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The waxing of the Shi'ite
crescent
By Sami
Moubayed
DAMASCUS - Since the Islamic
revolution took place in Iran in 1979, one of its
prime objectives was to strengthen Shi'ites all
over the Muslim world. Before that revolution,
they were a disinherited, underprivileged and
neglected community in Lebanon and Iraq.
This "Shi'ite emancipation" was first done
in Lebanon, through the charismatic cleric Musa
al-Sadr, who was funded and supported by the
mullahs of Tehran in his "Movement of the
Dispossessed" and its military branch, Amal,
created in 1974 and 1975, respectively.
They later supported Hezbollah, a pure
Iranian creation, that strove at first to
establish a theocracy in Lebanon, similar to the
one in Iran. In time, the role of Hezbollah became
to defend the Shi'ite community in Lebanon, rather
than bring them to power in Beirut, and safeguard
their political rights in the complex confessional
system of Lebanon.
In Iraq, the mullahs
began to fund, train, protect and harbor Shi'ite
dissidents opposed to the regime of Saddam
Hussein, where they were oppressed by the Sunni
minority. Ibrahim Jaafari, the new prime minister,
who is the de facto ruler of the new Iraq, spent
the years 1980-89 as a fugitive in Iran.
After 25 years of underground struggle,
this community succeeded in toppling Saddam,
ironically, with the help of the US. The overthrow
of Saddam, the newfound status of the Shi'ites in
Iraq, their victory in the January 2005 elections,
and the election of Jaafari were all well received
in Tehran. They summed up what Iran had wanted in
Iraq since 1979.
Jaafari, who has been
active in Shi'ite politics since 1968, raises
hopes throughout the Muslim world that struggle,
persecution and long years of banishment will not
prevent the Shi'ites from rising to power in their
respective communities, just like they did in Iran
in 1979, and Iraq in 2003. A member of the
pan-Shi'ite United Iraqi Alliance, and a
brother-in-law of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,
Jaafari's appointment as premier raises more than
an eyebrow in the Arab world.
The Shi'ites and
Syria
Syria's relationship with Iran and
its Shi'ites has always been a strategic one,
based on pragmatism and mutual interests rather
than pan-Shi'ite loyalties, as was the case with
Lebanon and Iraq. The Shi'ite community in Syria
is small and has no history of political
ambitions. They are first-class citizens, and
occupy several senior posts - as Syrians, however,
and not as Shi'ite Syrians.
Among the
most prominent are Dr Hani Murtada, the
current minister of higher education, who had
been president of Damascus University and is one of
the finest pediatricians in Syria, and comedian
and political satirist Duraid Lahham.
During the entire pre-Ba'ath era, only one
Shi'ite politician rose to fame in Syria, namely
Said Haydar from Baalbak, who co-led the revolt
against the French in the 1920s, and served
several times as a deputy in the Syrian
parliament, and who was a co-author of its
constitution.
Syria's support for the
Iranian revolution began in 1979, due to its
animosity toward the US-backed and Israel-allied
regime of Shah Reza Pahlevi. Actually, Damascus
had even involved itself in the Shi'ite
underground, by helping some of ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini's lieutenants prior to the revolution
that deposed the Shah.
Men like Ibrahim
Yazdi, Mustapha Chamran and Sadiq Qotbzadeh (two
future ministers in the Islamic Republic) were all
allies of Syria, and Qotbzadeh, for example, had
been given a Syrian passport to conduct anti-Shah
activities, disguised as a Paris correspondent for
the Syrian daily al-Thawra.
Damascus was
pleased when Iran's new leader, Khomeini, closed
down the Israeli Embassy in Tehran, to show his
distance from the Shah and his alliances, then
reopened it as an embassy for the Palestinian
Liberation Organization of Yasser Arafat. Syrian
leader Hafez Assad had offered Khomeini asylum in
Syria in October 1978. When Khomeini came to
power, Syrian vice president Abd al-Halim Khaddam
remarked that the Islamic revolution in Iran was
the "most important event in our contemporary
history" and boasted that Syria had supported it
"prior to its outbreak, during it and after its
triumph".
Syria also backed, but provided
no arms or money to, Iran during its eight-year
war with the Ba'athist regime of Saddam, starting
in 1980. When the war ended, the two countries
found more room for cooperation vis-a-vis
combating Israel through Hezbollah in south
Lebanon. Iran did it out of pan-Shi'ite loyalties.
Syria did it to continue its war by proxy with
Israel.
Some speculated that with Saddam
gone in 2003, the common enemy of Damascus and
Tehran, both countries would have little reason
for future cooperation, especially since the new
leaders of Baghdad were Shi'ite allies, and
proteges, of Iran. The new Iran-friendly regime in
Baghdad, many argued, would end all logical
reasons for a Syrian-Iranian honeymoon.
Yet Iran continued its support for Syria,
even after international pressure mounted on
Damascus following the assassination of Lebanese
ex-prime minister Rafik Hariri on February 14.
Iran feared, some believed, that Hezbollah's
alliance with Syria in the aftermath of the Hariri
crisis would damage the guerrilla movement's
standing in Lebanon.
These fears
were brushed aside by a statement by Syrian Prime
Minister Mohammad Naji al-Otari expressing
solidarity with Iran, and by Iranian Vice
President Mohammad Reza Aref, who said, "We are
ready to help Syria confront all threats." Syria
noted Iran's positive attitude and responded with
positive gestures, reacting very warmly to the
appointment of Iran's ally, Jaafari, as premier.
The Shi'ites of Bahrain
In
Bahrain, which has a 70% Shi'ite majority (of a
total population of about 443,000), ruled by a Sunni
minority, the Shi'ites hoped that Shi'ite power in
Tehran and Baghdad would bring more regional and
international attention to their plight. To them,
the ascent of Jaafari and the Shi'ites in Iraq is
of no less importance than the Islamic revolution
of 1979.
Treated as an underclass, they
rose against the Bahraini government in 1994, with
the funding of Iran, demanding reforms, better
living conditions and restoration of the
parliament abrogated by Sheikh Issa bin Salman
al-Khalifa in 1975. Hopes were a little heightened
in 2002 when Issa's son, King Hamad, restored
constitutional life to Bahrain, but curbed its
powers, and reduced Shi'ite representation.
They boycotted elections in 2002, and were
very poorly represented in the lower chamber of
parliament (the upper chamber was appointed by the
king). Before the elections, in an attempt at
bolstering Sunni representation in Bahrain,
authorities decided to grant dual citizenship to
nationals of the Gulf Cooperation Council living
in Bahrain (mostly Sunnis). This aroused much
controversy, and the Bahraini government decided
to back down, fearing Shi'ite wrath, and grant
citizenship to 10,000 Shi'ites living in Bahrain
as an appeasement before the elections of October
2002.
On March 26 thsi year, shortly after it was confirmed that
Jaafari was the new prime minister of Iraq,
80,000 Shi'ite demonstrators came out in Bahrain
to demand a new constitution giving them more
rights, among which was electing a prime minister,
and not having him appointed by the king. In the
past, demonstrators in Bahrain carried photographs
of Iraq's Sistani and Ali Khamenei, the Supreme
Leader of Iran.
The Shi'ites of Saudi
Arabia
The same scare has taken over Saudi
Arabia since 2003, where 11% of its 25 million
people are Shi'ites. They, too, complain of being
discriminated against, and have strong alliances
in Baghdad and Tehran. Only a few days after the
fall of Baghdad in April 2003, Sheikh Hasan
al-Saffa, a leading Saudi Shi'ite reformist,
appeared on satellite television to demand an end
to the injustice done against the Shi'ites in
Saudi Arabia.
Shi'ite districts in Saudi
Arabia were underdeveloped, and Saudi authorities
prevented Shi'ites from practicing their rituals
and building mosques, in addition to denying them
equal access to government jobs and the Saudi
army. By the end of April 2003, the Shi'ites had
petitioned Crown Prince Abdullah, the de facto
ruler of Saudi Arabia, for political and religious
freedoms. Among other things, they demanded
increased representation in government, the right
to set up their own courts, publish their own
books, the lifting of bans on their rituals, and
the creation of a special department to oversee
their issues at the Ministry of Endowments and
Islamic Affairs.
Deeply rooted in the
Arabian desert, the Shi'ites were around before
the modern state of Saudi Arabia was created in
the 1920s. In 1913, they swore allegiance to King
Abd al-Aziz (the kingdom's founder, who was then
sultan of Nejd), in exchange for a promise made by
him to guarantee their safety and freedom of
expression, once the desert was united. This was
done despite promises by the British to grant them
protectorate status, similar to the one according
to the small Persian Gulf sheikhdoms.
Abd al-Aziz
honored his initial promise, yet reneged on his
promises when creating Saudi Arabia in 1925.
Matters remained strained, more or less,
throughout the 20th century, and in 1993 an
agreement was reached between expatriate Saudi
Shi'ites and King Fahd. They promised to halt
opposition activities from abroad, urge Shi'ite
activists to return to Saudi Arabia, in exchange
for an amnesty by the king, and no more
discrimination. This did not happen.
Today, fears are heightened that the
Shi'ites of Saudi Arabia will be influenced,
funded or helped by the victorious Shi'ites of
Iraq. The Saudi Shi'ites, it must be noted,
refused to cooperate with Iran when it called on
them in 1980-88 to rebel against the House of
Saud.
Shi'ites in the remainder of
the Gulf are not as active, or as dangerous
to established regimes, as they are in Bahrain
and Saudi Arabia. Many have become active,
however, since the rise of the Iraqi Shi'ites in 2003.
In Yemen, the Shi'ites, who are 30% of
the country's 20 million, have also been
highly influenced by the Iraq debacle. They live
in tribal regions of Yemen, are heavily armed
and are greatly underdeveloped. In 2004, seeing
the benefits their co-religionaries were getting
in Iraq, they launched a failed rebellion
against President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and it
was suppressed by authorities, leading to the
killing of more than 400 people.
In Kuwait, where
the Shi'ites are 25% of Kuwait's 2.2 million, they
are loyal and in harmony with the
established government, represented with five deputies
in parliament, and until recently with Mohammad
Abu al-Hassan, a Shi'ite, as minister of
information. Matters became tense in 2004 when Yasser Habeeb,
a Kuwaiti Shi'ite student activist, was arrested
for distributing material offending leaders of
the Sunni faith who were companions of the
Prophet Mohammed. He was released in February 2004,
but authorities tried to arrest him again, to no
avail. The only two countries (in addition to
Syria) with a significant Shi'ite majority, which
nevertheless has no history of political
ambitions, or activism, are Oman and the United
Arab Emirates.
There is a fear rapidly
creeping throughout the Arab world from the rising
Shi'ite influence in the Middle East.
Shi'ite resurgence?
Two years
after the fall of Saddam's regime in Iraq, it is
safe to ask: Who were the real victors in this
bloody war of the Middle East in 2003? At first
glance, the only victors were George W Bush and
the neo-conservatives at the White House. A closer
look would show, however, that Iran as well,
ironically, has a lot to gain from the new Middle
East.
Or more specifically, the real victors
are the Shi'ites of Iran and the Muslim world.
They will enjoy the fruits of the post-Saddam
order long after Bush's army leaves Iraq.
This region, many fear, is now dominated by a
"Shi'ite crescent" uniting the Shi'ites of Iran, Lebanon,
Iraq and the Arab Gulf region.
Fear of this threat was first used by King
Abdullah of Jordan in an interview with the Washington
Post last December, arousing anger of the Shi'ite
community in the Arab world. Actually, the fear of
a "crescent" in this part of the world dates back
to the 1950s, when Iraqi prime minister Nuri
al-Sa'id talked about a "fertile crescent" plan
for the Middle East, to unite Iraq with Syria,
Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan, in a federal union
to be ruled by the Hashemite family in Baghdad.
This plan, lobbied for extensively in
Amman and Baghdad, was received with cold shivers
in Damascus, Beirut, Cairo and Riyadh. The
"crescent" remains, but players and roles have
shifted over the past 50 years. Today's "crescent"
is lobbied for extensively by its Iranian creator,
and supported by Baghdad, parts of Beirut and
Damascus, while it is being spurned in Saudi
Arabia, Bahrain, Yemen and Kuwait.
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian
political analyst.
(Copyright 2005
Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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