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What the US wants from
Iran
By Ehsan Ahrari
President George W Bush has been highly
critical of Iran's presidential elections, which
culminate in a choice between pragmatic clergyman
Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani and conservative
Mahmud Ahmadinejad. Bush might not be alone in
that criticism. But that is only one reason why
the United States and Iran don't like each other.
In fact, the absence of democracy may be somewhere
at the bottom of the list of reasons why these
countries recurrently show so much annoyance and
irritation toward each other. Even if Iran were to
become a democracy tomorrow, US-Iran rapprochement
is not likely to materialize. About the only way
Iran could become a "friend" of the US would be if
it became a vassal state, a la Afghanistan and,
more recently, Iraq.
In the post-September
11 era, the US is pushing a new global agenda, and
Iran wants no part of it because it has no
intention of becoming another pawn in the emerging
Pax Americana. Intentions, at least in this
instance, are not likely to save Iran from another
cataclysmic change. Through their sustained
refusal to bring about vital and imminent changes
within their polity, the hardline ayatollahs might
become the chief reason for the demise of the
Islamic Republic. That is what the Bush
administration wants. Only this time the
hardliners themselves might emerge as harbingers
of regime change in Iran.
The terrorist
attacks on the US created a phenomenon, indeed, a
new resolve on the part of the Bush administration
to subjugate Muslim countries. That is the general
strategy. The new euphemisms are "transformation"
or "democratization". The general underlying
assumption appears to be that, if these countries
were to become secular Western democracies, they
would not only become friends of the US, they
would also accept American hegemony in the region.
The implementation of democracy in Afghanistan and
Iraq through the use of military force is the
crucial manifestation of that thinking.
But that is merely the beginning of a new
trend. Through this, the US is also determined to
make a permanent presence in both those countries.
Afghanistan has already signed a strategic
partnership that guarantees America a permanent
military presence in that country. If the Iraqi
insurgency were pacified, and if Iraq were to
become a stable country, the US has every
intention of staying there permanently by
acquiring military bases. The general thinking in
Washington is that a pro-American Iraq and
Afghanistan would be two vital strategic centers
to fight the global "war on terrorism" in the
Levant and the Persian Gulf and South Asia,
respectively.
Iran is viewed as a major
obstacle in the implementation of this subjugation
strategy. More to the point, Iran's Islamic
revolution of 1979, despite the fact that it has
lost almost all of its revolutionary fervor, is
seen in Washington as a force which might still
challenge the US in the Middle East. Even though
its military prowess is no match for the might of
the lone superpower, Iran is still an important
military power in the Persian Gulf. Then there is
the apparent Iranian aspiration to develop nuclear
weapons, its insistence to the contrary
notwithstanding. If its denial, indeed, is true,
the question remains, why does Iran wish to
continue its uranium-enrichment program, an
important step toward developing nuclear weapons?
Two factors put Iran's claim of peaceful
intentions regarding its nuclear program on shaky
ground. First, Iran continues a vigorous and
ambitious program to develop long-range ballistic
missiles. As recently as May 31, it announced that
it had successfully tested a new solid-fuel
missile motor for its inventory of medium-range
missiles. This technology, according to the
official announcement, would be incorporated in
Iran's Shahab-3 missile. These missiles have a
range of at least 2,000 kilometers. In describing
this range, Western experts make a point that,
through these missiles, Iran could strike at
Israel and US bases in the region. No country that
develops such missiles and also refuses to stop
its uranium-enrichment program would be able to
convince anyone that it had no intention of
developing nuclear weapons in the foreseeable
future.
Second, the nuclear
proliferation-related activities of Pakistan's
rogue nuclear establishment has created such a
thick fog of uncertainty that no one really knows
the precise nature of Iran's current nuclear
know-how (ie, how far Iran is from actually
developing nuclear weapons). There is ample
suspicion in Washington that Iran's nuclear
program is farther along than is generally
thought.
The US faces a difficult
situation regarding Iran. The Bush
administration's arrogant declarations related to
regime change prior to its invasion of Iraq ran
into rude realities on the ground in the
post-invasion phase. The US is finding out the
bloody way that toppling a regime in a Muslim
country is easy as a military task. However,
ruling it is virtually impossible. Now the
official ranks of the neo-conservatives in
Washington are facing their own sense of "shock
and pause". Such a sense notwithstanding, the need
to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons
remains genuine.
At the same time, in view
of the disinformation about Saddam Hussein's
alleged possession of nuclear weapons, when the
conflict with another country involves the issue
of nuclear weapons, the Bush administration has
little credibility in the international arena.
That may be one reason why the US has been forced
to rely on the United Nations' nuclear watchdog
and on letting the EU-3 countries (France, Germany
and the United Kingdom) negotiate with Iran
regarding its uranium-enrichment program. Still,
the language of threat and cajoling has been used
intermittently through such phrases as "all
options are on the table", or through public
discussions in semi-official circles about letting
Israel use its preemptive attack option on Iran's
nuclear facilities. Some reports claim that US
Special Forces have carried out reconnaissance
missions to learn about nuclear, chemical and
missile sites in Iran, in preparation for possible
air strikes.
Iran may be vulnerable on the
issue of its nuclear program; however, its
symbolic role as a defiant actor to US hegemonic
aspirations in the Middle East remains the chief
source of its strength. The strategy of going back
to its Islamic roots as a legitimate source of
governance could have been made permanent by
earnestly developing a framework that heavily
relied on Islam and democracy. However, that very
idea died when, in its zeal to humiliate the US,
the hardliners of Iran's Islamic revolution
stooped to the tactics of holding American
diplomats as hostages in Iran in 1979. Through
that action, they might have retained some sense
of self-pride, at least in their own estimation.
However, that also marked the beginning of a
ghastly tradition of extremism from which the
Islamic Republic has yet to liberate itself.
As Iran continues to sink deeper and
deeper in to that tradition of radicalism, the
US's desire for regime change might become a
reality. Except, the next regime change in Iran is
likely to be brought about by the youth, with no
sense of purpose other than bringing an end to
Islamic rule. We are told by some Western
observers that Iranian youth have been
consistently showing preference for things
Western, including democracy. However, these are
the same observers who told us that American
troops would be showered with rosewater and rose
petals once they toppled Saddam Hussein.
There is little doubt that the Bush
administration wishes to see the end of the
Islamic Republic. In the final analysis, that is
what the US really wishes to see in Iran. What
might follow from that potential development in
the foreseeable future is the beginning of a new
era of anarchy. But at least the US is not likely
to be blamed for bringing about such an ominous
era - especially if it does not hasten its
potential arrival through covert action. The
Iranian hardliners will have to blame their
unhinged obscurantism and their deranged obstinacy
for the tragic end of the Islamic Republic.
The first round of presidential elections
in Iran has not left anyone with much hope for a
positive political change in Iran in the coming
years. The outcome of the second round is a choice
between Rafsanjani or Ahmadinejad - either one
could edge the country closer to a precipice.
Ehsan Ahrari is an independent
strategic analyst based in Alexandria, Virginia,
US. His columns appear regularly in Asia Times
Online. He is also a regular contributor to the
Global Beat Syndicate. His website:
www.ehsanahrari.com.
(Copyright 2005
Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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