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Marching to (illegal)
war
By C L Cook
A
British cabinet briefing paper warns ministers
that the way to war between the United States and
Iraq had been settled in private meetings between
President George W Bush and British Prime Minister
Tony Blair in March of that year, 2002. The
briefing memo (reproduced below), obtained by the
Sunday Times of London, goes on to say that
because "regime change" was illegal, it was up to
the ministers to construct a legal framework for
the inevitable invasion.
The reasoning, as
explained to the ministers, was the Americans' use
of British bases in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, a
move that would implicate Britain in any legal
challenges after the fact. Strategies outlined
expressed the hope Saddam Hussein would refuse to
cooperate with United Nations weapons inspectors.
"It is just possible that an ultimatum could be
cast in terms which Saddam would reject."
The document goes on to express doubt
that, failing Saddam's rejection of UN demands, an
invasion could be justified. This attempt to
manipulate the UN to get the war started is in
stark contradiction to Bush's assertion last week
that he and Blair had tried every avenue at the UN
to avoid going to war.
The Sunday Times
unleashed a firestorm for Blair in the days
leading up to the British election in early May
with the release of a memo detailing a meeting
between Britain's head of MI6 and top ministers,
including Blair, where the Bush administration
"sexed-up" intelligence to justify a war with
Iraq.
Though this memo story has played
large in the United Kingdom since the Sunday Times
revelations, Americans, the blogosphere
notwithstanding, have been late to the story, but
protest is growing there. Now, the corporate media
have gingerly picked it up.
Eighty-nine
Democratic congressional representatives have
issued a letter to the White House demanding
clarification on the MI6 assertion that
"intelligence and facts were being fixed around
the [Iraq] policy". The White House has so far
declined to respond.
The Democrats have
since announced plans to launch their own inquiry,
beginning this Thursday. Witnesses scheduled
include former ambassador and Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) contractor Joseph Wilson, who
debunked "intelligence" linking Saddam to an
attempt to secure yellow-cake uranium from Niger.
Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, was subsequently
"outed" as a CIA agent by as yet unidentified
administration insiders in a move many interpret
as revenge for Wilson's outspoken rebuttal of the
White House claims on the Niger file.
Chris Cook hosts Gorilla Radio,
a weekly public affairs program, broad/webcast
from the University of Victoria, Canada. He also
serves as a contributing editor to PEJ.org.
(Published with permission of PEJ.org )
The briefing
paper
[The paper,
produced by the Cabinet Office on July 21, 2002,
is incomplete because the last page is
missing.]
Cabinet Office paper:
Conditions for military
action
PERSONAL SECRET UK EYES
ONLY
Iraq: Conditions for
military action (a note by
officials)
Summary
Ministers are invited to:
(1) Note the
latest position on US military planning and
timescales for possible action.
(2) Agree
that the objective of any military action should
be a stable and law-abiding Iraq, within present
borders, cooperating with the international
community, no longer posing a threat to its
neighbors or international security, and abiding
by its international obligations on WMD [weapons
of mass destruction].
(3) Agree to engage
the US on the need to set military plans within a
realistic political strategy, which includes
identifying the succession to Saddam Hussein and
creating the conditions necessary to justify
government military action, which might include an
ultimatum for the return of UN weapons inspectors
to Iraq. This should include a call from the Prime
Minister to President Bush ahead of the briefing
of US military plans to the president on August
4.
(4) Note the potentially long lead times
involved in equipping UK armed forces to undertake
operations in the Iraqi theater and agree that the
MOD [Minister of Defense] should bring forward
proposals for the procurement of Urgent
Operational Requirements under cover of the
lessons learned from Afghanistan and the outcome
of SR2002.
(5) Agree to the establishment
of an ad hoc group of officials under Cabinet
Office chairmanship to consider the development of
an information campaign to be agreed with the US.
Introduction
1. The US
government's military planning for action against
Iraq is proceeding apace. But, as yet, it lacks a
political framework. In particular, little thought
has been given to creating the political
conditions for military action, or the aftermath
and how to shape it.
2. When the prime
minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at
Crawford in April he said that the UK would
support military action to bring about regime
change, provided that certain conditions were met:
efforts had been made to construct a
coalition/shape public opinion, the
Israel-Palestine crisis was quiescent, and the
options for action to eliminate Iraq's WMD through
the UN weapons inspectors had been exhausted.
3. We need now to reinforce this message
and to encourage the US government to place its
military planning within a political framework,
partly to forestall the risk that military action
is precipitated in an unplanned way by, for
example, an incident in the no fly zones. This is
particularly important for the UK because it is
necessary to create the conditions in which we
could legally support military action. Otherwise,
we face the real danger that the US will commit
themselves to a course of action which we would
find very difficult to support.
4. In
order to fulfill the conditions set out by the
prime minister for UK support for military action
against Iraq, certain preparations need to be
made, and other considerations taken into account.
This note sets them out in a form which can be
adapted for use with the US government. Depending
on US intentions, a decision in principle may be
needed soon on whether and in what form the UK
takes part in military action.
The
goal
5. Our objective should be a
stable and law-abiding Iraq, within present
borders, cooperating with the international
community, no longer posing a threat to its
neighbors or to international security, and
abiding by its international obligations on WMD.
It seems unlikely that this could be achieved
while the current Iraqi regime remains in power.
US military planning unambiguously takes as its
objective the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime,
followed by elimination if Iraqi WMD. It is,
however, by no means certain, in the view of UK
officials, that one would necessarily follow from
the other. Even if regime change is a necessary
condition for controlling Iraqi WMD, it is
certainly not a sufficient one.
US
military planning
6. Although no
political decisions have been taken, US military
planners have drafted options for the US
government to undertake an invasion of Iraq. In a
"running start", military action could begin as
early as November of this year, with no overt
military buildup. Air strikes and support for
opposition groups in Iraq would lead initially to
small-scale land operations, with further land
forces deploying sequentially, ultimately
overwhelming Iraqi forces and leading to the
collapse of the Iraqi regime. A "generated start"
would involve a longer buildup before any military
action were taken, as early as January 2003. US
military plans include no specifics on the
strategic context either before or after the
campaign. Currently, the preference appears to be
for the "running start".
7. US plans
assume, as a minimum, the use of British bases in
Cyprus and Diego Garcia. This means that legal
base issues would arise virtually whatever option
ministers choose with regard to UK participation.
The viability of the plans
8. The Chiefs of Staff have discussed the
viability of US military plans. Their initial view
is that there are a number of questions which
would have to be answered before they could assess
whether the plans are sound. Notably these include
the realism of the "running start", the extent to
which the plans are proof against Iraqi
counter-attack using chemical or biological
weapons and the robustness of US assumptions about
the bases and about Iraqi (un)willingness to
fight.
UK military contribution
9. The UK's ability to contribute forces
depends on the details of the US military planning
and the time available to prepare and deploy them.
The MOD is examining how the UK might contribute
to US-led action. The options range from
deployment of a division (ie Gulf War-sized
contribution plus naval and air forces) to making
available bases. It is already clear that the UK
could not generate a division in time for an
operation in January 2003, unless publicly visible
decisions were taken very soon. Maritime and air
forces could be deployed in time, provided
adequate basing arrangements could be made. The
lead times involved in preparing for UK military
involvement include the procurement of Urgent
Operational Requirements, for which there is no
financial provision.
The conditions
necessary for military action
10.
Aside from the existence of a viable military
plan, we consider the following conditions
necessary for military action and UK
participation: justification/legal base; an
international coalition; a quiescent
Israel/Palestine; a positive risk/benefit
assessment; and the preparation of domestic
opinion.
Justification
11.
US views of international law vary from that of
the UK and the international community. Regime
change per se is not a proper basis for military
action under international law. But regime change
could result from action that is otherwise lawful.
We would regard the use of force against Iraq, or
any other state, as lawful if exercised in the
right of individual or collective self-defense, if
carried out to avert an overwhelming humanitarian
catastrophe, or authorized by the UN Security
Council. A detailed consideration of the legal
issues, prepared earlier this year, is at Annex A.
The legal position would depend on the precise
circumstances at the time. Legal bases for an
invasion of Iraq are in principle conceivable in
both the first two instances, but would be
difficult to establish because of, for example,
the tests of immediacy and proportionality.
Further legal advice would be needed on this
point.
12. This leaves the route under the
UNSC [United Nations Security Council] resolutions
on weapons inspectors. [UN Secretary General] Kofi
Annan has held three rounds of meetings with Iraq
in an attempt to persuade them to admit the UN
weapons inspectors. These have made no substantive
progress; the Iraqis are deliberately obfuscating.
Annan has downgraded the dialogue but more
pointless talks are possible. We need to persuade
the UN and the international community that this
situation cannot be allowed to continue ad
infinitum. We need to set a deadline, leading to
an ultimatum. It would be preferable to obtain
backing of a UNSCR for any ultimatum and early
work would be necessary to explore with Kofi Annan
and the Russians, in particular, the scope for
achieving this.
13. In practice, facing
pressure of military action, Saddam is likely to
admit weapons inspectors as a means of
forestalling it. But once admitted, he would not
allow them to operate freely. UNMOVIC (the
successor to UNSCOM) will take at least six months
after entering Iraq to establish the monitoring
and verification system under Resolution 1284
necessary to assess whether Iraq is meeting its
obligations. Hence, even if UN inspectors gained
access today, by January 2003 they would at best
only just be completing setting up. It is possible
that they will encounter Iraqi obstruction during
this period, but this more likely when they are
fully operational.
14. It is just possible
that an ultimatum could be cast in terms which
Saddam would reject (because he is unwilling to
accept unfettered access) and which would not be
regarded as unreasonable by the international
community. However, failing that (or an Iraqi
attack) we would be most unlikely to achieve a
legal base for military action by January 2003.
An international coalition
15. An international coalition is
necessary to provide a military platform and
desirable for political purposes.
16. US
military planning assumes that the US would be
allowed to use bases in Kuwait (air and ground
forces), Jordan, in the Gulf (air and naval
forces) and UK territory (Diego Garcia and our
bases in Cyprus). The plans assume that Saudi
Arabia would withhold cooperation except granting
military over-flights. On the assumption that
military action would involve operations in the
Kurdish area in the north of Iraq, the use of
bases in Turkey would also be necessary.
17. In the absence of UN authorization,
there will be problems in securing the support of
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and EU
partners. Australia would be likely to participate
on the same basis as the UK. France might be
prepared to take part if she saw military action
as inevitable. Russia and China, seeking to
improve their US relations, might set aside their
misgivings if sufficient attention were paid to
their legal and economic concerns. Probably the
best we could expect from the region would be
neutrality. The US is likely to restrain Israel
from taking part in military action. In practice,
much of the international community would find it
difficult to stand in the way of the determined
course of the US hegemon. However, the greater the
international support, the greater the prospects
of success.
A quiescent
Israel-Palestine
18. The Israeli
reoccupation of the West Bank has dampened
Palestinian violence for the time being but is
unsustainable in the long term and stoking more
trouble for the future. The Bush speech was at
best a half step forward. We are using the
Palestinian reform agenda to make progress,
including a resumption of political negotiations.
The Americans are talking of a ministerial
conference in November or later. Real progress
towards a viable Palestinian state is the best way
to undercut Palestinian extremists and reduce Arab
antipathy to military action against Saddam
Hussein. However, another upsurge of
Palestinian/Israeli violence is highly likely. The
coincidence of such an upsurge with the
preparations for military action against Iraq
cannot be ruled out. Indeed, Saddam would use
continuing violence in the Occupied Territories to
bolster popular Arab support for his regime.
Benefits/risks
19. Even
with a legal base and a viable military plan, we
would still need to ensure that the benefits of
action outweigh the risks. In particular, we need
to be sure that the outcome of the military action
would match our objective as set out in paragraph
5 above. A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead
to a protracted and costly nation-building
exercise. As already made clear, the US military
plans are virtually silent on this point.
Washington could look to us to share a
disproportionate share of the burden. Further work
is required to define more precisely the means by
which the desired end-state would be created, in
particular what form of government might replace
Saddam Hussein's regime and the timescale within
which it would be possible to identify a
successor. We must also consider in greater detail
the impact of military action on other UK
interests in the region.
Domestic
opinion
20. Time will be required to
prepare public opinion in the UK that it is
necessary to take military action against Saddam
Hussein. There would also need to be a substantial
effort to secure the support of parliament. An
information campaign will be needed which has to
be closely related to an overseas information
campaign designed to influence Saddam Hussein, the
Islamic world and the wider international
community. This will need to give full coverage to
the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, including his
WMD, and the legal justification for action.
Timescales
21. Although the
US military could act against Iraq as soon as
November, we judge that a military campaign is
unlikely to start until January 2003, if only
because of the time it will take to reach
consensus in Washington. That said, we judge that
for climactic reasons, military action would need
to start by January 2003, unless action were
deferred until the following autumn.
22.
As this paper makes clear, even this timescale
would present problems. This means that:
(a)
We need to influence US consideration of the
military plans before President Bush is briefed on
August 4, through contacts between the prime
minister and the president and at other levels.
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