Minister Tony Blair, his Foreign Minister Jack Straw, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, and French President Jacques Chirac, have pitched in with US President George W Bush, telling the Syrians to leave Lebanon.

Many are speculating that the US will deal with the presence of 15,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon as it dealt with the Iraqi presence in Kuwait in 1991: war. The widely read Syrian journalist Ibrahim Hamidi wrote in the London-based al-Hayat that in 1991, Saddam Hussein believed that the US would invade Iraq, regardless of whether he withdrew the Iraqi army from Kuwait or not.

The situation in Syria is totally different and the US will not strike at Syria, nor does it want to topple the Syrian regime. Bush wants to change the policies of the Ba'athist regime in Damascus, and not the Syrian regime in itself. Among Syria's gestures signaling that it wants to cooperate with Washington and avoid such an outcome are tight control on the Syrian-Iraqi border, extraditing wanted ex-officials of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party from Syria, supporting the Palestinian-Israeli peace efforts, starting to withdraw the Syrian army from Lebanon, and permitting the resignation of the pro-Syrian cabinet of Lebanese prime minister Omar Karameh.

Many in Syria have been calling on President Bashar al-Assad to follow a "Syria first" strategy, although it contradicts the ideology of the ruling Ba'ath Party, which places emphasis on "Arabism first".

"He [Assad] should do what it takes to preserve Syria," is a phrase being heard all over Damascus. It should replace the Ba'ath Party motto, "One united Arab world with an eternal message," and the trinity of "unity, freedom and socialism" that Syrians have been indoctrinated with since 1963. It is this trinity, and the notion of "Arabism first" that have brought Syria to the troubled situation it is in today.

For the better part of the 20th century, Syria has involved itself, often crazily and needlessly, in Arab affairs, often damaging its own interests for those of the greater Arab world, as part of its commitment to Arab nationalism. This was the case even before the Ba'ath Party came to power in March 1963. The policy of "Arabism first" is now dead, among public and government alike.

Ironically, its leading advocate, the pragmatic president Hafez al-Assad, was the first man to turn against it in 1980 when he sided with Iran in its war against Iraq, and in 1991 when he went to war with the US against Iraq. His decision was "Syria first" par excellence, getting him on the good side of Washington as the USSR was falling apart, getting the US to launch the Arab-Israeli peace process at Madrid, and giving him a green light to establish a pro-Syrian regime in Lebanon, and oust army commander Michel Aoun.

The Syrian regime today should learn from Hafez al-Assad and do what it takes to maintain "Syria first", even if, sadly, this would be at the expense of its interests in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine. "Syria first" means bowing before the storm that is heading toward Damascus at monumental speed, and at this stage, doing what it takes to please the neo-conservatives in the White House. Some might call it weakness, others might say it is abandoning Arab nationalism, but to the average Syrian, it would be great conventional wisdom. It is the average Syrian who will suffer if war breaks out in Syria, therefore, they are the ones entitled to say what suits Syria most. "Syria first" they are saying all over Syria, and apparently, Assad has heard their calls, and is responding promptly.

A lesson from history
During the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, the leaders of Syria faced a dilemma that greatly resembles the one facing Assad today. They asked: do we accept the reality that we are unable to face the storm heading toward Syria? Meaning, we abandon our commitments to Palestine, accept the United Nations partition plan of 1947, and raise the slogan "Syria first". Or do we live up to our history of Arab nationalism, and the legend we created for ourselves, and gamble with Syria's future by sending its army to war in Palestine?

Some argued in 1948 that they did not want history to say that Israel was created without the Arabs putting up a fight against it, regardless of whether they won the war or not. But in fact, history today does not mention the bravery of the Arabs for going to war in 1948, all it mentions is their weakness.

In 1948, president Shukri al-Quwatli knew that the Syrian army was weak, and bound to be defeated if it went to war in Palestine. The Syrian army had only recently been created (in 1946) after the French mandate ended in Syria; its soldiers were ill-equipped, and its officers were inexperienced and unable to engage in proper combat.

Yet Quwatli could not possibly admit that to the Syrians. It was Quwatli after all, and his generation of politicians, who had indoctrinated the Syrian people with myths about their superiority since the final days of the Ottoman Empire. It was Quwatli, one of the finest and greatest patriots of modern Arab history, who had spoken of Arab nationalism, and particularly Palestine, pledging his support for Syria's "Arab brothers". The Syrians were a great people, he would say, with a great and strong army, and their history proved that they could defy and defeat any threat being made against Syria.

How could he now, in 1948, tell the Syrian people that they were weak and alone in the international community, and that Syria's weight in the world order was minimal? How could he tell them that it was the British, and not the people of Syria, who had actually liberated Syria from the Ottomans in 1918 and the French in 1946? Rather than tell them the truth, Quwatli decided to continue in the myth of political greatness he had fed his people (with good intention) since coming to power in 1943. He went to war in Palestine and the Syrian army was defeated because Quwatli did not have the ability to stand up for "Syria first" in 1948.

Assad's choice
In 2005, Assad stands where Quwatli stood 58 years ago. Today, realizing that the US is serious in its threats, he needs to avoid the fate of Quwatli. When he came to power in 2000, Assad marketed himself as a fervent Arab nationalist, with great commitment to the Palestinian cause. He had to fill in the shoes of his father, who, during his 30-year rule as president of Syria, had shown great commitment to the liberation of Palestine.

Assad used every public occasion to support the uprising in Palestine that broke out two months after he came to power, in September 2000. It became the cornerstone for political discourse, and the yardstick for nationalism in his new Syria. His most notable speeches, eulogizing the uprising in Palestine, were given during Arab summits. Government officials praised the Palestinian resistance, who had political offices in Syria from the days of president Hafez, poets wrote eulogies, state-run TV, radio and newspapers hailed the uprising as one of the greatest events in modern Arab history.

Donations for Palestine were raised throughout Syria, and Khalid Meshaal, leader of the political bureau of Hamas, appeared often among Syrian masses during demonstrations in Damascus, pledging that the uprising would continue. How can Assad today ask the Palestinian resistance based in Damascus to leave? He has repeatedly stressed that Hamas and Islamic Jihad only have media offices in Syria.

Can he tell the world today that he had to ask them to leave because it is in Syria's national interest that they set up base elsewhere? Conventional wisdom says: yes, because "Syria first" is more important today, to the average Syrian, than the intifada in Palestine. Assad has already made his decision, despite the latest lobbying of Israel, accusing Syria of standing behind the Islamic Jihad bombing in Tel Aviv last week that led to the killing of five Israelis.

Offices of the resistance no longer exist in Syria. All of their top leaders, including Meshaal, have been politely asked to leave, to prevent Syria from US pressure, or an Israeli air strike, like the one made in October 2003 at the Ayn al-Saheb camp near Damascus, which Israel claimed was a training camp for Islamic Jihad.

Syria has supported the Sharm al-Sheikh summit in February, which effectively ends the Syrian-embraced intifada. In 2003, when Mahmud Abbas was prime minister under Yasser Arafat, he attended a summit at Sharm al-Sheikh with Bush to negotiate the "Road Map", which also, if implemented, would have actually ended the intifada. The first Sharm al-Sheikh conference was greatly criticized in Syria, and so was Abbas for his cozying with the US.

Syria today is helping Abbas negotiate a ceasefire with Hamas through Hezbollah. Abbas acknowledged Syria's cooperation and new attitude on the BBC, after the Tel Aviv bombing of February 25, saying, "There is neither any evidence nor any proof that Syria was involved in the attack. For this reason we cannot speculate on the issue because of a lack of evidence."

When the war on Iraq began in 2003, Syria lobbied extensively against the US invasion. It did this through its diplomats at the United Nations, in world capitals, and on the streets in Syria through the massive demonstrations that took place against the US. When the war broke out, many Syrians, indoctrinated with hatred for the US due to its invasion of Iraq, crossed the border into Iraq and took up arms against the Americans.

This was done without approval of the Syrian government. It was a populist movement motivated by a combination of Arab nationalism, Islamic nationalism, despair and hatred for Israel and the US. The people wanted to fight and unleash their anger. If they were prevented from going, the state reasoned, these angry mobs would have certainly unleashed their anger inside Syria, at other Syrians and at the government.

Some of Saddam's officials came to Syria when the war ended in April 2003, and since then, the US has demanded their extradition, but Syria has denied that they were on its territory. Many senior officials were turned away at the Syrian-Iraqi border and were latter arrested like rabbits in different parts of Iraq. Since then, the US has accused Syria of all sorts of different crimes, ranging from welcoming Saddam's closest aides to Syria, to funding the uprising of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, to sending arms and volunteers to fight in Iraq. Ostensible evidence has been brought up against Syria: men appearing on Iraqi TV and admitting that they had been trained by Syrian intelligence, a claim by Iraqi Defense Minister Hazem al-Shaalan that an Iraqi woman, trained in Syria, had tried to assassinate him, and a statement from Prime Minister Iyad Allawi saying that he possessed photographs of guerilla fighters of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq with a high-ranking Syrian official, reported by media sources on the Internet to be Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam.

This is hard to believe because Syria would certainly not benefit from any insurgency on its borders that threatens to spill its chaos into the Syrian republic. It was the chaos in Iraq in April 2004 that led a group of armed Syrian men to return to Syria and carry out an act of sheer terrorism in Damascus, attacking and destroying a UN building. As for the photographs, it is difficult to believe that any Syrian official, not least the seasoned Khaddam, would have his picture taken as a souvenir with masked men in khaki outfits carrying weapons and heading off to Iraq.

Some argue that all of this meddling is taking place without approval, or knowledge, of Assad. It is being done, they claim, by one of his many senior intelligence officers. This is even more difficult to believe since today there are no security barons in Syria who have autonomy, or a large following, to carry out operations on their own.

With regard to Iraq, Assad has already began to pursue the "Syria first" strategy. First, he endorsed the Iraqi elections in January 2005, letting the Iraqis living in Syria vote for the US-backed post-Saddam order. He welcomed Allawi in Syria with full honors, although many in Syria consider the Allawi regime illegal because it was imposed by the US. It has created a wall on its 606 kilometer border with Iraq to prevent people from illegally crossing, and created observation units to monitor everyone and everything roaming around the border.

In early 2005, more than 15 clerics were arrested for calling on their followers to fight the Americans, as part of their religious duties (jihad). More recently, Syria has applied strict security on its border to prevent the crossing of insurgents through the Syrian border, and handed Sabaawi Ibrahim, a senior advisor and half-brother to Saddam, to Iraq, where he will stand trial as a war criminal, like all other ex-officials of the Ba'athist era. Sabaawi was number 36 on the US list of 55 most-wanted officials from Saddam's regime.

Syria's new attitude and cooperation were confirmed by none other than the usually aggressive Iraqi Defense Minister Shaalan, who said on al-Arabiyya TV, "Recently a form of cooperation has begun and, truth be told, Sabaawi was seized through cooperation with the Syrian side."

With regard to Lebanon, Syria has also began to apply the "Syria first" strategy. Over the past few months, international pressure has increased on Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon. France, the US, and the UN have all pitched in with Resolution 1559, demanding that the Syrian army leave Lebanon, and the disarming of the Syrian-backed Hezbollah.

Pressure was increased on Damascus after the assassination of Lebanon's former prime minister Rafik Hariri in February, and many, including Great Britain, the US and the Lebanese opposition, blamed Syria (either directly or indirectly) for Hariri's murder, claiming that as the protector of Lebanon, it had failed to protect Hariri.

Syria showed resistance to comply with withdrawal, knowing that its regional reputation would be tarnished if it pulled out of Lebanon under US pressure and to the chants of "Syria out" by the Lebanese opposition. Assad apparently realized the gravity of the situation and began withdrawing his troops from Lebanon, regardless of the bad image, in accordance with the internationally recognized Taif Accord, co-authored by Syria in 1989.

Total withdrawal, Assad said to Time Magazine, would be in a matter of months. It would probably be under the auspices of the Arab League. Syria would receive some form of guarantee, or promise, from the US that it will not impose sanctions on Syria, that it will lift the Syrian Accountability Act, and upstart the Syrian-Israeli peace process.

On February 28, the pro-Syrian yet greatly unpopular cabinet of Prime Minister Omar Karameh was dissolved by Karameh himself, greatly defusing the anti-Syrian sentiment that was brewing in Lebanon. Syria did not comment on the matter, saying that it was an "internal Lebanese issue".

What Syria needs to do today is secure the resignation of the unpopular and Syrian-imposed President Emile Lahoud, because that is what the entire world wants, and totally absent itself from the upcoming parliamentary election of Lebanon in May. In the meantime, its allies in Lebanon should be completely abandoned and left to deal with their constituencies in the elections.

If they are popular among their people, like Hezbollah, they will survive in post-Syria Lebanon. Anti-Syrian figures like Aoun should be permitted to return to Lebanon, and the arrested warlord Samir Gagegea should be released (he was arrested during the Hariri era in 1994). All of this would restore the confidence of the Lebanese, the UN, France, and all of Europe, in Syria, and Assad. It would gain more time for Syria, and make it easier to engage in dialogue with the US.

Dr Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.

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