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A watershed in
Syria
By Ronald Bruce St John
(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus)
As the Ba'ath Party congress began on
Monday, Syrian President Bashar Assad continued to
be torn by competing forces. In the wake of the
hasty removal of Syrian forces from Lebanon,
hardliners now are pushing for a reassertion of
party control. Reformers see the moment as ripe to
accelerate socioeconomic and political change. The
end result may well set the stage for Syrian
politics for years to come.
Socioeconomic reform
The
endorsement of additional free-market reforms for
Syria's state-run economy is one likely outcome of
the party congress. Implementation would be a
relatively easy and popular move, as Syrians are
tired of being poor.
Syrian first lady
Asma Assad recently signaled that related
socioeconomic reforms were under consideration.
Addressing a May conference in Damascus organized
by Women in Business International, a non-profit
organization that encourages networking among
businesswomen, she called for greater
institutional transparency and argued that any
increase in foreign investment would necessitate
more accountable institutions and more open
procedures. She also called for the creation of a
modern educational curriculum to broaden
opportunities and to reduce the gender gap.
Her remarks, a potential harbinger for the
party congress, carry additional weight in that
she has practical knowledge of the business world.
Born and raised in London, Asma was an economist
for Deutsche Bank and dealt with mergers and
acquisitions at JP Morgan before her marriage to
Bashar.
Political reform
Necessary political reforms will likely
prove more difficult to address. Assad is
reportedly considering a change in the Syrian
constitution that would remove a reference to the
Ba'ath Party as "the leader of society".
Old-school Ba'athists argue this would undermine
the authority of the party, while reformers hope
the president will go further and actually resign
from the party. Assad may seek some change in the
document's phraseology, but he is unlikely to go
too far in undermining the authority of the party.
In addition, the Ba'athists may also
announce new rules concerning the formation of
opposition political parties as long as they have
a "national platform", code words for being
non-sectarian. Assad and much of the ruling elite
belong to a small Shi'ite Muslim sect known as the
Alawis. Religious parties are a reminder of bloody
battles that took place in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, when Bashar Assad's father, Hafiz
Assad, faced mounting Muslim activist opposition.
Eventually, Hafiz brutally crushed the outlawed
Muslim Brotherhood in a February 1982 uprising of
Sunni Muslims in Hama. While Alawi-Sunni tensions
are slowly easing (both Bashar and his brother
Maher married Sunni women), recent events in
neighboring Lebanon and Iraq highlight the
potential threat sectarian politics pose for the
stability of the regime.
Another highly
symbolic issue for the Ba'ath Party Congress is
the emergency law that has kept Syria in a
permanent state of martial law for more than four
decades. First decreed in December 1962, the
Ba'athist regime reissued the state of emergency
when it seized power in March 1963, and the law
has been broadened since that time. The state of
emergency gives extraordinary powers to the
government, which may restrict freedom of movement
and assembly; censor letters, publications, and
broadcasts; seize property; and close media
offices. Assad could decide to abolish the law
entirely or restrict it to real breaches in
national security.
Political
opposition
The May 24 crackdown on the
Jamal Atasi Forum for Democratic Dialogue in
Syria, the only tolerated independent political
forum left in the country, added confusion to the
prospects for real political change. This was the
only political group to survive the 2001 crackdown
on political dissent that ended the so-called
"Damascus spring".
Suppression of the
Atasi Forum, albeit principally a secular
grouping, reflected regime concern with the
growing influence of revived Islamist currents.
Recently, participants in the forum were read a
letter from the exiled head of the Syrian branch
of the Muslim Brotherhood. Membership in the
Muslim Brotherhood has been a capital offense in
Syria since the bloodbath at Hama in 1982.
On the surface, the arrests appeared to be
a way for Assad and other top officials to
strengthen their position vis-a-vis hardline
critics within the regime in the run-up to
Monday's party congress. When Syrian authorities
released the forum members six days after
detaining them, the latter confirmed the
government had intended to send a message that
cooperation with the banned Muslim Brotherhood was
still forbidden and punishable. The decision to
curtail the activities of the Atasi Forum solely
due to its contact with the Muslim Brotherhood, a
relatively moderate movement today, raises fresh
doubts as to whether the congress will consider a
political reform package of any consequence.
Absent moderate outlets for political dissent, the
Syrian stage increasingly is set for violent
conflict between radical Islamists and the Assad
regime.
Frustration in
Damascus
Despite Washington's repeated
demands for economic and political reform in
Syria, the proclamation of new reforms in
Damascus, if that's what occurs after the party
congress, is unlikely to produce a major shift in
US policy. As the senate confirmation hearings for
John Bolton as UN ambassador aptly demonstrated,
the George W Bush administration has inflated the
Syrian danger for some time. This was done in part
because Damascus undoubtedly could do more to
support the US in its "war on terrorism". But the
White House has also found Syria to be a
convenient scapegoat for the failure of
administration policies in Iraq. As the violence
in Iraq escalated this spring, the Bush
administration repeatedly complained that Syria
was the main conduit fueling the flow of men and
money to the Iraqi insurgency. In this sense,
current US policy toward Syria reflects more a
frustration with the insurgency than either
diplomatic reality or domestic conditions within
Syria.
Either way, real or imagined
grievances against Syria mean US pressure will not
ease soon. On the contrary, the Bush
administration appears to have abandoned any
attempt at engagement. Instead, it is pursuing
regime change on the cheap through a deliberate
policy of destabilization intended to uproot Assad
through external pressure. In so doing, Washington
seems oblivious to the tentative economic and
political openings managed by the Assad regime in
the past year or so. The White House has also
ignored the wishes of Syrian activists, most of
whom want Washington to back off.
Increasingly frustrated with US failure to
reward positive Syrian steps, such as recent
actions against the insurgents in Iraq and the
withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, Damascus
halted military and intelligence cooperation with
Washington in May. The Syrian stance prompted
renewed discussions at the highest levels of the
US government as to the diplomatic, economic and
military options available to deal with the
"Syrian problem".
Absent US support, Syria
has focused on a pending agreement with the
European Union, its main trading partner. The
agreement, which gives Syria greater access to
European markets, is contingent on its full
compliance with UN Resolution 1559, which calls
for the removal of all Syrian forces, intelligence
and military, from Lebanon. While Syrian trade
with the US approximates only US$400 million, the
EU agreement is worth more than $1 billion in aid
and trade.
Time for action
June
2005 is shaping up to be a make or break month for
Assad. The outcome of the Ba'ath Party congress
will reveal much about the nature and motives both
of Syria and the US. Whatever happens, Assad and
the Ba'ath Party clearly need to take dramatic
steps. Timid policy change will only highlight the
insecure and indecisive nature of the regime. This
will embolden domestic and international
opposition, while confirming the hardliners'
belief in the need for tougher action at home.
Alternatively, if Assad unfurls a substantive
agenda for socioeconomic and political change, he
will rally support within the EU, call the Bush
administration's bluff and undercut domestic
opposition in and out of the Ba'ath Party.
Ronald Bruce St John, an analyst
for Foreign Policy in Focus, has published widely
on foreign policy issues. Author of Libya and
the United States: Two Centuries of Strife
(Penn Press, 2002), his latest book,
Revolution, Reform and Regionalism in
Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam,
will be published by Routledge in October
2005.
(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus) |
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