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Shadows across the
Bosphorous
By M K Bhadrakumar
By a curious coincidence, May 29, when the
vehement rejection of the proposed European
constitution in the referendum in France became
known in Turkey, was the 552nd anniversary of the
conquest of the Byzantine capital of
Constantinople (present-day Istanbul) by Fathi
Sultan Mehmet. That event in 1453 marked the
Ottoman entry into "Europe". The French "no" vote
- followed by the Dutch one - could well presage
difficulty for Turkey's "re-entry" into Europe.
Large swathes of territories straddling
Eurasia - Ukraine, Moldova, the Balkans and
Caucasus - face similar predicaments. The
post-Velvet Revolution regimes in Ukraine and
Georgia come under stress. The EU should have
spearheaded their painful "integration" into the
Western world. Their induction into the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is predicated
on an EU underpinning of some sort. Their ability
to disengage from Russia significantly depends on
their "EU option".
The Balkans and Black
Sea regions - Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Kosovo,
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro,
Croatia - face uncertainty in varying degrees as
regards their prospects of gaining entry into the
EU. The broken parts of former Yugoslavia may
begin to drift if they are deprived of the dream
of a possible EU membership. Meanwhile, the EU
itself is poised somewhat awkwardly in the Balkans
- a guide, guardian and philosopher, certainly,
but not yet an assured long-term benefactor.
The impact on the geopolitics of the
region remains to be seen. Will the Balkan
question reappear? Unresolved issues of ethnicity,
blood feuds, pogroms, religious extremism and
sub-nationalism lurk below the surface. To prevent
a breakdown, what sort of interim ties could the
EU offer? Will the drive toward making the Black
Sea an American lake be sustainable without the
region's comprehensive integration?
For
Turkey, the French referendum result came as a
double shock within the week. German Chancellor
Gerhard Shroeder's announcement of early elections
was already a matter of disquiet. The prospect of
the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) headed by
Angela Merkel winning the German election worries
Turkey. Last October, she proposed that all that
Turkey could aspire to was a "privileged
partnership" with Europe that allowed increased
economic cooperation but would leave Turkey
outside the EU, looking in. Last Thursday, she
repeated that the EU "cannot simply return to
business as usual" but must reconsider its plans
for Turkey. CDU foreign affairs spokesman
Friedbert Pfluger elaborated: "Europe is in
crisis" because of an "overstretching" of EU's
political capacities, and that a CDU-led
government would seek a temporary halt to EU
enlargement, in particular by seeking the option
of a privileged partnership with Turkey.
The Gallic opinion is equally set against
Turkey's EU membership. "The two most important
factors behind the French reaction are perhaps
Europe's economic stagnation and its ever-rising
unemployment ... The Europeans have started to see
both Brussels and the enlargement process as a
threat to their own welfare," Faik Oztrak wrote in
the Turkish newspaper Milliyet.
Even
ardent supporters of EU membership somberly take
note that the ground beneath their feet has
shifted. Prominent Turkish commentator Sami Kohen
wrote, "Now the EU will turn inwards, and take
care of its own problems, but while dealing with
these problems, it will slow down the enlargement
process ... there is [also] a phobia against
Turkey." While Turkish intellectuals rationalize,
popular perception is one of injured pride - that
Turkey faces deep-rooted European cultural
prejudices.
Professor Samuel Huntington
(author of The Clash of Civilizations)
plunged deep into these searing Turkish debates by
stating in Istanbul last week, "Turkey's history,
culture, religion and economy are so different
from those of the EU that its chances of being
accepted into the EU are virtually non-existent."
According to the Harvard professor, Turkey should
either aspire to lead the Islamic world, or focus
on nationalism. He added that if Turkey opted for
the latter path, it should concentrate on its
security and development, without being distracted
by EU ambitions or the Islamic world.
But
the choices are not that straightforward. The EU
means different things to different layers of
Turkish society. For the influential, flashy
corporate world in Istanbul with well-established
transnational ties with European business and
industry, EU membership is a natural progression
in life. But for the intelligentsia or the
established political elite that grew up in the
shadows of "Ataturkism", if the EU is appealing it
is for a different reason - EU membership is
Turkey's tryst with destiny, as Mustafa Kemal,
modern-day Turkey's founding father, had charted
out Turkey's farewell to its entanglement with the
Muslim world.
The "pro-EU" impetus in
Turkey's secular course is acceptable to the
Turkish military, too, but as the self-appointed
guardians of the Turkish state, the military would
be cautious about excessive surrender of Turkish
sovereignty to Brussels. Thus, the French and
Dutch votes as regards their antipathy toward a
centralized Europe under a Brussels-based
bureaucracy would, arguably, be a matter of quiet
satisfaction for the Turkish military.
But
for the silent majority in the Anatolian
heartlands, EU membership means something entirely
different. They share neither the corporate
world's passion for neo-liberalism nor the
intelligentsia's cultivated attraction to European
"enlightenment". They are devoutly Muslim and are
deeply rooted in Turkey's Islamic heritage. For
them, EU membership offers neither apparels of
"prestige" (which they do not need, given their
sense of belonging to their traditions and
culture) nor the prospect of a "European home" in
an intellectual or emotive sense (with which they
have no real interest in claiming affinities), but
simply, plainly, the EU is a means of improving
their quality of life and standard of living.
Furthermore, the stark existential choices
as Huntington made out for the country's political
elite and intelligentsia aside, cutting across
Turkish society, EU membership was also a
democracy project, given the pervasive public
disenchantment with the functioning of democracy
in Turkey. (In the parliamentary elections in
2002, the Turkish public resorted to wholesale
rejection of the established political elite.)
Turkey is undertaking an extraordinary reform
program in terms of fulfilling the criteria for EU
membership. There is the potential risk of reform
losing steam in the face of a quiet despondency
that the EU is shifting its goal post for Turkey.
Despite the affirmation that Turkey needed reform
- EU or no EU - it is unclear whether an intrinsic
commitment to reform is indeed inherent to the
order of priority of the political elite.
Turkey's orientations would have regional
implications. It cannot be otherwise as Turkey is
far too important a power. But Turkey is in a
tough neighborhood too - that includes one nuclear
power, or allegedly two in the not-too-distant
future (Israel and Iran). Some of Turkey's
neighbors would wish that Ankara did not take
seriously Huntington's advice to become a regional
power. Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Evripidis
Stylianidis said, "If Turkey feels rejected by
Europe, it might return to its past wish to become
a regional power. This might have a negative
impact on Turkish-Greek relations." Teheran,
Damascus, Yerevan, Baghdad or Nicosia, too, will
keenly watch.
As the French referendum
results were becoming known, British Foreign
Secretary Jack Straw phoned his Turkish
counterpart to convey Britain's continued support
for Turkey. (No such calls came from Paris, Berlin
or The Hague.)
It so happened that the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed on a
US$10 billion standby credit for Turkey. As the
IMF put it, "Turkey's economic performance is at
its strongest in a generation." The first tranche
of $837 million was promptly disbursed. The IMF
also agreed to the postponement of Turkey's debt
repayment of nearly $4 billion in 2006. For the
first time since Turkey's intervention in Northern
Cyprus in 1974, a US Congressional delegation
visited the region last week. Turkish Prime
Minister Tayyip Erdogan is currently visiting
Washington on President George W Bush's
invitation. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
counseled Europe to "include" Turkey. These are
meaningful gestures.
But US-Turkey
relations are delicately poised. The ascent of
Kurdish nationalism in Iraq remains a grave issue.
Turkey's frustrations over a US-Kurdish axis boil
over from time to time - adding to the vast
reservoir of "anti-Americanism" in public opinion.
Yet, the US would like Turkey, an important NATO
ally, to play certain defined roles in American
regional policy. Ankara would draw a careful line
between where American interests ended and its
interests began. Besides, it is far from clear
whether there is total unanimity about relations
with the US in the Turkish opinion.
Over-identification with American regional
policy could even be an outright liability for
Turkey - in Central Asia or the Middle East, for
instance. Turkey would have to make up its mind
whether its historical preserve over the Black Sea
could be reconcilable with US policy to make it an
exclusive American sphere of influence. All
parties realize the high importance of controlling
the vital transportation route that the Black Sea
is fast becoming, for the Caspian oil flowing into
the European market. Also, Turkey has been
patiently harmonizing with the EU's regional
policy - and the EU does not view former Soviet
republics ("Turkestan") or the Middle East with
missionary zeal. Moreover, Turkey's cooperation
with Russia and China is expanding rapidly.
Equally so, Turkey has been reticent about
the US's Middle East initiative and unresponsive
to American promptings to project itself as a role
model in the Muslim world. Turkey realizes the
complexity of its historical legacy with the
Muslim world, borne out of its tumultuous Ottoman
history. Besides, the Islamic world is becoming
increasingly crowded with state and non-state
actors - Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Hamas,
Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood, Jemaah
Islamiyah, the ubiquitous al-Qaeda, etc. After
almost a century's aloofness, Turkey would have to
"fit in". And an overarching question always
remains: what is it that the Islamic world can
offer Turkey that Turkey lacks?
Turkey's
options are thus ultimately narrowing - though
that alone does not quell its angst. A sense of
unease prevails that Turkey will have to keep
looking for a place within Europe, but settle for
a vastly different EU than it may have sought.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a
career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for
over 29 years, with postings including India's
ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey
(1998-2001).
(Copyright 2005 Asia
Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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