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Long shadows of the Shi'ite
tragedy
By Ehsan Ahrari
The legacy of Shi'ite Islam has an
overwhelming presence of tragedies involving the
assassination of Ali - the fourth caliph of Sunni
Islam, but Shi'ite Islam's first "infallible" imam
- and the battlefield death of his youngest son,
Hussain, and his other male relatives. Considering
what Iraq is currently experiencing as a result of
mounting pressures from insurgents and terrorists,
one cannot be too optimistic about the prospects
of success of the first elected government of
Ibrahim Jafaari. The very creation of this new
government - the 27 members of the new
transitional Iraqi government took their oaths of
office on Tuesday - was in doubt for several weeks
after the elections.
Even now, it seems
to be facing an uphill battle in its attempt to
avoid failure, which would become yet another
indicator in the tragic developments that have marked
post-Saddam Iraq.
The United
Iraqi Alliance (UIA), which won a majority of seats,
has had trouble formulating a cabinet. The
sectarian basis of electoral politics that was so
heavily emphasized in the provisional constitution
written under the US-led coalition provisional
authority has resulted in the emergence of the UIA
(140 seats) as a dominant party, with Kurds (75
seats) and the Iyad Allawi group (40 seats) as two
other major winners. Iraqi Sunnis now have fewer
than 20 seats in the 275-member National Assembly,
even though they comprise 20% of the population.
As a group that is
tasting power stemming from its 75 seats, the Kurds have
emerged as the most vociferous group. They
appear oblivious to the potential damage
their boundless aspirations would cause to the long-term
survival of their autonomy. It is no secret that the
Kurds want to convert their autonomy
into an independent Kurdistan. The only thing that is
forcing them to be somewhat discreet about
their aspirations is the fact that even the US -
their sole and most powerful ally - will not allow
it to materialize. In the meantime, the
Kurds had determined that they should
undermine the authority of Jafaari and postpone
the emergence of the new government long enough
so that Allawi got a chance to form a cabinet
under his premiership. The Kurds remain highly
suspicious of Jafaari's Islamist credentials, and
envision secular Allawi as a preferred
alternative.
Iraqi Shi'ites, on the
contrary, prefer Jafaari over Allawi because they
perceive the latter as too accommodating to Sunni
demands in the previous government. The Sunnis do
not really like any sectarian leaders; however,
they also know that they have to make the best of
the current very bad electoral realities, from
their perspective. After remaining the ruling
group of Iraq in its entire history as a state,
Sunnis are having the most difficult time
adjusting to their subservient status to the
Shi'ites. Despite these sustained inter- and
intra-sectarian suspicions, squabbling, and
suspicion, Jafaari succeeded in putting together a
cabinet, minus seven cabinet seats.
Of these, the Defense
and Oil ministries are still vacant. No
acceptable Sunni candidate has yet emerged to fill
the Defense ministry. The Kurds wanted the Oil ministry,
but no one else wanted them to fill that
post. The swearing-in of the first elected government should
have been a remarkable event, except for the
continued absence of Sunni support, and the fear
that this government might not survive for long.
Despite the fact that the
Sunnis did not participate in the
elections in any substantial way, they demanded seven
ministries and a deputy premiership. Even though the offer made
to them fell short by one, they are
still complaining that they do not have
any major portfolios. Most of the other Sunni
portfolios are of low status.
The
Sunnis are deeply suspicious of the
proposed de-Ba'athification of the Jafaari government.
They want the creation of a just system whereby
those former Ba'athists who are accused of
bloodletting in the Saddam regime are tried and
punished. However, a wholesale de-Ba'athification, the
Sunni leaders fear, would further alienate
their community. Jafaari knows that. He also knows
that he has to play a highly delicate balancing act
of being reasonably receptive to Sunni demands -
especially regarding de-Ba'athification - without
creating the appearance among the Shi'ites and the
Kurds that he is buckling under their pressure.
The fact that former
president Ghazi al-Yawar - a Sunni leader who is
now serving as vice president and an intermediary
between the Shi'ites and Sunnis - has expressed
his frustration with the uneven representation of
the Sunnis in the new government is also not
helping Jafaari in his seemingly insurmountable
task of incorporating Sunni support.
Within the Shi'ites, the Oil ministry also
has emerged as a source of contention. Even though
Ahmed Challabi is currently filling it as a
caretaker, various Shi'ite groups within the UIA
have failed to agree on a common Shi'ite candidate
to fill this slot on a long-term basis.
As
if Jafaari's job of putting together a government
wasn't difficult enough, Iraq's insurgents are
extremely busy causing as much violence,
destruction and mayhem as possible. The
insurgents have no doubt about the zero-sum type
of relationship between what they want and what
the newly formulated government wants to achieve.
If the
Jafaari-led government falters, the greatest winner of
this potential tragedy will indisputably be
the insurgents. However, looking at the seemingly mindless
wrangling and sectarian power-grabbing that is continuing,
one wonders whether these actors know that they
might be playing into the hands of those who wish
Iraq nothing but death and destruction.
Ehsan Ahrari is an independent
strategic analyst based in Alexandria, VA, US. His
columns appear regularly in Asia Times Online. He
is also a regular contributor to the Global Beat
Syndicate. His website: www.ehsanahrari.com.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact us for information
on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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