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The one-man Rafsanjani
show
By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - "As you consider it desirable
that all people in the country from different
interests have the opportunity to take part (in
the upcoming presidential elections), the
competence of Mr [Mostafa] Moin and Mr [Mohsen]
Mehralizadeh is recognized."
With these
written words, Ayatollah Ahmad Janati, leader of
the all-powerful Guardians Council (GC) in Iran,
addressed Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on Tuesday,
pledging to permit two disqualified candidates for
the June 17 elections to run for presidential
office. The Grand Ayatollah explained that
monopolizing the elections would fuel anti-regime
movements, shed doubt on the regime's credibility,
and create mass boycotts on election day.
Hours after the disqualifications were
announced, hundreds of students held a
demonstration at Tehran University, denouncing the
GC's measures and demanding that the reformist
Moin be permitted to run for office. Jean
Asselborn, the foreign minister of Luxembourg,
whose country currently holds the rotating EU
presidency, addressed the matter: "The EU
ministers regret that the GC has again decided to
approve only those candidates who represent a
relatively narrow range of political opinion. It
makes the expression of a truly democratic choice
by the Iranian people difficult."
Moin and
Mehralizadeh had been the prime reformers in the
presidential race, and because of their views,
which call for liberalizing Iranian politics, they
were disqualified by the GC. Janati and Khamenei
permitted Moin and Mehralizadeh to run for office
amid growing discontent within Iran at the GC's
decision to disqualify 1,035 candidates for
presidential office, permitting only six
hardliners to compete; all of whom are considered
puppets of the GC.
Observers of Iranian
affairs have praised Khamenei's decision and the
GC's U-turn. On the surface, it may seem
democratic, but Khamenei has done it with one
purpose: to impede the rise of ex-president
Hashemi Rafsanjani to power.
Although the
two men have been friends since the Iranian
revolution of 1979, they have quarreled on
political matters ever since. More recently,
Rafsanjani is believed to be seeking a deal with
the Americans that would end Iran's nuclear
program; something Khamenei curtly refuses.
Khamenei watched the campaigning with
interest, fearing that of the six men permitted to
run for office, only Rafsanjani had a power base
in Iran. With relatively weak candidates around
him, he would surely win the elections, portraying
himself as a political giant. If challenged by
someone like Moin, however, Khamenei believed
Rafsanjani's chances of victory would be seriously
questioned. So now eight people will run for
president, making victory for Rafsanjani a little
bit more difficult, though he is still very much a
favorite.
This will not lead to a showdown
between Khamenei and Rafsanjani (both former
presidents of Iran) since both men are keen on
showing the world that the Islamic republic is
unified and "democratic". Yet the next month will
be filled with behind-the-doors meetings and
political deals between Khamenei and basically
everybody else, to try to convince the masses to
vote for someone other than Rafsanjani.
His candidate is most probably Moin -
which places Moin in a tight spot. Initially, he
had been highly critical of Khamenei's veto power
over all political affairs in Iran, and the fact
that the ayatollah would use his influence to
overrun any decision reached by the political
establishments or the GC. Now, he is the man to
benefit most from Khamenei's veto since it got him
back into the presidential race.
Khamenei
as well will have a difficult time portraying
himself as a reform-friendly cleric since his
reputation since 1979 had been built as a
conservative. He has to convince the Iranians that
he wants a reformer like Moin in power because he
is a reformer at heart, and not because he wants
to keep Rafsanjani away from the job.
As
the Grand Ayatollah who should be godfather to
all, Khamenei cannot personalize his political
stances in public. Whichever candidate is elected,
however, both Moin and Khamenei would have their
credibility seriously challenged from day one. If
Moin is elected, he would discover that he cannot
work with or be submissive to someone like
Khamenei. And, in turn, Khamenei would discover
that cooperating with a reformer like Moin would
be unbearable, just as it had been under outgoing
President Mohammad Khatami. A gridlock would then
emerge and reforms would be stalled by political
bickering, as the case under Khatami.
On
the other hand, if Rafsanjani is elected, he will
work to curb the influence of the GC,
overshadowing it with his own personal clout, but
try to cooperate more positively with Khamenei
since ultimately he is no Moin or Khatami and is
closer to the conservatives in power than he is to
the reformers. By doing so, he would be able to
push through with his minimal reforms. Minimal yet
attainable reforms by Rafsanjani would be better
for the Iranian public than loud and daring
reforms (which will not get implemented) by Moin.
Either way, the success of the new president will
depend on how much he is willing to cooperate with
Khamenei, since he is the No 1 man in Iran. More
than anybody else, Hashemi Rafsanjani knows that.
The men who would be president
Mohammad Baqir Qalibaf,
43, is the youngest of the candidates. Born in
September 1962, he was only 17 when the Islamic
revolution broke out in 1979. A former general, he
became commander of the Nasr Forces at the age of
22 in 1984, during the Iran-Iraq War. Qalibaf
headed the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) in the 1990s, becoming chief of police in
June 2000. Among his memorable achievements is the
purging of the police force from all political
elements, particularly those opposed to the
Iranian revolution. This was done to ensure that
if rioting ever erupted, as was the case during
the Shah's era in 1979, and the army sided with
the demonstrators, then a loyal police force would
be there to maintain order.
His reputation
as a hardliner was cemented in July 1999 when,
along with 24 IRGC members, he told Khatami that
unless the government intervened to suppress
student demonstrations in Tehran, he would take
matters into his own hands and crush the
demonstrators. Pragmatic, ruthless and
conservative, his candidature was warmly received
by the GC, yet he is greatly unpopular in Iran,
generally believed to be a young dictator if he
came to office. On May 9, he compared himself to
Shah Reza Pehlavi, who is remembered for his
authoritarianism in Iran, saying: "This country
needs a Reza Khan. And I am the Reza Khan."
Ali Larijani,
born in 1958, is another hardliner, and a
candidate of the Coordination Council of the
Islamic Revolutionary Forces. He had been director
of Iranian Radio and Television in 1994-2004.
Loathed as much as Qalibaf, he succeeded Khatami
at the Islamic Culture and Guidance Ministry in
1992. During the first Rafsanjani era, Khatami had
been "impeached" from his position at the ministry
because he had too liberally relaxed the influx of
foreign films and music into Iran. To prove his
merit, Larijani did the exact opposite and was
backed by his brother Sadegh Larijani, who is an
influential member of the 12-man GC. Larijani
speaks the language of Middle East regimes, is
used to barking state rhetoric, and is no friend
to reformers like Khatami.
He is close,
however, to Grand Ayatollah Khamenei and serves as
his representative at the National Security
Council. Larijani is well aware that the US is
serious in its threats to Iran, but does he not
seem to mind that and has made no effort or public
statement on appeasing or even courting the
Americans. In fact, he has been very articulate
against "making any concessions on nuclear
technology", claiming this would be "tantamount to
the biggest treason". He has even been critical of
the European Union's role in getting Iran out of
America's hair by giving concessions, claiming
that if Iran gave up its weapon's program, it
would be like exchanging a pearl for a bonbon. The
victory of someone like Larijani would be greatly
unwelcome not only within Iran, but also within
the international community. His victory might be
a perfect opportunity, and excuse, for the
neo-conservatives in Washington to pursue their
agenda in Iran, which had always been prevented,
or delayed, by the diplomacy and maneuvering of
someone like Khatami.
Mohammad Ahmad
Nejad is more popular than both Larijani
and Qalibaf, considered by many Iranians to be
humble and warm. Also a conservative hardliner,
however, he has been mayor of Tehran since April
2003. After 1979, he joined the Office for
Strengthening Unity and was governor of Ardabil
province during the Iran-Iraq war in 1980-88. He
also served as a member of the central committee
of the Society of the Devotees of the Islamic
Revolution. He is not as powerful as Larijani and
Qalibaf, but can be a serious challenge to both
men because since 2003 he has gathered a lot of
followers in Tehran.
Mohsen Rezai
was born in 1954 in Masjid Sulayman and
headed the IRGC in 1981-87 during the harshest
years of the Iran-Iraq War. A military hardliner,
he is now secretary of the Expediency Council and
is trying hard to shake off his military
background and promote himself as a democrat. His
election campaigner described him as an Iranian
Charles de Gaulle. He once said: "My political
ideas are rooted in my deep belief in democracy. I
left the military when I decided to take part in
political activities." Iranians are not too fond
of military regimes, especially the youth, who are
hungry for open-minded, civil and young leaders to
lead them. Rezai is neither open-minded, nor
civil, nor young. He has been very critical of
Khatami's diplomatic maneuvers toward the US and
warned against American aggressiveness after
September 11. He thinks the Khatami regime gave
too many concessions to both the Americans and the
Europeans, claiming that if he came to power,
"submissive diplomacy" would come to an end. A
confrontationist like Larijani, his election would
be unwelcome in Washington, Europe and among the
Iranians living both at home and in the diaspora.
Mehdi Karoubi is the finest
among the conservatives, and, like Rezai, is a
member of the Expediency Council and a close
adviser to Khamenei. Born in 1939, he is a
hardliner turned mild reformer who criticizes the
GC yet supports Khamenei. In recent days he has
stood up for the rejected candidates, saying that
the GC was unjust in turning down their
applications. A polished and refined politician,
considered to be a true Iranian nationalist, he
was Speaker of parliament in 1990-92 and in
2000-04. He headed the Imam Khomeini Relief
Committee and the Martyrs' Foundation and is
founder and current secretary general of the
Militant Clerics Association, a pro-reform
movement of which Khatami is a member. On
relations with America, he advocates the most
pragmatic approach and has said: "With regard to
America, I must say that the American statesmen
should stop their current ways of intimidation and
approaches vis-a-vis Iran. If this happens, then I
will not oppose relations with America." His
candidacy will split the reformers in half, with
some voting for him and others voting for Moin or
Mehralizadeh - which in effect will serve the
interests of nobody but Rafsanjani.
Mostafa Moin is the man
making headlines today as the reformer who, if
elected, would continue the promising yet
undelivered reforms of Khatami. Born in Najaf Abad
in 1951, Moin studied medicine at Shiraz
University and after 1979 became president of the
university (1981-82). He has been on the Supreme
Cultural Revolutionary Council since 1983 and was
a member of parliament in 1982-84, 1988-89 and
1997-2001. Moin served as minister of culture and
higher education under both presidents Rafsanjani
and Khatami, resigning twice - in 1999 at the
suppression of student demonstrators (in which his
rivals in today's elections played a crucial
role), and in 2003, when the GC refused to permit
his ministry to pursue more "scientific
productivity". On Iranian-American affairs, he is
a moderate who recently said that he wanted
"dialogue with the world", pointing out that
"America is a part of that community". He added,
"We can have interactions with America as equals,
without imposed preconditions." He nevertheless
has demanded an apology from America for the
"moral, spiritual and material damage they have
inflicted on us".
Mohsen
Mehralizadeh is the other reformer
recently accepted into the presidential race. He
was born in 1956. Campaigning as a candidate for
the country's youth, he has set up an interactive
website for his campaign and is promoting himself
as an ally of Khatami. He is, however, a serious
contender to no one. In 1979-81 he was regional
commander of the IRGC and in 1985-90 worked at the
Ministry of Heavy Industries before becoming
managing director of the Kish Island Development
Organization. He then served on the Atomic Energy
Organization and as governor of Kharasan province
in 1997-2001. Since 2001 he has been adviser to
Khatami on sports affairs.
Hashemi
Rafsanjani was born in 1934 and was a
long-time ally and friend of Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, leader of the Islamic revolution. He
studied Islam in Qom, befriended Khomeini and was
persecuted for his theocratic views during the
Shah's secular regime in the 1960s. He became
Speaker in 1980-89, during the heyday of
Khomeini's rule, and briefly served as interior
minister. In 1988-89 he was acting
commander-in-chief of the Iranian army and played
a crucial role in getting Khomeini to accept a
ceasefire with Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
Between 1989-97 he was Khomeini's
successor and in 2000 was elected into parliament.
Until today, Rafsanjani was the first president in
Iranian history to leave office willingly. The
first president Abulhassan Banisadr (1980-81) was
impeached because of a war with the clerics.
Mohammad Ali Rajai, the second, was assassinated
in 1981, and Khamenei was "promoted" to become
Supreme Leader. During his term as president,
Rafsanjani tried to open channels with the US by
selecting the American oil company Conoco to
develop an Iranian oilfield, yet his request was
turned down by US president Bill Clinton.
Rafsanjani normalized relations with Great
Britain, and on May 19 said he wanted to repair
relations with the US. He is viewed with mixed
signals in the West because he supports the
Arab-Israeli peace initiative of Saudi Crown
Prince Abdullah (made in Beirut in 2002) but also
supports suicide bombings against Israel inside
the Palestinian territories. His youngest son, to
the great displeasure of the West, is named
Yasser, after the late Palestinian leader Yasser
Arafat. He is a principal patron of the Lebanese
Hezbollah.
In 1992 he handpicked the young
Hasan Nasrullah to become secretary general of
Hezbollah after the assassination of then-leader
Abbas al-Musawi, although other members were more
senior and experienced that Nasrullah.
Rafsanjani's relationship with the Lebanese party
will surely cause him problems in the
international community, especially with the US,
because United Nations Resolution 1559 asks
Hezbollah to disarm, something which Rafsanjani
refuses to allow to happen.
He is a
declared supporter of foreign investment and
women's rights, he is a balanced politician to
both the reformers and conservatives; too liberal
to be considered a conservative, and too
conservative to be considered a liberal. He has
been accused by enemies of profiteering at the
state's expense, but in effect, his wealth came
from a construction career of the 1960s, during
the Shah's boom years. These accusations were also
made because his son Muhsen Hashemi currently is a
contractor and head of Tehran Metro, but they are
now generally believed to be false, although they
made headlines during the Khatami presidency.
Rafsanjani is popular among all segments
of Iranian society because of his age, experience
and shrewdness, having served in top political
positions since 1979. As Iran's regional and
international standing is being damaged by its
animosity with the US, Iranians are searching for
a familiar face, a hero, to lead them. And among
the eight candidates, these traits can only be
found in Rafsanjani.
Sami
Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.
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