Oil, geopolitics and war with
Iran By Michael T Klare
If the United States attacks Iran, one
thing is certain: the administration of President
George W Bush will never mention oil as a reason
for going to war. As in the case of Iraq, weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) will be cited as the
principal justification for a US assault. "We will
not tolerate the construction of a nuclear weapon"
by Iran is the way Bush put it in a much-quoted
2003 statement.
But just as the failure to
discover illicit weapons in Iraq undermined the
administration's use of WMD as the paramount
reason for its invasion, so its claim that an
attack on Iran would be justified because of its
alleged nuclear potential should invite widespread
skepticism. More important, any serious assessment
of Iran's strategic importance to the US should
focus on its role in the global energy equation.
Before proceeding, let me state for the
record that I do not claim oil is the sole driving
force behind the Bush administration's apparent
determination to destroy Iranian military
capabilities. No doubt there are many national
security professionals in Washington who are truly
worried about Iran's nuclear program, just as
there were many professionals who were genuinely
worried about Iraqi weapons capabilities. I
respect this. But no war is ever prompted by one
factor alone, and it is evident from the public
record that many considerations, including oil,
played a role in the administration's decision to
invade Iraq. Likewise, it is reasonable to assume
that many factors - again including oil - are
playing a role in the decision-making now under
way over a possible assault on Iran.
Just
exactly how much weight the oil factor carries in
the administration's decision-making is not
something that we can determine with absolute
assurance at this time, but given the importance
energy has played in the careers and thinking of
various high officials of the Bush administration,
and given Iran's immense resources, it would be
ludicrous not to take the oil factor into account
- and yet you can rest assured that, as relations
with Iran worsen, US media reports and analysis of
the situation will generally steer a course well
clear of the subject (as they did in the lead-up
to the invasion of Iraq).
One further
caveat: When talking about oil's importance in US
strategic thinking about Iran, it is important to
go beyond the obvious question of Iran's potential
role in satisfying our country's future energy
requirements. Because Iran occupies a strategic
location on the north side of the Persian Gulf, it
is in a position to threaten oilfields in Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates,
which together possess more than half of the
world's known oil reserves. Iran also sits athwart
the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through
which, daily, 40% of the world's oil exports pass.
In addition, Iran is becoming a major supplier of
oil and natural gas to China, India and Japan,
thereby giving Tehran additional clout in world
affairs. It is these geopolitical dimensions of
energy, as much as Iran's potential to export
significant quantities of oil to the US, that
undoubtedly govern the administration's strategic
calculations.
Having said this, let me
proceed to an assessment of Iran's future energy
potential. According to the most recent tally by
Oil and Gas Journal, Iran houses the
second-largest pool of untapped petroleum in the
world, an estimated 125.8 billion barrels. Only
Saudi Arabia, with an estimated 260 billion
barrels, possesses more; Iraq, the third in line,
has an estimated 115 billion barrels. With this
much oil - about one-tenth of the world's
estimated total supply - Iran is certain to play a
key role in the global energy equation, no matter
what else occurs.
It is not, however, just
sheer quantity that matters in Iran's case; no
less important is its future productive capacity.
Although Saudi Arabia possesses larger reserves,
it is now producing oil at close to its maximum
sustainable rate (about 10 million barrels per
day). It will probably be unable to raise its
output significantly over the next 20 years while
global demand, pushed by significantly higher
consumption in the US, China and India, is
expected to rise by 50%. Iran, on the other hand,
has considerable growth potential: it is now
producing about 4 million barrels per day, but is
thought to be capable of boosting its output by
another 3 million barrels or so. Few, if any,
other countries possess this potential, so Iran's
importance as a producer, already significant, is
bound to grow in the years ahead.
And it
is not just oil that Iran possesses in great
abundance, but also natural gas. According to Oil
and Gas Journal, Iran has an estimated 940
trillion cubic feet (26.6 trillion cubic meters)
of gas, or approximately 16% of total world
reserves. (Only Russia, with 1.68 quadrillion
cubic feet, or 47.6 trillion cubic meters, has a
larger supply.) As it takes approximately 170
cubic meters of gas to equal the energy content of
one barrel of oil, Iran's gas reserves represent
the equivalent of about 155 billion barrels of
oil. This, in turn, means that its combined
hydrocarbon reserves are the equivalent of some
280 billion barrels of oil, just slightly behind
Saudi Arabia's combined supply. At present, Iran
is producing only a small share of its gas
reserves, about 76.5 billion cubic meters per
year. This means that Iran is one of the few
countries capable of supplying much larger amounts
of natural gas in the future.
What all
this means is that Iran will play a critical role
in the world's future energy equation. This is
especially true because the global demand for
natural gas is growing faster than that for any
other source of energy, including oil. While the
world currently consumes more oil than gas, the
supply of petroleum is expected to contract in the
not-too-distant future as global production
approaches its peak sustainable level - perhaps as
soon as 2010 - and then begins a gradual but
irreversible decline. The production of natural
gas, on the other hand, is not likely to peak
until several decades from now, and so is expected
to take up much of the slack when oil supplies
become less abundant. Natural gas is also
considered a more attractive fuel than oil in many
applications, especially because when consumed it
releases less carbon dioxide (a major contributor
to the greenhouse effect).
No doubt the
major US energy companies would love to be working
with Iran today in developing these vast oil and
gas supplies. At present, however, they are
prohibited from doing so by Executive Order (EO)
12959, signed by president Bill Clinton in 1995
and renewed by President Bush in March 2004. The
United States has also threatened to punish
foreign firms that do business in Iran (under the
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996), but this has
not deterred many large companies from seeking
access to Iran's reserves. China, which will need
vast amounts of additional oil and gas to fuel its
red-hot economy, is paying particular attention to
Iran. According to the US Department of Energy
(DoE), Iran supplied 14% of China's oil imports in
2003, and is expected to provide an even larger
share in the future. China is also expected to
rely on Iran for a large share of its liquefied
natural gas (LNG) imports. Last October, Iran
signed a US$100 billion, 25-year contract with
Sinopec, a major Chinese energy firm, for joint
development of one of its major gas fields and the
subsequent delivery of LNG to China. If this deal
is fully consummated, it will constitute one of
China's biggest overseas investments and represent
a major strategic linkage between the two
countries.
India is also keen to obtain
oil and gas from Iran. In January, the Gas
Authority of India Ltd (GAIL) signed a 30-year
deal with the National Iranian Gas Export Corp for
the transfer of as much as 7.5 million tons of LNG
to India per year. The deal, worth an estimated
$50 billion, will also entail Indian involvement
in the development of Iranian gas fields. Even
more noteworthy, Indian and Pakistani officials
are discussing the construction of a $3 billion
natural-gas pipeline from Iran to India via
Pakistan - an extraordinary step for two long-term
adversaries. If completed, the pipeline would
provide both countries with a substantial supply
of gas and allow Pakistan to reap $200 million to
$500 million per year in transit fees. "The gas
pipeline is a win-win proposition for Iran, India
and Pakistan," Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat
Aziz declared in January.
Despite the
pipeline's obvious attractiveness as an incentive
for reconciliation between India and Pakistan -
nuclear powers that have fought three wars over
Kashmir since 1947 and remain deadlocked over the
future status of that troubled territory - the
project was condemned by US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice during a recent trip to India.
"We have communicated to the Indian government our
concerns about the gas-pipeline cooperation
between Iran and India," she said on March 16
after meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Natwar
Singh in New Delhi. The Bush administration has,
in fact, proved unwilling to back any project that
offers an economic benefit to Iran. This has not,
however, deterred India from proceeding with the
pipeline.
Japan has also broken ranks with
Washington on the issue of energy ties with Iran.
In early 2003, a consortium of three Japanese
companies acquired a 20% stake in the development
of the Soroush-Nowruz offshore field in the
Persian Gulf, a reservoir thought to hold 1
billion barrels of oil. One year later, the
Iranian Offshore Oil Co awarded a $1.26 billion
contract to Japan's JGC Corp for the recovery of
natural gas and natural-gas liquids from
Soroush-Nowruz and other offshore fields.
When considering Iran's role in the global
energy equation, therefore, Bush administration
officials have two key strategic aims: a desire to
open up Iranian oil and gas fields to exploitation
by US firms, and concern over Iran's growing ties
to America's competitors in the global energy
market. Under US law, the first of these aims can
only be achieved after the president lifts EO
12959, and this is not likely to occur as long as
Iran is controlled by anti-American mullahs and
refuses to abandon its uranium-enrichment
activities with potential bomb-making
applications. Likewise, the ban on US involvement
in Iranian energy production and export gives
Tehran no choice but to pursue ties with other
consuming nations. From the Bush administration's
point of view, there is only one obvious and
immediate way to alter this unappetizing landscape
- by inducing "regime change" in Iran and
replacing the existing leadership with one far
friendlier to US strategic interests.
That
the Bush administration seeks to foster regime
change in Iran is not in any doubt. The very fact
that Iran was included with Saddam Hussein's Iraq
and Kim Jong-il's North Korea in the "axis of
evil" in Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address
was an unmistakable indicator of this. Bush let
his feelings be known again in June 2003, at a
time when there were anti-government protests by
students in Tehran. "This is the beginning of
people expressing themselves toward a free Iran,
which I think is positive," he declared. In a more
significant indication of White House attitudes on
the subject, the Department of Defense has failed
to fully disarm the People's Mujahideen of Iran
(or Mujahideen-e Khalq, MEK), an anti-government
militia now based in Iraq that has conducted
terrorist actions in Iran and is listed on the
State Department's roster of terrorist
organizations. In 2003, the Washington Post
reported that some senior administration figures
would like to use the MEK as a proxy force in
Iran, in the same manner that the Northern
Alliance was employed against the Taliban in
Afghanistan.
The Iranian leadership is
well aware that it faces a serious threat from the
Bush administration and is no doubt taking
whatever steps it can to prevent such an attack.
Here, too, oil is a major factor in both Tehran's
and Washington's calculations. To deter a possible
US assault, Iran has threatened to close the
Strait of Hormuz and otherwise obstruct oil
shipping in the Persian Gulf area. "An attack on
Iran will be tantamount to endangering Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait and, in a word, the entire Middle
East oil," Iranian Expediency Council secretary
Mohsen Rezai said on March 1.
Such threats
are taken very seriously by the US Department of
Defense. "We judge Iran can briefly close the
Strait of Hormuz, relying on a layered strategy
using predominantly naval, air, and some ground
forces," Vice Admiral Lowell E Jacoby, the
director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee
on February 16.
Planning for such attacks
is, beyond doubt, a major priority for top
Pentagon officials. In January, veteran
investigative reporter Seymour Hersh reported in
The New Yorker magazine that the Department of
Defense was conducting covert reconnaissance raids
into Iran, supposedly to identify hidden Iranian
nuclear and missile facilities that could be
struck in future air and missile attacks. "I was
repeatedly told that the next strategic target was
Iran," Hersh said of his interviews with senior
military personnel. Shortly thereafter, the
Washington Post revealed that the Pentagon was
flying surveillance drones over Iran to verify the
location of weapons sites and to test Iranian air
defenses. As noted by the Post, "Aerial espionage
[of this sort] is standard in military
preparations for an eventual air attack." There
have also been reports of talks between US and
Israeli officials about a possible Israeli strike
on Iranian weapons facilities, presumably with
behind-the-scenes assistance from the United
States.
In reality, much of Washington's
concern about Iran's pursuit of WMD and ballistic
missiles is sparked by fears for the safety of
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, other Persian Gulf oil
producers, and Israel rather than by fears of a
direct Iranian assault on the United States.
"Tehran has the only military in the region that
can threaten its neighbors and Gulf security,"
Jacoby declared in his February testimony. "Its
expanding ballistic-missile inventory presents a
potential threat to states in the region." It is
this regional threat that US leaders are most
determined to eliminate.
In this sense,
more than any other, the current planning for an
attack on Iran is fundamentally driven by concern
over the safety of US energy supplies, as was the
2003 US invasion of Iraq. In the most telling
expression of White House motives for going to war
against Iraq, Vice President Dick Cheney (in an
August 2002 address to the Veterans of Foreign
Wars) described the threat from Iraq as follows:
"Should all [of Saddam's WMD] ambitions be
realized, the implications would be enormous for
the Middle East and the United States ... Armed
with an arsenal of these weapons of terror and a
seat atop 10% of the world's oil reserves, Saddam
Hussein could then be expected to seek domination
of the entire Middle East, take control of a great
portion of the world's energy supplies, [and]
directly threaten America's friends throughout the
region." This was, of course, unthinkable to
Bush's inner circle. And all one need do is
substitute the words "Iranian mullahs" for "Saddam
Hussein", and you have a perfect expression of the
Bush administration case for making war on Iran.
So, even while publicly focusing on Iran's
weapons of mass destruction, key Bush
administration figures are certainly thinking in
geopolitical terms about Iran's role in the global
energy equation and its capacity to obstruct the
global flow of petroleum. As was the case with
Iraq, the White House is determined to eliminate
this threat once and for all. And so, while oil
may not be the administration's sole reason for
going to war with Iran, it is an essential factor
in the overall strategic calculation that makes
war likely.
Michael T Klare is a
professor of peace and world security studies at
Hampshire College and the author of Blood and
Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's
Growing Dependency on Imported Oil
(Metropolitan Books). This article is used here
by permission ofTomdispatch.
