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COMMENTARY
Dangerous games the
Saudis play
By Ehsan Ahrari
One wonders why there is any surprise
that hardline Islamists won the Saudi
municipal elections. Seven winners from that country's
most liberal city, Jeddah, were part of the "golden
list" circulated by hardline Islamist clerics.
Five of the six winners in Buraidah, capital of
the ultra-conservative province of Qassem, were
also hardline Islamists. Islamists also did well
in the holy city of Medina. A close look at these
elections is likely to uncover dangerous games
that are being played in the birthplace of Islam.
The good news is that democracy finally
appears to be coming to Saudi Arabia. Those who
are advocating its evolution in the West do not
appear impressed, for they are highly focused on
the fact that women are still excluded. As much of
a sad reality as the exclusion of women from the
electoral process in the kingdom is, there is
little doubt that they will exercise their right
to vote in the near future. It is worth reminding
that there was no participation of women in the
democracy of the United States long after the
establishment of the republic. The passage of the
19th Amendment to the US constitution in 1920
provided that right to them.
There is
ample criticism in the Western media that the
conservative clerics attempted to influence the
voters. But what is wrong with anyone's attempt to
persuade the voters? That is what electoral
campaigning is all about. For a staunchly Muslim
country like Saudi Arabia - where Islam is so
central to all aspects of daily life - there is no
harm for the hardline clerics to make sure that
the candidates who fulfill their religious
requirements should be elected, as long as others
are not denied the right to campaign for their
respective favorite candidates. At least that
aspect of the electoral process is not tainted.
As expected, the losing candidates cried
foul and blamed the government for turning a
"blind eye" to the endorsement of the hardline
clerics of the winning slate. They are likely to
lodge complaints with the election commission
against the "interference" of the clergy. It is
important to note that the election commission has
previously ignored such complaints. The Saudi
government, to be sure, is not a silent observer
of these developments. It is not unhappy that the
hardline Islamists have been elected. At the same
time, it has enough power to appoint "liberals" to
ensure that it stays in control of political
developments in the coming months.
What is
most interesting about the introduction of
elections in the highly religious autocracy is
that it is willing to experiment with something
that King Fahd Ben Abdel Aziz only a few years ago
depicted as not within the culture of Islam. In
this sense, the Saudi government might have
initiated a process that is fully capable of
developing into a tsunami for change. If that
tsunami does not develop within a matter of six
months or even a few years, a regular expansion of
the voting process may still create uncontrollable
momentum for that purpose.
How does
al-Qaeda envisage the election of hardline
Islamists in Saudi Arabia? To the extent that
anyone who considers the Saudi government a
legitimate entity and cooperates with it, he can
be depicted as an "infidel" in the highly
contentious frame of reference of that
organization. However, it may not pick a public
fight with these Islamists who have recently won
elections. Instead, al-Qaeda is likely to remain
fully focused on attacking the Saudi government
and its assets, as it has done in the past year or
so.
If the Saudi government were to falter
or be overthrown as a result of such attacks,
those very elected hardline Islamists might become
allies of al-Qaeda. As long as such a development
does not take place, al-Qaeda might not pick a
fight with the Islamists.
It is also
interesting to note that, as these events were
taking place in his country, Crown Prince Abdullah
was about to visit President George W Bush at his
ranch in Texas. On this occasion, the Saudi
government-controlled papers are generally
reminding the Bush administration of their
country's old ties and its role in serving as a
safe and a reliable source of oil at a time when
the price of a barrel of oil has recently gone
over the US$50 mark.
It is
expected that the Palestinian-Israeli
peace process (or the lack thereof) and the high
price of oil will dominate the Bush-Abdullah
agenda. Washington will also express its gratitude
to Riyadh in its behind-the-scenes pressure on
Syria's decision to withdraw its troops from
Lebanon. The chances are slim that the evolution
of democracy will take up much time in the
conversation between these two leaders. Bush is
likely to express his satisfaction regarding the
palpable emergence of democracy and will express
hopes that it will continue to grow.
In
the overall expression of hoopla and criticism
related to the Saudi elections, no one should
forget that real change in the birthplace of Islam
will come only when there is a serious dialogue
about the necessity for reforming Wahhabi
perspectives. In their palpable willingness to
open up or even to democratize their polity, the
Saudi rulers are either not really understanding
what they must do, or fooling the US by allowing
cosmetic changes as a substitute for real ones in
the name of democracy, since that is what
Washington is currently demanding in the Muslim
Middle East.
What the Saudi rulers must do
is to reform the Wahhabi perspectives through a
serious debate and dialogue inside their borders
among various groups, including the Shi'ites and
the Sufis, and those who are not firmly committed
to the Wahhabi worldview. At one time, the acutely
anti-Shi'ite, anti-Sufi and extremely obscurantist
Wahhabi viewpoint served the interests of the
Saudi dynasty by bringing them to power. Today,
those perspectives are in dire need of radical
surgery. Until that happens, Saudi Arabia seems to
follow a strategy of biding its time until the
hardline insistence for political reform from
Washington either dissipates or completely withers
away.
From the Saudi predilections for
avoiding and postponing changes as much as
possible, that might be a deft move. However,
considering how important it is to bring about
genuine change in the Saudi polity, postponing or
avoiding these changes might not be in the best
interest of that country.
Ehsan
Ahrari is an
independent strategic analyst based in Alexandria,
Virginia. His columns appear regularly in Asia
Times Online. He is also a regular contributor to
the Global Beat Syndicate. His website:
www.ehsanahrari.com.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact us for information
on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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