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A troubled triangle: Iran, India
and Pakistan
By Iason
Athanasiadis
TEHRAN - The formation of
a critical triangular relationship among regional
powers Iran, India and Pakistan - both cooperative
and adversarial - has accelerated in the past
months. Iran is trying to shore up alliances with
its neighbors in the face of escalating tension
with the United States, even as Pakistan and India
seek to disengage from the increasingly tight
control that Washington exerts over the region by
engaging in fence-mending. At the same time,
Pakistan and India are attempting to extract
further benefits from US patronage, namely
advanced weapons systems.
After the
relative policy success of a Shi'ite-majority
government coming to power in Iran's Arab neighbor
Iraq, Tehran is now looking east, keen to
normalize relations with its neighbors in the hope
that their support will blunt the edge of the US
military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the
same time, Iran is strengthening its relations
with regional superpowers China and Russia.
This month Washington justified its growing
involvement in the region when it identified Iran,
India and Pakistan as a "troubled triangle":
"Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran are a troubled
triangle and the US strategy is to involve the US
government in the region to reduce the troubled
nature," said the US Army War College's Larry
Goodson. "The US faces ... a real conundrum in
that we have to stay in order to achieve [our]
strategic interest of stabilizing and transforming
these troubled regions but our very presence there
is going to continue to attract some of the more
militant jihadists who want to challenge their
conception of the US project for the world.
Anti-American attitudes are at an all-time high in
some areas. We really can't stay and yet we dare
not go."
Washington,
meanwhile, is utilizing a carrots-and-sticks policy as it tries
to disrupt the rapprochement between Iran and its
neighbors that would end Tehran's international
isolation. The Bush administration's carrot is an
offer to sell India and Pakistan advanced F-16
fighter jets capable of dispatching nuclear
payloads. India has yet to accept the offer and is
making noises that it might approach Russia and
the European Union as alternative arms suppliers.
As for Pakistan, given Iran's close cooperation
with arch-foe India, it has steered a more
ambivalent course, welcoming a permanent US
presence in Afghanistan even as it offers to act
as an intermediary between Washington and Tehran
on the nuclear dispute.
The governing
circles in Tehran know that their Sunni Muslim
nuclear neighbor could well use its
US-supplied weapons against them one day, a
fear that Washington is implicitly encouraging in
its bid to further contain Iran. But the Bush
administration's strategy could well backfire by
hastening Tehran's scramble toward a nuclear
safeguard.
Last month, Pakistani
officials said the proposed sale of F-16 jets to
Islamabad had no links with the US-Iran standoff.
They were responding to reports in the media
insinuating that, in return for the F-16s,
Pakistan agreed to cooperate with Washington's
efforts to undo the Iranian nuclear program.
Pakistan has admitted that one of its top nuclear
scientists, Abdul Qadeer Khan, supplied Iran with
centrifuges used to enrich uranium for atomic
warheads and some officials have criticized Iran
for cooperating with the International Atomic
Energy Agency so fully on the issue. Tensions
between Pakistan and Iran have been further raised
by accusations that Tehran is sponsoring an
ethnic-led insurgency in the Balochistan province
that connects the two countries.
To complicate matters
further, India has rapidly developed its
relationship with China, prompting Islamabad to scramble in its
bid to keep Beijing's affections. Pakistan and
China signed a friendship treaty last month
and started negotiations on establishing a joint free-trade
zone. But the relationship lacks a
strategic dimension, unlike ties between India and China, which
are focused on this regard. The two countries
upgraded their ties to "strategic relations" after
the first-ever such dialogue between them in New Delhi
in January. Two weeks ago, they moved to resolve
their long-running border dispute to a backdrop of
flourishing trade, which touched an all-time high
of US$13.6 billion last year.
Iran
has also
been improving relations with China. Beijing secures
13.6% of its annual energy needs from Tehran
and looks set to receive more after a huge deal
signed recently. Buttressing their alliance, Beijing
and Tehran signed a preliminary accord worth
$70 billion to $100 billion by which China
will buy Iranian oil and gas, while helping develop
the Yadavaran oilfield close to the Iraqi border.
Earlier this year, China pledged to buy $20
billion in liquefied natural gas from Iran over
the next 25 years. In return, it sends
manufactured goods to Iran, including computer
systems, household appliances and cars. China is a
particularly valuable ally for Iran because it
holds veto power at the UN Security Council and
could shield Tehran from hostile diplomatic action
by Washington and London.
As
part of Tehran's eastern charm offensive, it
has built solid trade relations with India and is
pursuing a common policy in Central Asia, a
key strategic region. In January, the state-run Indian
Oil Corp reached an agreement with the
Iranian firm Petropars to develop a gas block in
the gigantic South Pars gas field, home to the
world's largest reserves. At the same time, India
is cooperating with Iran on securing Persian Gulf sea
lanes and is helping develop Iran's Chahbabar
port. This is partly aimed at frustrating
Pakistan's ambitions to make its own port of
Gwadar, just a few kilometers to the east, into a
regional hub.
At the same time, there has
been a rapid expansion in energy ties. Iran and
India are currently engaged in a joint project to
build a gas pipeline that would also cross
Pakistan. Dubbed the "peace pipeline", the $4.5
billion project could cement relations among its
three participants through creating financial
incentives for peaceful coexistence. But
Washington signaled its displeasure with India's
collaboration with Iran when US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice stated that Washington had
concerns over the pipeline deal. In a rare snub to
Washington, India responded by saying that
long-term energy security would dictate its energy
policy, not politics.
"I think that there
are a number of companies working in Iran,
including a large number of European companies,"
Indian Petroleum Secretary S C Tripathi said. "A
large number of countries are having economic
relations with Iran, therefore it should be
possible for us also to work out a reasonable and
well-drafted and well-crafted hydrocarbon
agreement with Iran. I think it should be
possible."
But to Pakistan's
consternation, aside from signing a significant
trade pact, India and Iran have also cultivated
limited military relations, conducting a joint
naval exercise in March 2003 that was possibly
motivated on Tehran's part by the US naval
presence in the Persian Gulf. Iran is also seeking
India's help for servicing its naval and air-force
equipment, including its MiG-29 jets. According to
a recent Center for Strategic and International
Studies report, Iran's Developing Military
Capabilities, Tehran sought India's help in
developing batteries for submarines, which are
more suitable for the warm waters of the gulf than
those supplied by Russia. At the same time, Iran
is buying more military hardware, in particular
missile technologies, from China.
Aside
from worrying Islamabad, friendly ties between
Tehran and New Delhi are also causing concern in
Tel Aviv. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
made a point of voicing his concerns about the
alliance to his Indian hosts in a 2003 visit.
Israeli officials are concerned that their weapon
deals with India will be compromised should New
Delhi decide to pass on classified Israeli
military technology to Tehran. Keen not to
antagonize Washington, New Delhi has been cautious
in keeping its distance from Iran on the nuclear
issue, although it has claimed to have helped
Tehran with generating nuclear energy.
From Islamabad, Tehran is seen as almost
as much of a threat as New Delhi. Ayesha Siddiqa,
an ex-Pakistani government director of naval
research, said that "strategically it will be
positive for Pakistan to support a hostile policy
towards Iran".
Talat Massod, a retired Pakistani
lieutenant general, told Voice of
America radio that Pakistan would welcome a
permanent US military presence. He said that
officials in Islamabad would be happy to see a
permanent US presence, believing that it would
provide support in the event of hostilities with
its neighbors.
"Pakistan, to be honest
with you, I think they will not mind that," he
said, "because they may think that it is a good
way to countervail India, provided they themselves
have good relations with the US."
The
comments
were indicative of Pakistan's sense of insecurity,
which Washington is hoping to exploit in
its drive to attain a full-time presence in the region.
Christopher Candland, an American academic currently
conducting field research in Peshawar on
the politics of Southeast Asia, told Asia Times
Online that India feels that "the more menacing
Pakistan is made to appear, the more Washington
will strengthen its relationship with New Delhi".
"In other words," Candland said, "the
Pakistani military is said to be using the
religious political parties to frighten Washington
into more military aid. In my view, it's a
dangerous confluence of opposing forces."
Washington also appears to be increasingly
tilting toward Delhi. While it has offered to sell
F-16 fighter planes capable of delivering nuclear
bombs to both New Delhi and Islamabad, the US has
allowed India the option to buy the more advanced
F-18s. The offer to India also includes licenses
for technology transfer and for local production,
something that Pakistan was not granted.
"Understandably, this disparity gives rise
to the perceptions in Islamabad and in New Delhi
that Washington has made a long-term commitment to
India's security but is only interested in
supporting Pakistan's security as long as it
continues its operations in Pakistan against
suspected al-Qaeda agents," Candland said.
From Iran's standpoint, the increasing
militarization of the region, coupled with US
attempts to build alliances with India and
Pakistan, can only be interpreted as a growing
threat. Tehran has responded to the threat by
boosting its relations with Russia and emerging
superpower China. A high-level Iranian delegation
visited China early this month to discuss expanding
trade ties, while Moscow has been the primary
supporter of Iran's nuclear program. Despite a
long-standing history of Russian meddling in Iran,
bilateral ties today are at their highest level
since World War II.
As things stand,
future trends may include Iran gravitating toward
China, Russia and India, even as a pro-Western
Pakistani government continues to build close ties
to Washington. In an intelligence estimate
published in February, the National Intelligence
Council - on which the Central Intelligence Agency
and other intelligence agencies are represented -
warned that India and China would emerge as major
global players by 2020.
It is certain that
"Asia is particularly important as an engine for
change over the next 15 years", the estimate said,
noting that "one could envisage a range of
possibilities from the US enhancing its role as a
regional balancer between contending forces to
Washington being seen as increasingly irrelevant".
Seemingly worried over such a
scenario, the US has moved to maintain its relevance in
the region through seeking to spark off a
regional arms race and heighten tensions between India
and Pakistan. Concurrently, Washington has
asked Israel to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty in
an unprecedented move that could go some way
toward ironing out the perceived tilt in US foreign
policy toward Tel Aviv.
As Afghanistan is
increasingly pacified, Pakistan may become more
and more irrelevant. Iran's stock is likely to
rise, both in South Asia and in the Arab world. As
an energy-rich country, Iran is certain to figure
in great power calculations and alliances -
whether these powers be the US, China or India -
to a greater extent than Pakistan. Tehran's fate
depends on several factors, not least how quickly
Central Asia's energy resources come on tap and
what policy the EU and Russia decide to follow in
the region.
At the moment, the view from
Tehran is ever more agreeable. To the west, the US
remains bogged down in Iraq, where a friendly
Shi'ite government is governing. To the east, a
solidifying network of alliances promises greater
security for Tehran. For the time being, Iran
appears to be well on top of the waves sweeping
over the region.
(Copyright 2005 Asia
Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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