|
|
|
|
US marches toward sanctions on
Iran
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
BERLIN - The George W Bush administration,
prioritizing the so-called Iran threat, has picked
up speed in its march toward United Nations
sanctions on Iran, with key government officials
going on the offensive against Iran both on
Capitol Hill and at the divisive nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference
in New York. Like the jaws of a deadly pincer, two
high-ranking officials with the US State
Department took all the media limelight they
needed to level new accusations of Iranian
proliferation and demand immediate action by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to
complain against Iran to the UN Security Council.
Andrew Semmel, a deputy assistant
secretary of state, addressed the NPT conference
and accused the IAEA of failing to fulfill its
"legal responsibility to report Iran's serious and
longstanding safeguards non-compliance to the
Security Council". His colleague, Nicholas Burns,
under secretary of state, simultaneously addressed
the US Congress, claiming there was no sign that
Iran had given up its ambition to become a nuclear
power. Both officials asked Iran to suspend "all
nuclear-related activities".
In light of
the Iran-European Union nuclear talks scheduled to
begin on Monday in Paris, the renewed US pressure
is well-timed to bolster the Europeans'
negotiation posture vis-a-vis Iran and to pave the
way for a showdown at the UN Security Council in
the near future. With Europe already
pre-positioning itself for a common cause with the
US on this matter, and Iran unwilling to
permanently give up its NPT right to the nuclear
fuel cycle, the stage is set for yet another major
Middle East crisis, with the potential to trigger
military action.
The chances are that the
crisis will be averted for a few more months, and
we may witness a relatively tranquil summer prior
to a hectic fall. Yet no one can predict with any
certainty that the current proto-crisis will not
degenerate into a full crisis even sooner. What is
beyond doubt, however, is the great gulf dividing
Iran and the so-called European Three (EU-3:
Germany, France and Britain), over the issue of
Iran's uranium-enrichment program, and the
distinct possibility that the talks may break down
as a result of Iran's unwillingness to keep its
current suspension of its nuclear fuel program
much longer.
This, in turn, raises an
important question of what will happen if the
issue is picked up by the Security Council?
Certainly, the Security Council has the right to
consider any issue deemed meritorious of its
attention. But, whether or not this will translate
into UN sanctions on Iran, in the absence of any
credible evidence of Iran's breach of its NPT
obligations, is far from certain.
Increasingly, it appears that in the US's
steady march for Security Council action against
Iran, a quid pro quo with Germany
is in the works, in light of Germany's quest for a
permanent seat on the Security Council and the
planned visit to Washington of Germany's
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. Needless to say, it
would be a rather bad omen for the UN if, in
retrospect, it turns out that Germany bargained
its Europeanist Iran policy for the sake of a
largely symbolic addition as a non-veto permanent
member of the Security Council. In contrast, in
light of the burgeoing Iran-germany trade
relations, upped nearly 40% this quarter compared
to last year, Germany has much too lose
economically if it goes along Washington's script
for action.
The US can
proceed toward UN sanctions only by ignoring the
positive developments in Iran-IAEA cooperation
over the past two years, thus turning the clock
back. Hasn't the IAEA been successful in getting
Iran to sign the Additional Protocol,
allowing
extensive inspection of its nuclear sites, present
comprehensive reports on its nuclear program, and
go along with
its request for temporary
suspension of its uranium enrichment activities,
all these in the past two years, warranting the
IAEA's rather warm reference to Iran's
"constructive cooperation" in their
latest
resolutions on Iran? Why then is the US turning a
blind eye to the IAEA's significant breakthroughs
with Iran, if not for the sinister objective of
eventual war-mongering?
Assuming for a moment that, indeed,
the US and Europe somehow get their way at the UN,
the question of compliance then arises: given the
need to impose sanctions on Iran's oil industry -
ie, the only area where it would hurt Iran - would
such sanctions have any chance of success, seeing
how energy-hungry the West is and how countries
such as China and India would be disinclined to
respect UN sanctions?
Indeed, the most
likely result of a Security Council sanction on
Iran, other than losing further legitimacy as a
tool of US foreign policy, is an ineffective
sanctions regime, so causing such irritation to
the Iranians that they may exit the NPT
altogether, as warned by Iran's top negotiator,
Hassan Rowhani.
On the other hand, Iran
may well put up a fine defense at the Security
Council, exposing the Western double standard of
ignoring Israel's arsenal while seeking to invoke
Chapter 41 against Iran in the name of fostering
peace and stability. Chances are the UN would be
further undermined, as a surrogate for US foreign
policy, as a result of confrontation over Iran,
which today enjoys solid backing from the
Non-Aligned Movement. In other words, the US's and
Europe's recipe for Security Council action may
backfire on them and, possibly, turn into a mini
Iranian victory. What both sides need to consider,
however, is the Iraq analogy, and how the US
government used sanctions as a prelude for war. Is
the same path being charted by Washington now
vis-a-vis Iran? And if so, shouldn't the world
community behave slightly different from how it
did, peevishly toward Washington, in the previous
crisis?
Henceforth, looking through the
gloomy glass, with Iran-EU talks on the verge of
collapse, the US and the United Kingdom hardening
their stance against Iran, and Iranian national
pride disallowing their humiliation under Western
pressure with respect to their legal rights, the
prospects for an amicable resolution of the Iran
nuclear crisis do not seem very bright, to put it
mildly. Then again, neither does the prospect of a
successful UN sanctions regime against Iran, if
indeed such measures somehow get past the
potential veto axes of China and Russia. What such
dim prospects then lead to is the military option,
so openly talked about in Western capitals these
days, yet that may only exacerbate the threat of
an Iranian nuclear threat, instead of nipping it
in the bud.
Notwithstanding the above, the
best solution may indeed be a monitored, contained
enrichment program by Iran, put forward by the
Iranian government yet adamantly rejected by the
EU-3. Maybe then the genie of this crisis can be
put back in the bottle.
Kaveh L
Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After
Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy
(Westview Press) and "Iran's Foreign Policy
Since 9/11", Brown's Journal of World Affairs,
co-authored with former deputy foreign minister
Abbas Maleki, No 2, 2003. He teaches political
science at Tehran University.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact us for information
on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
|
|
|
|
|
All material on this
website is copyright and may not be republished in any form without written
permission.
© Copyright 1999 - 2005 Asia Times
Online Ltd.
|
|
Head
Office: Rm 202, Hau Fook Mansion, No. 8 Hau Fook St., Kowloon, Hong
Kong
Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
|
|
|
|
