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Faded hopes for Iranian
exiles
By Mahan Abedin
Engulfed by various crises, and reeling
from a Human Rights Watch report that branded it a
serious abuser of human rights, the
Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) still insists on touting
itself as a credible alternative to the ruling
political system in Iran. Its relentless
propaganda notwithstanding, there is now every
sign that the MEK will disintegrate some time in
the next five years.
For the past two
decades the MEK had based its strategy on a
carefully constructed three-tier approach
encompassing a political coalition (in the form of
the National Council of Resistance), a disciplined
political organization at the heart of this
coalition (ie, the MEK) and an armed force in Iraq
(the so-called National Liberation Army). But
rather than reflecting actual capabilities, this
three-tier strategy was essentially propaganda and
designed to consolidate the MEK's position as the
leading enemy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
This illusion worked well just as long as Saddam
Hussein remained in power in Iraq. It is for good
reason then that MEK observers identified the
March 2003 US invasion as the biggest strategic
setback in the organization's 40-year history.
The contention here is straightforward:
deprived of its armed wing and its ideological
leader, unable to organize effectively in the West
due to its terrorist designation and with events
in Iran developing on a trajectory that is least
favorable to MEK designs (the big turnout in last
Friday's presidential election is one example of
this), the MEK is faced with several fundamental
crises that it cannot overcome. The only realistic
scenario (and indeed solution as far as some of
the more progressive forces in the MEK are
concerned) is the dissolution of the organization
as presently conceived.
The 'third'
way
Since the ouster of Saddam, the MEK has
discovered "peaceful" politics. Previously
insistent that the only roadmap to regime change
in Iran was through an invasion of the country by
its 3,000-strong force based in Camp Ashraf, in
Iraq's Diyala province, the MEK had to revise this
overly ambitious strategy after its forces
capitulated to the American military and
surrendered their arms.
The MEK's "third"
way is refreshingly simple to the point of
bewilderment. The only effective way of forcing
change in Iran, according to the organization's
spokesmen, is neither through war and an American
invasion, nor compromising with the Islamic
republic, but in empowering the Iranian opposition
(ie, the MEK).
There are several
fundamental problems with this reductive argument,
not least because an American "war" against Iran
is unlikely, and what the MEK terms "compromise"
with the ruling regime is mired in ambiguity.
Aside from this basic observation, the whole
notion that the MEK can affect anything in Iran
(let alone overthrow the Islamic republic) is no
longer taken seriously by anyone. MEK spokesmen
claim that if the organization was removed from US
State Department and European Union terrorism
lists, it would be in a position to effectively
challenge the ruling regime. The problem with this
argument is that before 1997 the MEK was not only
not on any terrorist lists, but it also enjoyed
the whole-hearted support of Saddam and could use
Iraqi territory as it wished, and even in those
highly favorable circumstances it could not
advance its agenda even by a millimeter.
To advance this latest "third" way
approach, the MEK has made some minor and cosmetic
changes to its organization and tactics. Most
importantly, the organization has resorted to
establishing pressure groups and consultancies in
North America. These organizations are run by
veteran MEK members, and their primary function is
to establish and manage relations with
neo-conservative organizations and interests in
the US.
The heads of these effectively
fake organizations also contribute opinion pieces
to sympathetic US dailies and publications,
promoting the "third" way and the so-called
Iranian resistance. Arguably the most well-known
consultancy is Near East Policy Research Inc,
which, according to a website that investigates
MEK lobbying in the US [1], was established in May
2003 by Ali Safavi, a well-known and veteran MEK
member. Another well-known MEK member, Ali Reza
Jaafarzadeh (who was previously the MEK's official
representative in the US) is currently working for
the Fox News network as a Middle East analyst.
This latest MEK initiative has all the
trappings of the MEK's previous ambitious and
failed programs and is unlikely to amount to
anything in the long term. Its biggest success so
far has been to mobilize neo-conservative support
for the "third" way. At the forefront of this
support is the Iran Policy Committee (IPC), an
organization made up mostly of retired military
officers with impeccable neo-conservative
credentials. The IPC published a white paper,
outlining US policy options for Iran, in February.
Although mostly a clumsy report written by
non-experts, this white paper was remarkable for
its whole-hearted support of the MEK.
The
best way to understand the MEK's "third" way is to
place it in a continuum of failed strategies in
the past. The MEK's "first" way of gaining power
in post-revolutionary Iran was to start a serious
terrorist campaign in June 1981. The leaders of
the organization had grossly overestimated their
strength and conversely underestimated the
determination of the Islamic republic to put down
armed challenges. The result was the complete
elimination of the MEK network inside Iran, to the
extent that by late 1983 the MEK had no serious
presence in the country. The failure of this
"first" way led to desperate measures, which
culminated in an alliance with Saddam, the invader
of Iran.
The MEK's entry into Iraq led to
the creation of a conventional, albeit very small,
armed force along the Iran-Iraq border. The
"second" way envisioned capturing power through an
invasion of Iran backed by Iraqi air cover. This
crazy strategy was taken to its mindless extreme
in July 1988, when the MEK army launched operation
"eternal light" and invaded Iran from the central
border regions. Not surprisingly, the small MEK
force was destroyed by Iranian forces after the
Iraqis backed off from providing prolonged air
cover. The MEK admitted losing more than 1,200
fighters in the operation, but the true figure was
nearer to 2,000.
The end of the Iran-Iraq
war in 1988 might have heralded the end of the
"second" way had it not been for Saddam's wish to
keep the MEK both as a strategic trump card
against Iran and an internal security tool within
Iraq. This ensured that the strategy of toppling
the Islamic republic through an armed invasion was
not abandoned, until the US invasion of Iraq in
March 2003 put an end to the MEK's tried, tested
and failed plans. This paved the way for the
concoction of a "third" - and most probably final
- MEK strategy of overthrowing the
post-revolutionary order in Iran.
An
organization in crisis
The MEK knows better
than anyone else that the "third" way is a
non-starter. Firstly, the organization has no
presence inside Iran and little credibility with
Iranians outside the country. At best, the
organization is simply dismissed as decrepit and
irrelevant, while a majority of Iranians regard
its members as eccentric traitors who fought
alongside their enemies in the Iran-Iraq war. The
MEK also knows better than anyone else that it
cannot gain recognition from the US government. It
is not just because the MEK is the only Iranian
organization that has murdered Americans and
publicly boasted about it, but also because the US
government is well aware of the checkered history,
authoritarianism, limitations and hopeless future
of this quixotic organization.
The MEK's
"third" way is simply a tactic to buy time and
prepare the organization psychologically for the
inevitable expulsion of its remaining members from
Iraq. In the final scheme of things, the "third"
way is designed to prevent the organization from
disintegrating, but it is unlikely to work.
Essentially, four factors drive the
dynamics of organizational disintegration. First
and foremost the loss of its armed wing and the
effective end of the "armed struggle" is
profoundly unsettling for the MEK. The entire
organizational ethos and world view of the MEK
revolves around "armed struggle" and the
romanticism and cult of martyrdom that surrounds
it. All its slogans, insignia, flags and imagery
are woven around this theme. Indeed, one of the
main reasons that the MEK came into conflict with
the Islamic republic was the organization's
insistence that it maintain its own armed militia
in the country. Moreover, the whole-hearted and
obsessive attachment to political violence was a
factor in the US State Department's decision to
add and maintain the MEK on its terrorist list.
Secondly, the disappearance of Massoud
Rajavi, the ideological and spiritual leader of
the MEK, deprives the organization of effective
long-term leadership. Rajavi went into hiding the
very day that Saddam abandoned Baghdad to American
invaders, and not a word has been heard from him
since. Whether or not he physically survives in
the decisive months and years ahead is beside the
point, for the fact is that he is now politically
dead and cannot be revived.
As critics of
the organization have been quick to point out, any
leader who decides to go into hiding at a time
when his organization is experiencing its most
stressful period since its inception cannot expect
to be rehabilitated. Rajavi has gone into hiding
for good reasons, since the disasters that have
engulfed the MEK in recent years have largely been
a result of his decisions and style of leadership.
But Rajavi's incompetent leadership
notwithstanding, his loss is a big blow to the
organization. Above all else it completely
undermines its elaborate and complex ideology. To
put it simply, the MEK believes that it is at the
forefront of human evolution, and that its
ideological leader, Rajavi, stands at the very
peak of historical evolution. The fatal damage
that the loss of this so-called ideological leader
inflicts on the MEK's eccentric world view is
self-evident.
Thirdly, the MEK cannot
resettle effectively in the West. The group's
highly centralized and disciplined organization
means that it needs a discrete territorial base
from which to operate. The vast Ashraf camp in
Iraq's Diyala province was ideal for the MEK and
its loss cannot be over-estimated. Following the
downfall of Saddam, the MEK tried to relocate most
of its people and resources to its European
headquarters in the Parisian suburb of
Auvers-Sur-Oise, but these plans were foiled on
June 17, 2003, when French counterterrorism agents
stormed into the sleepy village and detained more
than 165 MEK members, including Maryam Rajavi.
Finally, political developments inside
Iran have made it increasingly difficult for even
the most hardcore of MEK members to believe that
regime change is a realistic scenario. The MEK has
consistently misread political developments in
Iran for the past quarter century, partly because
it has not had a presence inside the country. For
instance, Rajavi, the disappeared ideological
leader, was for three years telling his
organization that the Islamic republic would
collapse before the end of Mohammad Khatami's
first term as president in June 2001. This wildly
optimistic assessment turned out to be yet another
example of wishful thinking on the part of the
overly pretentious Rajavi.
This month's
closely contested presidential election and the
surprises it has thrown up - Mahmud Ahmadinejad -
indicates, first and foremost, that the reformist
discourse of making major changes to the country's
political institutions has been eclipsed by more
parochial and practical concerns with social
justice and the nature and scope of economic
development. Therefore, if the reformist program
(which is inherently loyal to the Islamic republic
and seeks to gradually reform it from within) is
increasingly dismissed as irrelevant, groups that
advocate the overthrow of the Islamic republic in
its entirety are clearly beyond the pale as far as
the vast majority of Iranians are concerned.
The factors outlined above encompass core
features of the MEK and go to the very heart of
this organization as a coherent and viable entity.
The fact that all these characteristics have not
just been undermined, but simply eliminated from
the equation, speaks volumes about the existential
crisis that has engulfed the MEK. In fact, there
are already signs that the organization's
remarkable discipline is breaking down. Sources
inside the British, Dutch and Canadian sections of
the MEK speak of a sharp decline in the morale of
supporters and a tendency by some peripheral
elements in the organization to speak to other
Iranian organizations. A few years ago, this would
have been unthinkable, since the MEK bans any
interaction with members of groups and
organizations that are not under its influence.
In the event of disintegration, at least
two distinct groups will emerge from the carcass
of the MEK. Veteran member Mehdi Abrishamchi (long
considered Massoud Rajavi's right-hand man and the
former husband of Maryam Rajavi, who divorced her
so Massoud could launch his so-called ideological
revolution) will most likely emerge as a leader of
a breakaway faction. Abrishamchi will likely
attract those MEK elements who want to go back to
the roots of their organization, before Massoud
Rajavi transformed them into an isolated cult.
Veteran member Mohsen Rezai (better known as
"Habib") might constitute another pole of
leadership. Known as a pragmatist and realist,
Rezai could attract the more talented members of
the organization, especially those who currently
perform political and diplomatic tasks. Maryam
Rajavi is unlikely to emerge as a leader of any
sorts since she derives all her legitimacy from
Massoud. One of the arrangements that followed the
MEK's ideological revolution in 1985 was that
Massoud would be the "ideology" while Maryam would
perform executive tasks.
The above
scenario is clearly speculative, but in all
likelihood factions motivated by the
aforementioned agendas will emerge from the
carcass of the MEK. The point to be made is that
the MEK - despite all its faults - has 40 years of
history behind it and to expect it to disappear
entirely is unrealistic. Although the MEK is the
oldest Iranian political group of modern times,
the disintegration of the organization in its
current form has been long overdue. Various
factors have converged to ensure its survival to
this point, of which the most important was the
patronage of Saddam. And in the final analysis,
whatever emerges from the carcass of the MEK, the
greatest legacy of its demise will be the final
and definitive repudiation of terrorism as a
legitimate tool in Iranian politics.
Note:
[1] MEK influence in US
politics
Mahan Abedin
is the editor of Terrorism Monitor, which is
published by the Jamestown Foundation, a
non-profit organization specializing in research
and analysis on conflict and instability in
Eurasia. The views expressed here are his own.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd.
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