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COMMENTARY
A different type of regime change
in Syria
By Ehsan Ahrari
When presidential historians look back at
the presidency of George W Bush, the phrase
"regime change" will stand out as his major
contribution to the policy options of US
presidents. Whether or not a future US president
will be able to carry out one or more regime
changes is not that significant. What is important
to note is that Bush carried out two changes of
regime - one in Afghanistan and one in Iraq -
through military actions, and continues to
contemplate a similar outcome in Syria, but by
implementing a different strategy.
The
window of opportunity proved to be the
assassination of Lebanon's former premier, Rafik
Hariri, on February 14. Even though there is no
evidence of Syria's involvement in that tragedy,
Syria became a primary suspect. The predominant
reason for this is that dictatorships express
their disapproval of potential troublemakers and
challengers to their power by assassinating them.
The more brutal the technique used, the higher are
the chances that the fear factor will make all
future troublemakers think twice before
challenging the dictator.
Such was the
case with Hariri, because he had started to oppose
the continued Syrian occupation of his country.
When he was assassinated, most Lebanese were
convinced it was done by Syria. They came out in
large numbers, volubly demonstrating and demanding
the end of Syria's occupation of their homeland.
Quite deftly, the Bush administration
snatched the opportunity and demanded an imminent
withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, where
they had been stationed for the past 29 years.
Syrian President Bashar Assad fully
understood what he must do and what would happen
if he stalled. Because of the fact France was in
agreement with the US in demanding Syrian
withdrawal, Assad figured a strongly worded
resolution to that effect would be passed quickly
at the United Nations Security Council. He seemed
to have concluded that his best bet was not to let
the situation deteriorate and announced a
timetable for troop withdrawal. He completed the
final phase of the withdrawal of his troops from
Lebanon on April 25. By doing so, Assad thought
that he nullified any preemptive action that the
Bush administration was contemplating against his
regime.
Assad's reasoning and actions were
sound, but his regime is not yet out of the woods.
The concept of regime change - a hallmark of the
Bush administration - has not become irrelevant.
In the case of Syria, the US is likely to bring
about the same results it has in Iraq and
Afghanistan by using different tactics. First, the
US is likely to continue its demands that Syria
liberalize and pluralize its government. The most
obvious purpose of such demands is that it
dovetails the Bush administration's overall policy
of transforming the authoritarian states of the
Middle East into democracies.
In reality,
the pluralization and liberalization of Syria
would instantly threaten the old oligarchs who are
the real holders of power in that country. They
have to decide quickly if they will allow
President Assad to pluralize and democratize the
Syrian polity, whereby they (the oligarchs) would
lose their long-standing position of power and
privilege. Their choices are not simple. They have
the option of staying with the status quo, or even
overthrowing Assad.
If this were to take
place, however, Syria would be further exposed to
potential punitive actions from abroad. The US is
in an excellent position to take military action
against Syria, especially if it were granted
approval to do so by the United Nations.
Alternatively, if the oligarchs agreed to
democratize their polity, they, in reality, would
be presiding over the demise of their own
privileged status. As the last republic of fear,
any attempt to liberalize and pluralize Syria is
loaded with all sorts of triggers that the regime
would have no choice but to quell through the use
of force, since that's what it has done so
efficiently in the past. However, any use of
brutal force against domestic dissents would only
intensify pressure from abroad for incorporating
the demands of force for change.
Second, as the US intensifies its pressure on Syria
to liberalize, according to Flynt Leverett of
the Brookings Institution (and author of a recently
issued book, Inheriting Syria), it has
also told Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel
not to agree to open a negotiating front with that
country over the future status of the Golan
Heights. Assad is willing - indeed anxious - to
open negotiations on that issue. The US is in no
mood to offer any opportunity to Syria whereby it
would gain any momentum stemming from a potential
breakthrough on the Golan Heights, which has been
under Israeli occupation since 1973.
Syria
also remains under US suspicion stemming from its
alleged refusal to tighten control on its borders,
which serve as regular pathways for the movement
of Iraqi insurgents. In addition, there is a
shared sentiment within the neo-conservative
circles in the US that Saddam Hussein's weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) were somehow transferred to
Syria. That is why, according to the peddlers of
this perspective, no WMD were found in Iraq.
Syria is likely to cooperate with the US
on tightening its borders; however, in the absence
of a quid-pro-quo approach from the Bush
administration, there is not likely to be any
major breakthrough, at least on insurgent issues.
Regarding WMDs, Syria has categorically denied any
involvement.
In the final analysis,
the real reason underlying the Bush
administration's intense dislike of Syria is that after
the dismantlement of Saddam's regime, Syria and
Iran remain the next two countries that still
refuse to accept American dominion in their
neighborhood. Of the two, Syria appears more
vulnerable to regime change than Iran, but through
the use of non-military tactics. After what it is
experiencing in Iraq, toppling another regime
through military action is not at all a feasible
option for the US.
However, for a
dictatorship such as Syria, plenty of other means
are at the US's disposal. In fact, it can be
argued that the best way to bring about regime
change in Syria is by sustaining the demands of
liberalization, and then letting the forces of
change create an explosive situation, which would
eventually dismantle the regime. Bush has little
less than four years to wait for the success of
this strategy. Another regime change is in the
making. And all indications are that this is
something of which Assad is also aware.
Ehsan Ahrari is an independent
strategic analyst based in Alexandria, Virginia.
His columns appear regularly in Asia Times Online.
He is also a regular contributor to the Global
Beat Syndicate. His website:
www.ehsanahrari.com.
(Copyright 2005
Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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