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Compromise or time-bomb?
By Bashdar Ismaeel
The
euphoria surrounding the Iraqi elections of
January 30 has fast evaporated over the past
months, with politicians bogged down in protracted
negotiations over the shape of the government, and
the key characters who will head it.
In
the first breakthrough on Sunday, delegates to the
National Assembly chose Hajim al-Hasani, a
US-educated Sunni economist who currently holds
office as minister of industry, as Speaker of
parliament. His two deputies will be Dr Husayn
al-Shahristani (Shi'ite), one of the most
prominent opposition leaders under Saddam Hussein,
and Arif Tayfour, a Kurd.
The deputies are
due to meet again on Wednesday to name a president
and two vice presidents. After that they will
select the premier, and the National Assembly is
then charged with writing a new constitution by
mid-August.
Wrangling over the past weeks
has been intense and highly frustrating, with
predominantly bilateral negotiations between the
two main benefactors of the elections, the Kurds
and the majority Shi'ite group.
The United
Iraqi Alliance (UIA) headed by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim
and masterminded by the influential and most
powerful figure in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani, won a principal majority, with just
over half of the seats in the new National
Assembly - 146 of the 275 seats available. The
Kurdistan Alliance scored 26% of the electoral
turnout, representing 77 seats, and find
themselves in the prime position of kingmakers.
The strong turnout in the Kurdish-dominated areas
of Iraq gave them a prized if not resented wild
card that effectively means that no government can
be formed without their approval and cooperation.
A union between the Kurdish and Shi'ite
lists is logical, given that between them they
control 223 seats or almost 81% of the overall
quota. If an agreement can be struck between the
long oppressed groups on the Iraqi mosaic, then
the required two-thirds majority will never be in
danger, although seemingly oppression and
brutality under Saddam's disposed regime and a
newly found status of power is all they have in
common.
In principle, a high-level deal on
the future makeup of Iraq was struck even before
the advent of the Second Gulf War among the many
exiles now in the assembly. However, the finer
implementation of any agreement is much harder
than a vague common concord, that Iraq will be
governed by a constitution that will be
democratic, federal and pluralistic. The
protracted negotiations, and even the lack of
overall representation, with the main Sunni group
forming less than 5% of the assembly, is an
ominous step for Iraq - the real political
jostling and fiery dealings have just begun and
must be negotiated successfully to ensure that
progress continues.
Protracted
negotiations
Negotiations to date have
left a bitter taste in the mouths of many, with
the see-sawing situation highlighting restlessness
and frustration, with each group at times blaming
the other for stalling. Crucially, the US, clearly
still jubilant from the apparent success of the
first Iraqi elections in 50 years, decided to opt
out as an influencing factor in the negotiations,
and smartly left the Iraqis to sort it out
themselves.
The impact of the negotiations
on the Iraqi geographical, political and ethnic
showground is the obvious reason why they have
became so protracted. In theory, the US-sponsored
Transitive Administrative Law (TAL) should have
set the wheels and basis for these negotiations in
motion, however, somewhat ironically, the TAL,
which was reviled by many and only signed after
days of delays and US pressure, was a debating
factor and a hindrance.
The TAL in
principle was most notorious for the "Kurdish
veto", where a majority in three provinces can
reject a constitution, effectively allowing the
Kurds the ability to reject any article that is
not deemed in their best interest. However, how a
group that only composes 20% of the Iraqi
population can be granted such power, where 65% of
the population is Shi'ite, clearly left many a
politician questioning the dominant and
power-broking role of the Kurds. Conversely,
however, many of the secularist groups within
Iraq, and significantly the US, are quietly
pleased with the lack of an authoritative Shi'ite
grip on power, thus diluting demands, such as
Sharia law, which the US feared would align the
Shi'ites in Iraq closely with the Iranian
theocracy only a short drive across the border.
The Kurdish wild card
The UIA
candidacy for prime minister, Ibrahim Jaafari, was
announced shortly after the elections. However,
forming an agreement with the Kurds has proved a
touch more elusive. The Kurds, conscious that
their new historical role of power-broker won't
last, are keen to maximize their gains, and for
the first time in their less than colorful
history, imprint their mark on the new Iraq.
Coupled with the virtual de-facto
independence they have been enjoying since 1991
under a US military umbrella, they are very
reluctant to bow down to the pressures of the
greater Iraq once more. This is an Iraq that most
of the new generation in the north have not seen,
and that only reminds them about their oppressive
and bitter past. Clearly, as two referendums have
shown, most Kurds aspire to independence, which is
widely acknowledged in the present climate as
political suicide, with hostile neighboring
countries ready to pounce. The second best for
them would be a form of federalism that is close
to their current status, and in reality very close
to outright independence. However, this has been a
crucial stumbling block in the negotiations, with
the Shi'ite's adopting a line that either the
Kurds are partners in the new Iraq or not.
This leads on to the logical question in
any so-called voluntary union; how far does
decentralization go, and what will federalism
constitute? The answer to this in turn determines
just as importantly how disparate each federation
becomes, for example, will the regional resources
be a property of the federal region or the central
administration, in other words, will distribution
of natural resources be based on geography or
ethnicity?
Circular negotiations have at
times been common, perhaps most evident in the TAL
on the role of Islam in the constitution. Although
Islam is deemed "a source of legislation", more
problematically, it is not the source.
Furthermore, under the interim constitution, no
legislation can be adopted which may go against
the principles of Islam. This is effectively an
Islamic veto on legislation. Yet there appears to
be a counter veto to that handed to the Islamists
- no law can be adopted which contravenes
democratic principles or civil rights.
The Kurds
have spearheaded the negotiations with a number
of principle demands. Kirkuk is to be instated
in the Kurdish-administered region straight
away, with the resettlement of Arabs who
came under the infamous Arabization policy to be
expedited. Furthermore, resources of the Kurdish
area, including Kirkuk, are to come under the
restrain of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).
The Kurdish paramilitary force and the
protectorate force in Iraqi Kurdistan, the
peshmerga, will remain under the authority
of the KRG, and the Iraqi army is prohibited to
enter without prior consent of the Kurdistan
parliament.
Significantly, for the
secular-minded Kurds who are predominantly Sunni
in origin, the government must not be Islamist in
orientation. This was augmented by the Kurdish
desire to bring on board the more secular Shi'ite
list, the Democratic Alliance of interim premier
Iyad Allawi, to dilute Shi'ite Islamist demands.
Above all else, the Kurds, who are still
distrustful of the greater Iraq, want written
guarantees on any agreement.
The Shi'ite
demands are slightly more clear-cut than that of
the Kurds. It is more of a case of Shi'ites
meeting Kurdish demands than the other way round.
In reality, the Kurds will not hesitate to agree
on demands by the Shi'ites, as long as their
federal region incorporates their key demands, and
the center does not have an influential control
over the area. The main demand of the UIA is that
Islam should be the overriding source, if not
the source of legislation. For the
Shi'ites, Iraq is to remain as much of a
centralized unit as possible, where the government
in Baghdad will drive resource management and its
distribution, foreign policy and defense, among
others. They, as the majority, believe that in
turn they should have the biggest influence on the
makeup of the new Iraq and the subsequent
constitution.
Elusive
compromise
Compromise is the classical
element of any democracy, where those around the
negotiating table can ascertain some median ground
for cooperation and agreement. However, this
principle is foreign to an Iraq that hosted a
brutal dictatorship for almost 35 years. And even
when compromises arise, it is doubtful that the
principles will be all-enchanting and
wide-reaching. Many elements are likely to be
swept under the political rug at the new assembly
for the sake of driving the process forward and
thwarting the thriving insurgents who have
experienced a field day of late as the politicians
bicker.
For example, in reality,
to resolve the internal-security question in
Kurdistan, the peshmerga will in effect
remain intact, with only a handful joining the new
army, where they will be referred to differently
and as an official unit of the greater Iraqi armed
forces. Kirkuk will eventually be returned to the
KRG, but according to the terms of the TAL.
Mindful of a Sunni and even Turkmen
backlash, the Shi'ites have decreed that Kirkuk
will not be returned while the thousands of Iraqis
which moved in under the Arabization campaign are
still there. This could cause inevitable conflict,
and be perceived as breaking to the will of the
Kurds among the Sunni clergy already
underrepresented and skeptical about their
political future.
A number of Kurdish
demands will be granted. However, these agreements
have to be seen as democratic and not the result
of backroom dealings. This will look more
justifiable, especially in front of the
ever-watchful eyes of bordering Turkey, which has
repeated the intervention rhetoric more than once.
Conversely, in the eyes of the independent-minded
Kurdish population, any agreement must not be seen
as a sellout to the Arabic majority. In reality,
the Kurds will have more influence from the center
than first envisaged, but crucially the Kurdish
parties will be mindful to not portray this as a
step back for Kurdistan.
As for the
crucial question of natural resources, in return
for not controlling the abundant oil-fields of
Kirkuk in the north, the Kurds will receive a high
percentage of oil distribution from the center.
Future repercussions
Even once
the elusive first government is formed, the road
ahead may be bumpier and rougher than the
proportion of the way it has successfully
negotiated thus far.
It is important
that any agreement is in essence future-proof. If it
is formed for the sake of progressing with a new
government and utilizing the momentum created by
the elections, then problems are sown as opposed
to resolved. Any "hot item" postponed on the
political agenda has an annoying habit of gaining
heat as time goes by, and either way it will burn
if precautions are not taken.
The TAL,
although a significant agreement, was signed with
much reservation and was somewhat even bypassed
when, under pressure from Sistani, it omitted any
mention of United Nations Resolution 1456, which
deals with suppressing terrorism. For some, any
agreement in the current climate will not
represent a true coalition, but a very loose
mutual cooperation.
The consequences of
any agreement are obvious if any party,
particularly the Kurds, feel that their best
interests have not been considered, or that any
deal has been reneged; there is the inevitable
threat of a breakdown in government and possibly a
threat of secession altogether. In turn, no
Kurdish participation means that there is no
government; the political mind games are far from
over.
The problems do not lie just in the
formation of a government, but also in the greater
Iraqi ethnic landscape. The first Kurdish
president in Iraq may not strike well with the
Sunni elite, some Shi'ites and surrounding Arabic
countries. How a Kurdish president will be
perceived at the Arabic League summits remains to
be seen. Kurdish control of Kirkuk and the
subsequent reaction by the Sunni, and particularly
neighboring Turkey, to its annexation to the KRG
poses an interesting predicament.
How a
common national identity can be placed over the
vast Iraqi ethnic mosaic is the most critical of
all the key challenges ahead. The official
language of Iraq will be both Kurdish and Arabic,
but in reality both languages will remain
regional-based. It is very likely that essentially
Iraq will be composed of disparate if not
independent regions. The exact law-making powers
of each region remain to be seen. It is unclear if
each region will be able to formulate separate
trade agreements and foreign alliances; even the
proposed international status of the new Arbil
airport (KRG capital) became a recent discussion
point. An iconic and significant indicator of
national identity is the national flag, and even
that will cause dispute and controversy in Iraq,
as it has in the past.
An overpowering
consequence, at this decisive time, will be the
non-participation of Sunni Arabs. It is imperative
that they are brought on board and given key
cabinet positions, despite merely holding 20 seats
at the National Assembly, to ensure that elements
of the insurgency are appeased and the government
is portrayed as incisive and united. The
appointment of Hasani will go some way to meeting
this requirement. Importantly, the Shi'ite-Kurdish
coalition is also eager to carve out a role for
outgoing premier Allawi, whose list came in second
with 40 seats, to ensure a wider depth to the
coalition.
Cabinet posts
The
president, along with his two deputies, will be
part of the so-called presidential council, which
will be formally charged with appointing the prime
minister. Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan is widely predicted to assume the
largely iconic role of president. Adnan Pachachi,
a Sunni, will likely assume one of the roles of
vice president, with Allawi holding the other vice
presidency. Prominent Shi'ite politician Dr
Ibrahim Jaafari is the most likely bet for
premier.
Of the 30 ministries available,
the government will be divided roughly on the
basis of a sectarian quota, leaving 16 posts for
Shi'ites, six for the Kurds, six for Sunni Arabs
and one each for Christians and Turkmen.
Conclusion
The strength and
credibility of any new government is going to be
open to debate. Some will argue that whatever
results are achieved will be nothing short of
classic compromise and a sign that Iraqis truly
want to work together in shaping their future.
However, just as importantly, some will portray
any coalition as a time-bomb, which will rear its
ugly head in the not too distant future.
Most reassuringly, Iraqis are trying to
reconcile their divergent visions via the medium
of political dialogue. For this to remain,
however, and to stave off any civil war, all
groups, regardless of the results of the
elections, must be considered, and any agreement
must meet the sensitivities of any one group.
One thing that is apparent, Jaafari, as
the new prime minister, will certainly be under
the spotlight and has tough times ahead. There was
even premature pressure in some UIA circles for
him to withdraw as their candidate because of the
slow progress on forming a coalition, with some in
other circles still a touch apprehensive in terms
of his apparent Islamist designs on Iraq.
The first National Assembly which convened
on March 15 was ominous to future dealings, with
the vast ethnic and religious array on show, a
great example of the wide spectrum that is Iraq.
Even before the government was sworn in, there was
disagreement on whether oaths should be read in
Kurdish, Arabic, or both.
The "ripple of
change" across Iraq and the Middle East, as hailed
by Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair, and
encouraged by the US, as the new dawn of
democracy, has not quite materialized in Iraq, but
Iraqis have made progress. Iraq has been marked
from its early days by a totalitarian grip on
power; it is no surprise that negotiations have
been onerous and time-consuming. However, having
waited almost 35 years to escape the grip of
repression and totalitarianism, it is fair to say
that the majority of Iraqis are willing to accept
the delays.
Bashdar Ismaeel is a
London- based freelance writer who also holds
first-class bachelor of science degree honors. The
focus of his work is primarily on Iraq, the Kurds
and Middle Eastern current affairs. He can be
contacted at bashdar@hotmail.com.
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