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SPEAKING
FREELY
The state(s) of
Iraq
By Tom R Burns and Masoud
Kamali
Speaking Freely is an Asia
Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say. Please click here
if you are interested in
contributing.
Overview
The United States and the European Union
announced in February that they were committed to
a "federal, democratic, pluralistic and unified
Iraq". This commitment fails to take into account
the historical and social conditions prevailing in
the "state of Iraq" and is likely to lead to
disastrous violence. But other scenarios are
possible. We propose an organized transition
process with multilateral negotiations among major
Iraqi groups, the involvement in mediating and
peacekeeping roles of the EU (and possibly the
United Nations) and regional powers Turkey and
Iran.
This would reduce the risk of the
further deterioration of Iraq into a
post-Yugoslavia type of situation. This article
stresses the importance of considering alternative
institutional designs for a future "state of Iraq"
and dealing effectively with the substantial
issues of minority rights and equitable
distribution of oil revenues and other key
resources.
A crooked
history
Iraq was from the moment of its
artificial construction, in the wake of the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, a fragmented
society with deep cleavages (consisting of three
very different provinces of the empire). Such a
construction could only be ruled by coercion.
Systematic force was employed by the British in
establishing its rule over "the state of Iraq" in
the pursuit of geopolitical position and, of
course, oil.
Military force was used again
and again to solve political conflicts, threats or
problems of government. Similarly, and more
systematically and brutally, the Ba'ath Party
established in the early 1970s a totalitarian type
of rule. The Ba'ath regime, particularly under
Saddam Hussein, managed through a balancing of the
use of the carrot and the stick to maintain some
equilibration of the religious and sectarian
conflicts: Kurds versus Arabs (and versus the
central government of Baghdad), Sunni versus
Shi'ite, among others.
The Ba'ath
government - obviously, a ruthless one - managed
to link to the party many Iraqis who previously or
potentially would have opposed the central
government. Thus it achieved some success in
integrating many of the country's disparate social
forces.
The US invaders in 2003 decided
(despite numerous warnings from the Army War
College and The Future of Iraq Project, located in
the US State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs) to eliminate the two institutions that
might have helped to maintain public order in
Iraq, namely the Ba'ath Party and the army. The
way was opened, not unexpectedly, for a
substantial breakdown of public order in much of
Arab-speaking Iraq (observable on television each
day).
The present weak (barely the
skeleton of a) state is a serious problem in the
face of the challenge to maintain public order - a
major threat in any country when the government
collapses, but especially problematic in a deeply
divided society such as Iraq (which risks evolving
into a post-Yugoslav type of chaos). New power
bases are of course emerging; for instance, the
Kurdish quasi-state in the north, armed insurgent
groups, especially in Sunni areas, and Shi'ite
clerical power introducing new forms of religious
politics - largely foreign to Iraqi post-World War
II politics.
The present occupation
government has little or no legitimacy in Iraq -
and therefore little capacity to mobilize or make
use of civil society - because it is closely
associated with non-Islamic forces and is largely
understood as an alien power (except among many
Kurds). It is apparent that the US (with its
proxies) is unable to govern Iraq or maintain
stable order.
Possibilities and risks:
The EU as midwife
The US and Britain, and
their allies, will not be able to remake Iraq - or
to engage in effective "nation-building" (Pentagon
chief Donald Rumsfeld's skepticism about
nation-building in Iraq is insightful and
correct). They are not even in a position to
mediate multilateral negotiations. They lack
sufficient legitimacy and support (also, in the
Iraqi collective memory, Britain is an old
colonial power, which in 1920 poison-gassed and
bombed Iraqi towns, killing many civilians).
A new Shi'ite authority (led by the United
Iraqi Alliance with all of its own complexity and
divisions) - probably with Kurdish involvement -
is likely to emerge as the core of a new
government after January's elections. This
government should be prepared to recognize and
negotiate with agents representing diverse Iraqi
interests (and powers). Above all, it needs to
make perfectly clear that the future institutional
design of Iraq is open to negotiation with a view
to achieving consensus, and, in any case, need not
be a unitary, majority-rule state.
Substantial consensus about the eventual
form of the state is essential to lasting peace
and stability. Sustained consensus is less a
requisite in the case of a confederation or
separate states than in the case of a unitary or
even a federal state. Elections are only a small
part of the democratic process. And, as Tayyip
Erdogan, prime minister of Turkey, emphasized
recently in an interview in Davos, the Iraqi
election has not been fully democratic, in part
because of the Sunni boycott and the threatening
forces of insurgency in many parts of the country.
The new Shi'ite-led government likely to emerge
will have at least four major tasks:
(1)
To begin immediate negotiations with
representatives of the Kurdish region as well as
of the Sunni region (including insurgent groups).
The Sunni insurgents, including Ba'ath
contingents, should be encouraged to prepare for
negotiations and to establish public order (in
"their" areas). The new, largely Shi'ite
government should stress open negotiations to
neutralize or isolate those Sunni and other groups
who are determined to sustain guerrilla warfare.
This would certainly entail acceptance of agents
such as insurgent groups, whether they meet the
approval of the occupying forces or not. A
preliminary agenda for trilateral or multilateral
negotiations would consist of at least five major
issues:
The form of the state (or states) emerging out
of "Iraq" (see below).
The issue of the rights of minorities in
whatever political arrangement is established.
The problems of precise boundaries.
The equitable distribution of oil, water, and
other resources.
The composition and leadership of
the international body (or bodies) that would monitor
and be available to resolve conflicts not
manageable by the three. That is, trilateral
negotiations (Shi'ite, Kurd and Sunni
representation) should take place under
international mediation - in particular, the EU
(possibly with UN involvement) - not only to
preempt escalating conflicts but to facilitate
attention to legitimate regional and international
interests in the contents of any agreements (for
instance, the concerns of Iran and Turkey but also
other states bordering Iraq and/or those in the
Middle East with substantial Shi'ite populations).
Also, such international involvement would tend to
neutralize or minimize US meddling in the
negotiations.
(2) To build up a military
and police under the Shi'ite authority that can
maintain minimal public order, at least in the
Shi'ite areas (the Kurds can manage themselves
with their autonomous government and at least
50,000 effective armed forces). There is no
general confidence in the US-constructed
armed units. These units lack legitimacy and face
indifference or opposition almost everywhere; even
their members have little or no confidence or
trust in their own units. Not surprisingly, they
dissolve in the face of more determined
insurgency.
(3) To negotiate with the
US for withdrawal of its forces as soon as
is feasible, at least from Kurdish and Shi'ite
areas; the new authority could also support
negotiations between Sunni insurgents and occupying
forces that would lead to the withdrawal of the
occupying forces from Sunni areas. Withdrawal is
essential to the process of building up legitimate
Iraqi authority and forces of order and to
conducting difficult societal negotiations.
(4) To establish the EU (possibly with UN
involvement) as the major international agent
mediating the negotiations - the EU has already
begun to play such a role internationally, and
there are ambitions within the EU for an expanded
role. The EU should, whenever appropriate, involve
Turkey and Iran as well as Jordan and Egypt in the
process. Turkey and Iran are obvious regional
powers led by Islamic governments that are
arguably motivated to play a constructive role for
the sake of regional stability (as Iran has done
in the case of Afghanistan). The EU is
particularly appropriate for the mediator role
because it has reasonably good relations with most
of the key agents involved or likely to be
involved, including the US (this cannot be said
about the UN).
The EU is also an economic
and political force that can provide incentives
and sanctions. EU trade and other relations with
Iran and Turkey also are important. Future Turkish
membership in the EU is important in this context
as well; Turkey is profoundly concerned about a
Kurdish separatist movement as well as the
possible emergence of another powerful Shi'ite
state on its border.
A few comments are
called for on the question of the ultimate form of
the new "state of Iraq".
Taking into account the history, the complex
configuration of forces - Kurds, Shi'ite and Sunni
communities as well as secular Ba'ath groups - we
would argue that the establishment of a strong
unitary state will result either in a dictatorship
or civil war(s) (Kurd versus Arab, Shi'ite versus
Sunni, Ba'ath against others). Of course, a new
dictatorship might be established even under
apparent "democratic rule". For instance, the
Shi'ite majority government sets up military and
police forces under its control, and ultimately
uses a combination of coercion and patronage to
keep opposing groups in place (as the Ba'ath Party
did relatively successfully for more than 30
years).
Another option would be the division
of Iraq into three states, reflecting in
part the historical provinces of the
Ottoman. Turkey would be very skeptical about such a
solution, but proper EU and other regulation of
the border along Iraqi "Kurdistan" might make for
a stable arrangement under the right conditions. A
generous provision of discounted oil to Turkey
could also play a constructive role. Would the
separate states stabilize? This undoubtedly would
require a substantial external engagement (for
instance, the EU - and UN - as well as Turkey and
Iran) in the stabilization. It might easily
degenerate into warfare with further foreign
intervention, or the establishment of a single,
unitary state as a dictatorship (for instance, the
return of Ba'ath hegemony).
Confederation, with a weak but
unified presidency, common currency and international
and regional protection, is an institutional
option somewhat between a unitary state and
separate states. In contrast to a federal state,
it requires only a minimum capability and
authority for central decision-making. Therefore,
a confederation, stabilized by an external
organization, would appear to be the best possible
arrangement under the circumstances (the external
agent might consist, as in the negotiations, of
the EU - and possibly the UN - Turkey and Iran as well
as possibly others). But all of this is a matter
of design, not determinacy.
In any
case, the institutional design of a future Iraqi
region should take into account the cleavages, group
configurations, and internal as well as external
conflict potentials in order to minimize risky
tensions and potentially disastrous
confrontations. In the context of negotiating
whether to establish a unitary state, a federal
state or confederation, or separate states, a
number of related issues must be negotiated and
settled in any case. These concern the rights and
protection of minorities (not only Shi'ites, Sunnis
and Kurds, but Turkmens, Assyrians, other
Christians, Jews and Persians), boundaries of
regions, and rights to and distribution of
resources, oil and water. Ideally, oil revenues
and territory should be decoupled and a system of
sharing fairly petroleum income devised - this
would reduce the "territorial stakes" in the
multilateral negotiations.
The emergence
of Shi'ite power in Iraq will be closely watched
(and felt) by the entire Middle East: on the one
hand, those states bordering Iraq and/or with
their own substantial Shi'ite populations (these
include Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Jordan
and Turkey); on the other hand, those Arab
monarchies potentially threatened by the Iranian
anti-monarchy, republican model of Islamic
society. The risk of one form or another of
war(s), civil and international - and how best to
handle them - must be a major consideration of the
mediating agents (the EU and others such as Turkey
and Iran) who become engaged in the
post-occupation developments.
In sum, our
arguments suggest a way out of the Iraqi quagmire
with its highly risky scenarios. The window of
opportunity is narrow, however. Three major groups
of agents are participating in a dance of life and
death: the Iraqi groups that must be encouraged to
engage in multilateral negotiations, the EU
(particularly, but not only, Britain, France and
Germany, and the EU candidate Turkey) that should
assist mediation and, ultimately, peacekeeping,
and finally the US and its allies.
The key
is for the US leadership to recognize: first,
there is no "Iraqi nation"; second, legitimate
authority and public order must emerge from within
Iraqi society, starting with the Kurdish and
Shi'ite regions setting the stage for multilateral
negotiations and the formation of new order(s);
third, the outcome of these difficult processes -
whether one state or two or more, whether
Islamic-dominated or secular with Ba'ath Party
resurrection - will probably not be to the liking
of some or many outside Iraq. However, further
death and destruction may be minimized, and the
likelihood of establishing stable and peaceful
democratic order(s) maximized.
Tom R
Burns is professor emeritus at Uppsala
University, Uppsala, Sweden and visiting scholar,
Stanford University, California, spring 2005. He
is author of more than 10 books dealing with
politics and policymaking, environment and
technology, and social theory and methodology
relating to conflict analysis and conflict
resolution, and institutional analysis and
design.
Masoud Kamali
is professor at Mid-Sweden University and
director of the European Union
project "Institutional Patterns and Politics of
'Racial' Discrimination" at the Multiethnic Center,
Uppsala University. He is the author of several books
and numerous articles. Among his books are
Revolutionary Iran: Civil Society and State in the
Modernization Process and Multiple
Modernities: The Cases of Iran and Turkey.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click here
if you are interested in
contributing.
(Copyright 2005 Asia
Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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