Iraq key to US-Iran engagement
By M K Bhadrakumar

There is an old popular Arab saying: "Books are written in Cairo, printed in Beirut, but read in Baghdad." Though Persian-speaking, Iranians certainly make it a point to read those books written in Arabic. They have always been avid readers of books, though with a penchant for interpreting ideas ultimately on their own terms.

That much becomes clear by the choice that Tehran made by making its entry into the New Middle East via Baghdad. The choice was by no means easy, the journey was uncertain and fraught with perils - known and unknown - and mostly very lonesome. Tehran seems to have navigated itself astutely, finally.

President Mohammad Khatami was among the first world leaders to felicitate the newly elected political leadership in Baghdad. In a congratulatory message of undisguised happiness over the occasion, Khatami conveyed to Iraqi President-elect Jalal Talabani that it was a "magnificent electoral show" that brought the new government into office. Offering Iran's hand of cooperation, Khatami expressed optimism that "a secure, free and independent Iraq" would emerge and that with "vigilance and unity of the entire Iraqi nation" this could be realized. He expressed satisfaction that the democratic process in Iraq was running its course "without outside interference".

Khatami's message disregarded the US military presence in Iraq or any sense of Islamic brotherhood with the regime in Baghdad.

Iranian media commentaries have been equally revealing. The Tehran Times lauded the fact that first and foremost, Baghdad had liberated itself from the "chauvinistic atmosphere of pan-Arabism" and had broken loose from "false Arab nationalism" - the "idea that Arabic nationalism was the cornerstone of patriotism". (Will the US neo-conservatives - and Israel - take note?)

The commentary went on to stress that Kurds and Shi'ites alike were victims of Ba'athist ideology and had been all these years "encircled in the web of pan-Arabist tendencies".

The Iran Daily hailed Talabani as the "first non-Arab president" of Iraq and noted that Kurdish-Shi'ite solidarity in Iraq was "clearly a positive development for Iran that has more commonalities with Kurds than other regional countries". It advised Sunni Arabs to "come to terms with and accept the ground realities".

The Iranian commentaries sidestepped recent demonstrations organized by Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr against the US military presence.

Thus, paradoxically, Washington and Tehran find themselves providing by far the staunchest outside support for the Kurdish-Shi'ite political axis that has emerged in the Iraqi leadership - that is, Israel's shadowy influence with the Iraqi Kurds apart. How did Tehran arrive at this point?

An authoritative benchmark of the Iranian position on Iraq was available in a speech made by Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi at the United Nations General Assembly last September 25. It harped on the United States' "lawless militarism", called for the "speedy withdrawal of foreign forces" from Iraq and sought "enhancement of the UN's pivotal role", but underlined that "Iraq's stability was of utmost national importance for Iran".

Behind the rhetoric, Tehran had begun adjusting itself to the new interim government in Baghdad headed by Iyad Allawi. Tehran began casting its net wide with the Kurdish constituency in Iraq. Tehran could foresee the inevitability of the US searching for a political calendar in Iraq sooner rather than later. By diversifying its influence within Iraq, Iran was hoping to place itself as a factor that could not be ignored.

Iran was not seeking a "strategic defiance" of the US at all, but a constructive engagement over Iraq's stabilization. As much as Iran's national-security interests necessitated the policy, it also projected Iran as a factor of regional stability (reminiscent of Iranian roles in the Tajik civil war and in Afghanistan). Thus a stream of important Iraqi visitors to Tehran began, starting with Kurdish leader Masoud Barazani (even as Kharrazi was addressing the UN in New York).

Nonetheless, there were many variables at work: the nuclear standoff; US presidential elections; apprehensions of (pro-Israeli) neo-con dominance in US policymaking; stereotyped thinking in Washington toward Iran's "Islamic regime"; lack of steady back channels with Washington; and, most important, an overall lack of clarity in the US approach to the Iraqi situation.

The last element was particularly relevant. Iranian commentaries of the November-December period last year were constantly posing questions: Was the US really sincere about holding elections in Iraq? Why was the US allowing large-scale infiltration by Arab militants into Iraq with covert backing of neighboring Arab regimes? Was the US working on a secret understanding with those Arab regimes toward preventing a democratic process that might lead to a Shi'ite-dominated government in Baghdad? Were pointed militant attacks on key figures of Shi'ite leadership part of a plan to eliminate them systematically? Was it Washington's objective to divide Iraq and bring Iraqi Shi'ites under Hashemite tutelage as a counter to Iran's influence in Najaf? Why else was Allawi, who enjoyed Washington's backing, visiting Amman so often? Was there a coup in the making in the run-up to the elections?

Tehran read meanings into the drift in Washington's policy through the October-December period. A commentary by the Tehran Times on November 24 titled "Dark secrets about the Iraq election" summed up the Iranian concerns. It asked: "Is the United States really trying to establish democracy in Iraq?" It speculated that the US would have sized up "the power of religious authorities to mobilize Iraqi Shi'ites" and concluded that "active participation by Shi'ite clerics in Iraq's social and political scenes" would endanger long-term US interests in the region - a view prevalent in neighboring Arab countries. It warned against reinducting Ba'athist elements "with pan-Arabist tendencies" into government posts. It implied that the US was being deliberately soft on the Sunni triangle as bringing it under military control "does not seem so difficult".

On November 27, Khatami reinforced these concerns with visiting Iraqi vice president Ibrahim Jaafari at Tehran. Khatami warned against any role for "the remnants of the former Iraqi regime" and stressed the imperative of sticking to the election schedule, of allowing Shi'ite participation and of firmly countering interference by neighboring Arab governments.

Iranian commentaries of that period relentlessly cautioned Washington that Arab regimes did not want to see security established in Iraq since Iraq's moves toward democracy would raise questions about the "socio-political structure of those countries". Equally so, Iranian commentaries showed no inclination to regard the Iraqi militants as a political resistance to US occupation. In the Iranian judgment, these were "terrorists" first and last and needed to be dealt with as a security issue. Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were singled out by the Tehran Times as working for an indefinite postponement of the Iraqi elections "because the Shi'ites would certainly win the election, which would in turn raise the question of the legitimacy and viability of unelected regional Arab governments over the long term".

A turning point came with Osama bin Laden's message in December to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, citing him as the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Tehran Times seized the moment and in a memorable commentary on December 29 asked Washington to take note that "terrorist networks have made an unholy alliance" in Iraq; that Washington's approach to countering terrorism was flawed; and that it was time Washington adopted a "realistic policy". It explained that Washington was completely missing the point, amid September 11, 2001, that all Muslims should not be equated. Shi'ites had abhorred violence historically, had nothing to do with al-Qaeda and therefore ought to be regarded as natural allies in the struggle against terrorism. The commentary urged Washington not to be swayed by "disinformation" spread by certain Arab rulers "who exaggerated the danger of the Shi'ite sect". These misperceptions were clouding Washington's judgement as to who were its "main enemies" in the region.

Soon after, we notice that Tehran's comfort level began to rise, after the unequivocal position taken by President George W Bush about holding Iraqi elections and on allowing the Iraqi Shi'ite voice to be heard.

Tehran turned its mind to "positive thinking" once the assessment was made that Bush was determined to push through the Iraqi elections as per the January 30 schedule. Iran felt reassured. The Iranian concerns from then on devolved on three issues. First, do all that Tehran could to ensure that the elections would have legitimacy in the world perceptions. This, clearly, meant that Iraqis must be cajoled to participate in the election in large numbers. For large-scale popular participation by itself would be a touchstone of the credibility of the electoral process. Tehran began working in that direction.

Second, Tehran kept reminding the Iraqi Shi'ite community that the elections were a God-sent opportunity for them in their long and tragic journey in search of a political role in their own country. Tehran urged them to make the best use of that opportunity by turning up in large numbers to vote on election day. Tehran had the confidence that the Shi'ite opinion was largely crystallized around Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the electoral outcome of large-scale Shi'ite participation would be predictable.

But that was not the whole point. Tehran was also intensely conscious that the Iraqi Shi'ites were poised to conclusively leave behind their pan-Arab identity in favor of an ethnic Iraqi identity - and this was sure to have a huge downstream impact on the political landscape of the region. In fact, the growing despair in the scorn poured on the Iraqi elections by neighboring Arab regimes - questioning the legitimacy of the elections for all conceivable reasons - would substantiate Iran's judgement that the Arab political map in the region was, post-Iraqi elections - never going to be the same again.

The big question today, in fact, is: What is "pan-Arabism" without Iraq? The repercussions for the geopolitics of the entire Middle East out of this conclusive burial of "pan-Arabism" are going to be enormous. A road is opening toward a New Middle East consisting of nation-states based on national and ethnic identities without the pretentious baggage of Arab nationalism.

Third, Tehran kept urging the Iraqi Shi'ites not to retaliate against the mounting attacks on them and their places of worship by Sunni militants. Tehran's message was more or less: "Be patient, you will very soon have your hour of triumph." Tehran counseled the Shi'ites that they should not allow themselves to be distracted from the priority ahead, namely, that the Iraqi elections must go ahead in a way that the legitimacy of the electoral verdict would not come under cloud in the perceptions of the international community.

Will this common ground over Iraq in recent months provide the basis for a broader US-Iran engagement? Some pointers are available. Mutual rhetoric has petered out. The Iranian attitude toward the Palestine issue is mellowing. Iran is refraining from making provocative power projections as an inveterate adversary of Israel. Iran is all but suggesting that it can as well play a constructive role as regards militant Palestinian groups or Hezbollah in Lebanon.

More to the point: Is "realism taking hold in Washington" - as the hugely influential former US national security adviser Brent Scowcraft put it in an interview with Der Spiegel last week? Scowcraft maintained that he was "hopeful", but not sure if he could be "confident just yet". He said: "The Iranians aren't as aggressive as we sometimes think. Perhaps they won't destroy all their nuclear facilities, but we could achieve an open-ended ban on enrichment activities. That's something we could deal with pragmatically. So far the changes in the president [Bush] in his second term have been mainly of a rhetorical nature. The government's Iran policy provides us with the first indications of a substantial change in direction."

M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian career diplomat who has served in Islamabad, Kabul, Tashkent and Moscow.

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