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An attack on nuclear
control
By Kaushik Kapisthalam
After the series of controversial
nominations of known hawks to posts in the United
Nations (John Bolton) and the World Bank (Paul
Wolfowitz), the George W Bush administration could
be set to plant its imprint on what is perhaps the
most important multilateral treaty in the world -
the Non-Proliferation Treaty of nuclear weapons,
commonly known as the NPT.
Opened for
signature in 1968, the NPT entered into force in
1970. A total of 189 countries have since joined
the treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon
states - the US, Russia, France, the United
Kingdom and China. In 1995, the treaty members
decided to extend the agreement indefinitely.
Israel, India and Pakistan - with known weapons -
have so far refused to sign the treaty. North
Korea joined the NPT in 1985, but in January 2003
announced its intention to withdraw.
To
arms-control advocates all over the world, the NPT
is a great success story in that it establishes a
political and legal barrier to the spread of
nuclear weapons. To the "lesser" powers of the
world, the NPT represents a grand bargain - the
big powers promise to cut down and one day
eliminate their nuclear weapons, while
simultaneously working with the non-nuclear powers
to give them the ability to use nuclear technology
for peaceful purposes, including the production of
energy. The right of the non-nuclear signatories
of the NPT to use nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes represents the cornerstone of the treaty,
say advocates.
But Bush has something to
say about that.
On March 7, the White
House issued a statement from Bush on the occasion
of the 35th anniversary of the entry of the NPT
into force. The carefully worded statement,
however, had some blunt warnings that leave no
doubt as to what direction the current US
administration wants the NPT to take. After the
platitudes, the Bush statement called on the NPT
members to "close the loopholes that allow states
to produce nuclear materials that can be used to
build bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear
programs". Bush also noted, "We cannot allow rogue
states that violate their commitments and defy the
international community to undermine the NPT's
fundamental role in strengthening international
security."
No nuclear technology to
'rogue states'
Media reports from
Washington indicate that this represents a
fundamental shift in America's non-proliferation
policy. Until now, the US had been working with
the United Nations-empowered enforcer and verifier
of the NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), to identify and punish NPT violators that
the US felt were acting against its interests.
For instance, the US worked with the IAEA
and the UN Security Council to punish Iraq after
IAEA inspectors found it to be in violation of the
NPT after the discovery of Baghdad's secret
nuclear weapons program in 1991. However, recent
events, including the US invasion of Iraq in 2003,
the crises in North Korea and Iran, as well as the
successful US-UK effort to force Libya to abandon
its secret nuclear weapons program, have led the
Bush brainstrust to question the efficacy of the
NPT and the IAEA.
Under the NPT, there are
the five weapons-states, with the remaining
non-weapons states. The only condition under which
a non-weapon state can be denied nuclear
technology is if it is found to be in violation of
the NPT, like Iraq was in 1991. The only agency
that can adjudicate on a country's violation of
the NPT is the IAEA. However, the new Bush plan
would appear to seek to create a new class of
countries that will be denied all access to
peaceful nuclear technology, even if they have not
been found in violation of the NPT by the IAEA.
The Bush plan, however, does not spell out who
decides if a country belongs to the "rogue" group.
One Washington-based non-proliferation
expert, who did not want to be identified, noted
that while the Bush administration might come up
with objective-sounding criteria to identify
"rogue" states, such determinations are bound to
meet with resistance overseas. "Many European
countries see Pakistan as a rogue nuclear state
which cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons,
especially in the light of recent revelations on
the A Q Khan nuclear network [Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan
- father of Pakistan's nuclear program and
confessed proliferator], while the US is unwilling
to make such a determination, at least for now for
reasons outside of the nuclear realm," observed
the expert.
Similarly, the possession of
nuclear weapons by Israel is seen by many
countries, especially in the Arab and Islamic
world, as a trigger for other countries in the
region to look to obtain nuclear weapons, while
the US simply does not want to discuss Israel's
nuclear program in conjunction with the alleged
nuclear programs of countries like Iran, the
expert noted.
American frustration
A little over a year ago, on the sidelines of
a meeting of the Group of Eight industrial
nations, Bush called for tough steps in the wake
of the Khan revelations. He proposed an indefinite
global moratorium on the sale of nuclear fuel
cycle technology to countries that don't have it
already. Once again, this idea met with severe
objections from countries like France and Germany,
which have had lucrative business deals selling
such technologies to NPT member states. Under
their pressure, Bush agreed to limit the called
moratorium to one year.
Bush also called
for a universal adherence to the so-called
Additional Protocol, which is an add-on provision
to the NPT wherein countries would allow tougher
and more intrusive IAEA inspections. For example,
under the NPT, a non-weapon state need only give
the IAEA access to certain designated "nuclear"
facilities. However, under the Additional
Protocol, the IAEA can go anywhere and search for
virtually anything, including "dual-use" items.
Interestingly, Iran signed the Additional Protocol
in December 2003.
However, American
officials are frustrated that despite the
Additional Protocol and more intrusive inspection
regimes, it is still very hard to prove that a
country was violating the NPT by developing
nuclear weapons. The current focus of American ire
is obviously Iran. The IAEA and many European
countries agree that Iran has been acting
suspiciously with regard to its NPT commitments,
but unlike the US, the IAEA cannot make a
determination on that until it has
incontrovertible evidence of Iran's treaty
violations.
There have been a series of
reports from the US Central Intelligence Agency
listing various allegations on Iran's
weapons-related activities, but after the American
bungling of Iraq's weapons capability, few are
willing to take American claims at face value.
Faced with skepticism, the US has so far been only
able to offer its suspicions, but no compelling
evidence. The Iranians "keep their secrets very
well", noted US National Security Adviser Stephen
J Hadley last week. The New York Times quoted a
senior American official as saying that the US
cannot afford to wait around for other countries
to be convinced of Iran's weapons plan because by
that time the Iranians might actually have a
weapon or two to brandish. In the post-Iraq war
scenario, however, this argument faces a skeptical
international audience, much to the chagrin of the
Bush administration.
Review
meeting
One of the reasons for the Bush NPT
statement was to set the stage for the May 2005
NPT review meeting in New York. Aside from the US,
many non-weapons states have their own list of
complaints about the current state of the NPT.
They note with some justification that the Big-5
nuclear weapons states have not lived up to their
end of the nuclear bargain by going slow on their
stated goal of moving toward reducing and
eventually eliminating their nuclear weapons. Some
were outraged that the Bush administration, while
lecturing others on nuclear restraint, has gone
ahead with plans to build a new generation of
nuclear weapons, including the Robust Nuclear
Earth Penetrator, otherwise known as the nuclear
bunker-buster bomb.
Countries like China
also harbor deep suspicions about US-led
initiatives outside the NPT-framework, like the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI
is not a treaty but an informal coalition of
like-minded states that offer cooperative
assistance to intercept suspected nuclear and
missile transfers by other countries. Under the
aegis of the PSI, the US has been able to
intercept shipments to and from Libya, Yemen and
North Korea. However, China, Russia and a few
other nations contend that such actions under the
PSI violate other international agreements, like
the Law of the Sea Treaty, which govern
international shipping traffic. In addition, such
informal arrangements are subject to the whims and
fancies of the stronger nations, especially the
US, critics note. For instance, in December 2002,
Spanish commandos intercepted a North Korean ship
carrying complete scud missiles and warheads to
Yemen. However, the US pressured Spain to let the
shipment go for reasons that observers speculated
could be tied to Yemen's support to the American
"War on terror".
Meanwhile, middle-tier
nations like Japan and South Korea note with
concern as countries in their neighborhood, such
as North Korea, announce their nuclear weapons
abilities. Experts caution that this could cause a
rethink in these nations' strategic circles on the
merit of abandoning nuclear weapons. Japan, for
instance, has enough nuclear fuel to assemble a
few dozen bombs should it choose to do so. Many
other Western non-nuclear countries have similar
or greater abilities and might reevaluate their
choices should Iran go nuclear and mate its
long-range missiles with atomic warheads.
The non-proliferation academic and
official community, meanwhile, is working overtime
to come up with means to shore up the NPT, or at
least prevent a total treaty collapse. With 189
signatories, there is virtually zero chance of
renegotiation. For the first time, analysts are
contemplating the idea that a treaty like the NPT
needs to take into account the reasons that may
drive countries toward nuclear weapons. Observers
note the difference in how the US treated Iraq
under Saddam Hussein and North Korea and asserted
that the Iraq war might actually drive countries
that might feel under threat by the US and others
to build nuclear weapons at all costs. However,
many others are skeptical that political concerns
and threat perceptions could ever be worked into a
multilateral treaty like the NPT. It appears
possible that the May 2005 NPT review meet might
only produce weak, if any new agreements. One NPT
skeptic quipped that the review conference might
even speed up the collapse of the treaty.
Consequences of attack on
Iran
The US has now granted its blessing to
the European-led negotiation attempt with Iran. It
has also offered carrots to Tehran, including
support for Iran's admission into the World Trade
Organization and perhaps an eventual restoration
of diplomatic ties. However, the US has not - and
many say is unlikely - to offer the main thing
that the Iranians want - a guarantee of
non-attack. Many feel that things could come to a
head within a matter or months.
In 1981,
Israeli fighter-bombers attacked and destroyed a
French-built nuclear research reactor in Osirak in
Iraq that was allegedly part of Baghdad's nuclear
weapons program. The UN Security Council condemned
the act and noted that the attack was "in clear
violation of the charter of the United Nations and
the norms of international conduct". It noted
further that the bombing was "a serious threat to
the entire safeguards regime of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, which is the foundation of
the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons." Essentially, Israel usurped the role of
the IAEA in determining if a country was in
violation of the NPT. However, the act did not
affect the treaty a great deal because Israel was
not a signatory to the NPT.
Most
diplomatic observers predict that unless the IAEA
is able to obtain irrefutable proof of an Iranian
atomic weapons program, it is unlikely to refer
the matter to the UN Security Council. Even if the
US muscles the IAEA into referring the Iranian
matter to the council without solid proof, either
Russia or China is likely to veto any American-led
move to sanction or authorize force against Iran.
It is to be noted that to date the IAEA and the US
have been unable to prove that Iran has actually
enriched any uranium at all. All that has been
proven is that Iran has kept a set of
uranium-enrichment facilities hidden from the IAEA
for many years, though the act of uranium
enrichment itself is allowed under the NPT as long
as it is for peaceful purposes.
Faced with
a regime change prospect, Iranian leaders might
actually follow the lead set by North Korea - by
waiting till their scientists and engineers obtain
critical nuclear skills and then withdrawing from
the NPT altogether and going ahead openly with
weapons development. Israeli officials have been
dropping public hints about Iran getting close to
a "point of no return" in terms of nuclear weapons
development. However, unlike Iraq, any attack on
Iran's IAEA safeguarded nuclear facilities is
unlikely without some American participation, even
if Israeli forces carry out the act.
Should the US attack Iranian nuclear
facilities without incontrovertible proof of their
being involved in weapons development, it could
signal a death knell for the NPT, experts warn.
Sirus Naseri - a senior member of Iran's
delegation to the IAEA, said recently, "To even
imply that a nuclear-weapon state would attack
[IAEA] safeguarded facilities of a
non-nuclear-weapon state pokes a hole right in the
heart of the Non-Proliferation Treaty."
Non-proliferation advocates have always
maintained that the pillar that supports the NPT
and the dream of global nuclear disarmament is the
idea that nuclear weapons must be devalued. It now
appears, observers note, that the actions of the
nuclear powers have only increased the value of
nuclear weapons, and in some cases made it
imperative for countries to seek to develop them.
Kaushik Kapisthalam is a
freelance defense and strategic affairs analyst
based in the United States. He can be reached
at contact@kapisthalam.com
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
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