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BOOK REVIEW
Diehard legionnaires
Hizbullah. The Story From Within by Naim Qassem
Buy this book
Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia
Official histories of guerrilla movements are double-edged swords. On one hand,
they offer rare peeks into internal goings-on in secretive organizations, and
on the other, they are apologies for controversial deeds and views. Hezbollah's
deputy secretary general, Sheikh Naem Qassem, profiles his Islamist legion as
if it were a paragon of virtues, sprinkling occasional candid disclosures. The
book is his self-set mission to prove that "the  essential
nature of Hezbollah is moderate" and to snub Western allegations of terrorism.
Despite some dubious assertions, readers benefit from understanding the
shrewdness and tact of this radical Lebanese power that rattled Israel.
The early 1960s heralded the embryonic "Islamic condition" in Lebanon. Shi'ite
clerics returning from Najaf (Iraq) shaped congregations to give an Islamic
redirection to life in the face of dereliction of welfare duties by the state.
The imams were outspoken critics of Israel, consecrating belligerent outfits
like Amal to assist the Palestinian struggle. Israel's invasion of Lebanon in
1978 and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 raised the stakes for ushering in an
Islamic government in Beirut through a united resistance army of Muslims based
on the jihad structure. Existing militant groups merged to form Hezbollah (Army
of Allah) with the blessings of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard.
Hezbollah was a creation of Iran just as the Taliban was of Pakistan. Qassem,
however, claims "no connection between the internal administration of the
Iranian state and Hezbollah's administration". (p 57) Further, Hezbollah is
credited with "independence in the work arena" (p 237) vis-a-vis Tehran.
Spiritually, financially and militarily, the reign of the Iranian ayatollahs
was and is Hezbollah's lifeline.
The party had total conviction in the Koran and jihad. It "served Allah and
shunned false gods". (p 22) Concern for politics affecting fellow Muslims was
paramount. An Islamic state was thought to be "the supreme representation of
human happiness". (p 30) Qassem advocates "free public choice" in an Islamic
state, though this was belied by Hezbollah's moral policing in Iran and
Lebanon. It banned casinos, concerts, dances and beauty contests and defended
the gender-iniquitous Muslim personal law by averring, "What God almighty
legalizes cannot be prohibited by anyone." (p 213)
Qassem names jihad as "basic behavior in a Muslim's life". When the nation (ummah)
was subject to humiliation, the enemy had to be conquered by paying any price.
If a Muslim mother fearing bereavement hid her son from battle, it meant
"deviation from obedience to God". After losing his own son in 1997 to Israeli
bombardment, Hezbollah's secretary general, Hasan Nasrullah, proclaimed, "We do
not spare our children. We pride ourselves when our sons fall martyrs." (p.121)
The godly promise of victory for jihad was a sufficient motive to keep fighting
against injustice. Martyred blood raised "youth's sense of responsibility" and
abstracted "tameness and acquiescence among the people". (p 172)
Hezbollah's ideology and party membership center on jihad credentials. Yet, to
avoid the pitfall of excluding others in multi-confessional Lebanon, it opened
doors to Sunnis, Druzes and Christians through peripheral membership and
independent circles. Among 12 Hezbollah MPs in the 1992 Lebanese parliament,
there were two Sunnis, one Catholic and one Maronite. The party entered into
pragmatic dialogues with Maronite, Orthodox, Catholic, Armenian and Assyrian
orders. When Jezzine was liberated from Israeli control in 1999, Hezbollah did
not harm the majority Christian civilian population and exhorted abolition of
sectarianism. The following year, disciplined Islamist partisans stayed the
hand of vengeance against families of Lahdist collaborators.
Uniting Lebanese society against Israel was the chief imperative. The party did
not enter the crux of the Lebanese civil war, warding off conflict against
internal sectarian factions. Intra-Muslim confrontations were distractions from
the Zionist enemy. When the "Palestinian Camps War" broke out in 1985 in
Beirut, Hezbollah assisted in its abatement. Clashes with the Amal faction
between 1988 and 1990 were dissolved amicably after Iranian and Syrian
intervention. Syria's "political cover was needed" often to inhibit recurring
tensions with the Lebanese army over deployment and control of the South.
Qassem exults that Hezbollah had no field desertions in its two-decade war with
Israel. Abandonment of jihad was a disgrace, loss and demise inviting
punishment from God. In Imam Ali's words, "Death shall defeat you in life, and
you shall defeat life through death." Citing Ali's son Husain as a role model,
Qassem describes love for martyrdom as "part of the love for God". (p 45)
Martyrdom vitalized Islam in Lebanon most speedily and prompted Israel to
withdraw almost entirely in the year 2000. Qassem quotes a Knesset member,
"Hezbollah not only drove our army mad but left the whole of Israel insane."
Even after 2000, the war was ongoing in the Sheba Farms region and over the
dispute about Arab captives in Israeli prisons. The party engaged in exchange
hostage-taking of Israelis, but not of victims belonging to other
nationalities.
The proficiency with which Hezbollah executed rocket launches, bombs and trap
tactics was matched by a "steadfast desire for highly dangerous activities".
Cultivation of dogged belief in martyrdom was a result of "spiritual
mobilization" that could "only be as thorough within an Islamic context". (p
75) A successful operation was considered one that wounded, killed or expelled
Israeli occupiers. When hurting Israeli soldiers was inadequate to deter the
latter's targeting of Lebanese civilians, Hezbollah directly beleaguered
Israeli civilians in Palestine. Aggression was met with reciprocity, especially
when Israel and the US kidnapped or assassinated fiery Shi'ite clerics in South
Lebanon. Being a geographically focused combatant, Hezbollah felt it futile to
hit Western targets around the world.
Hezbollah postponed involvement in Lebanese politics for a while, since its
primary mission was jihad. Its "Open Letter" was issued in 1985, two years
after foundation. The party's decision to jump into electoral politics in 1992
came following intense internal debate about whether it amounted to abandoning
the Islamic vision. There was apprehension that representative democracy did
not conform to overall Islamic philosophy and that entering parliament would
soften the zest for jihad. Hezbollah MPs abstained from participation in
government religiously and it was only in 2005 that they accepted a cabinet
ministry.
Hezbollah was never convinced of the efficacy of political negotiations with
Israel. Resistance was "the only available solution for the power imbalance".
(p 73) The May 17 Accord in 1983 under American auspices "cuffed Lebanon within
its own territory". The 1989 Taif Accord was unsatisfactory for its failure to
eliminate sectarianism. The 1993 Oslo Agreement was "a dangerous free gift to
Israel". The only agreement the party appreciated was the Syrian and
Iranian-brokered ceasefire in 1996.
Delivery of social services received top priority attention from Hezbollah. It
reconstructed buildings damaged by Israeli air raids, distributed water and
agricultural credit, and opened health centers, educational institutions and
mosques. Special care was taken of civilians injured in the war and for
"following up on public and private plights". (p 204)
Hezbollah was fiercely devoted to the Palestinian cause, avowing that "it is
not permissible to squander the land of Muslims" and that "liberation is a
natural obligation for which all Muslims are liable". (p 168) Targeting of
Israeli civilians by Hamas and Islamic jihad was necessary to "achieve balance
in the domain of horror". (p 175) Qassem posits Hezbollah's tactics as an
inspirational ray of hope for Palestinians.
Shi'ite-Sunni bonding to confront American hegemony was a fundamental tenet of
the party. It successfully thwarted US efforts to isolate Hezbollah from its
patrons, Iran and Syria. It refused overtures for talks with Washington and
checked "the imported view of events from predominating" the Middle East
through its radio station, al-Nour, and TV station, al-Manar.
Today, Hezbollah is a reality entrenched at the core of Lebanon, with strong
structural basis for endurance. "The believer's ability to resist is permanent
and exponential". (p 269) Despite the recent withdrawal of the Syrian army, the
party has its ways and means of retaining the protecting hand of Damascus.
Given the cyclical nature of Middle Eastern politics, we can be sure that
Qassem's committed legionnaires will continue to be major factors in war and
peace.
Hizbullah. The Story From Within by Naim Qassem, Saqi Books, London,
2005. ISBN: 0863565174. Price: US$ 42.50, 320 pages.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us
for information on
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