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In Iraq's insurgency, no rules,
just death
By Ehsan Ahrari
In the very initial phase of evolution,
Iraq's insurgents decided that Iraq would not be
governed by the American-appointed government.
After the elections of January 30, they also
determined that a government elected under the
American-written constitution would not govern it.
But how are they are going to impose their will?
Their decision all along seems to be that one side
has to be either eradicated or defeated.
The American side cannot be eradicated,
but the insurgents seem to have decided that they
will not be defeated, as long as they are willing
to die for their cause. One US Marine recently
described the battle with insurgents in Ubaidi, 15
miles east of the Syrian border, by observing,
"They came here to die. They were willing to stay
in place and die with no hope. All they wanted was
to take us with them." How do you develop
an effective strategy to fight those who follow
no rules, except their willingness to die for
their cause? No one on the American side seems to
have an answer.
The insurgents in Iraq
comprise a variety of groups. First and foremost
are the Ba'athists and pan-Arabists, including
persons of civilian bureaucracy and armed forces
under Saddam Hussein. They had careers and
retirement plans. They had guaranteed sources of
income to support their families. Even in the
uncertain political environment of Iraq under a
dictator, they did not harbor grave doubts about
having a secure means of earning a living, as long
as they did not antagonize the wicked regime.
Today, almost 90% of them have no job, no income
and no future. Thus, they form a majority of the
Iraqi insurgency. A large number of army personnel
are reportedly well trained in urban warfare. They
are eager to destroy the current evolving system,
which, from their point of view, is highly
illegitimate because it is created by the United
States.
Then there are the Sunni Islamists
who wish to see their country ruled under the
banner of Sunni Islam. There is also the Iraqi
branch of al-Qaeda, whose goals of having an
Islamist Iraq may not be too much different than
that of the Sunni Islamists, like Ansar al-Islam,
and its offshoot, Ansar al-Sunnah. They are driven
by the jihadi frame of mind. The "super-Infidel"
is occupying the land of Islam, according to this
perspective, and should be driven out, no matter
the cost. In this frame of reference, there is no
compromise, just death, either for them, or for
their enemy, or for both. Consequently, Iraq has
gone beyond a point where it could be described as
"hell".
To fight the enemy, America cannot
have any strategy other than its willingness to
fulfill the desire of the insurgents. One has to
paraphrase 18th century US statesman Patrick
Henry's famous statement: "Give me liberty or give
me death." In this instance, the Iraqi insurgents
are not interested in living under what the
Americans call a system based on liberty. They
have chosen death as a price of destroying that
system. In the process of dying, they are also
willing to take a whole lot of Iraqis and
Americans with them. This is not a reality that
America wanted to create in Iraq.
Still,
the Bush administration is poised to stabilize
Iraq through increased reliance on the indigenous
security forces, while keeping a high operational
tempo that is aimed at catching the insurgents off
guard and capturing or killing their top leaders.
It is hoped that the capture or eradication of the
top leadership of the insurgency will eventually
lead to the defeat of that movement. The American
thinking is sound; however, the tactics used might
produce contrary results.
No
one seems to recognize
the fact that the intense pace of the Iraqi
insurgency is constantly keeping US forces off
guard. Since the Shi'ites are not as hostile to
the Americans as the Sunnis, someone in the
American military chain of command has decided to
rely on Shi'ite security forces to bring about law
and order. A news dispatch published in the
Washington Post on May 8, is a case in point of
how destabilizing some of the tactics used by the
US and the Iraqi government are. The government
side is currently using Shi'ite Iraqi forces for
security purposes in the Sunni city of Ramadi,
which has remained one of the hotbeds of the Sunni
insurgency. From the perspective of forces of
stability, since there is no Sunni government in
Ramadi, they are forced to use the Shi'ite forces,
"including ad hoc militia groups such as the
Defenders of Baghdad - as are flowing into Ramadi
as part of the latest strategy by Iraq's central
government and the US military to stem insurgent
violence here".
The above dispatch makes
some very important pro and con points. It states,
"As a short-term counterinsurgency strategy, such
forces have several advantages. First, they and
their families are less subject to intimidation
than when the forces are in their own area. Also,
as Iraqis, they are far more familiar with the
territory and less likely to be viewed as
occupiers than are US troops." However, it goes on
to note "... by pitting Iraqis from different
religious sects, ethnic groups and tribes against
each other", this tactic "also aggravates the
underlying fault lines of Iraqi society,
heightening the prospect of civil strife ..."
As sectarian strife between the Shi'ites
and Sunnis is increasing, one wonders who in his
right mind would devise such a dangerous tactic
only to attain short-term security? The insurgents
might not be wrong if they were to read this as a
desperate move.
The decision of the Bush
administration not to engage in constructive
dialogue with Iran and Syria is another tactical
mistake of utmost significance. According to some
reports, Syrian intelligence is actively involved
in recruiting and training Iraqi insurgents. Iran
is also accused of being involved in similar
activities. However, given the fact that such
reports are coming from Kurdish sources, one
wonders how credible they really are. After all,
the Kurds have a lot to lose if the current
formula for the evolution of democracy in Iraq
were to fail.
Regardless of whether such reports
are credible or aimed at promoting the partisan
perspectives of the Kurdish groups in Iraq,
the US government must engage Iran and Syria if
it is serious about stabilizing Iraq. As long as
those two countries equate the emergence of a
stable and democratic Iraq as a threat to their
respective national securities, they would do
everything to minimize the chances of the
emergence of that reality.
How much worse
do things have to get in Iraq before they get
better? No one has a clue, except for the
insurgents. They seem to have concluded that a
Western-dominated Iraq will not be the beginning
of a new phase for them. They want to stop the
emergence of that reality. That is why they follow
no rule other than dying for their cause, and take
with them a whole lot of others who oppose them.
Ehsan Ahrari is an independent
strategic analyst based in Alexandria, VA, US. His
columns appear regularly in Asia Times Online. He
is also a regular contributor to the Global Beat
Syndicate. His website: www.ehsanahrari.com.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact us for information
on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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