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Saudis search for
stability
By P R Kumaraswamy
Note: The US Embassy
and two consulates in Saudi Arabia were closed
this week in the wake of terrorist threats. Other
nations issued advisories to those planning to
travel to the kingdom. Meanwhile, the price of
crude oil shot up to a record of more than US$64 a
barrel, partly on fears of instability in the
country.
The smooth transition of
power in Saudi Arabia following the death of King
Fahd bin Abdul Aziz is unlikely to hide the severe
challenges facing the new ruler, King Abdullah bin
Abdul Aziz. He will have to navigate a host of
problems facing the oil-rich kingdom, such as
relations with the United States, uncertainties
following the surprise election of Mahmud
Ahmadinejad as the new president of Iran,
galloping oil prices, pressures for reform and
growing international terrorism.
However,
the real challenges facing Abdullah are domestic
and will test his ability to provide decisive
leadership to Saudi Arabia. With royal members
estimated at more than 5,000 princes and perhaps
an equal number of disenfranchised princesses, the
House of Saud is in the throws of a host of
crises.
Aging rulers
In recent
years, a number of Middle Eastern countries have
witnessed a change of leaders and the succession
invariably meant the ushering in of
second-generation leadership; in countries such as
Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar and Morocco, younger
leaders have ascended the thrown. Even in the case
of Syria, the death of President Hafez Assad led
to his son Bashar taking over office. Despite the
obvious drawbacks, these leaders represent a
younger generation with new aspirations.
Saudi Arabia is not part of this pattern.
Succession is still restricted to the sons of its
founder King Abdul Aziz al-Saud. Since the
founding of the modern Saudi Arabia in 1932, the
desert kingdom has had only six rulers; Abdul Aziz
(1932-53) and his sons Saud (1953-64), Faisal
(1964-75), Khalid (1975-82), Fahd (1982-2005) and
now Abdullah.
As a result, each new king
is no younger than the earlier one. For example,
Abdullah as well as Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul
Aziz are between 75 and 90 years of age. At this
rate, keeping succession among the sons of the
founder will inevitably mean shorter reigns and
frequent successions.
Perhaps anticipating
this problem, in 1992 Fahd introduced the basic
laws, which among other things proclaimed: "Rulers
of the country shall be amongst the sons of the
founder and their descendants. The most upright
among them shall receive allegiance." In light of
this statement, it may be necessary to implement
radical changes in the succession order. For
instance, once succession passes over to the
grandchildren of founder Abdul Aziz, who among the
hundreds of third-generation princes would be
found able and acceptable?
Power
struggle
The internal power struggle within
the al-Saud family will likely be shaped by the
so-called Sudairi Seven (now six following the
death of Fahd). These six surviving sons of Abdul
Aziz share the same mother and have amassed
considerable power and influence. The group
includes powerful princes such as Sultan, Nayif
and Salman. Enjoying and enlisting their
unqualified support will be vital for Abdullah to
pursue any part of his agenda. Despite the
debilitating stroke Fahd suffered in 1995, for a
decade Abdullah looked after the day-to-day
running of the country as a crown prince. One
might even argue that if it were not for the
Sudairi factor, Fahd might have been removed or
forced to abdicate in favor of Abdullah.
Moreover, all three sons of the new king
who are politically active have been accommodated
in the National Guard headed by Abdullah. This is
perhaps an indication of his limited power base
within the family. Therefore, Abdullah will have
to expand his support base by enlisting the
support of his other half-brothers and other
influential members of the royal family. Any
meaningful political reform in Saudi Arabia will
have to be within the al-Saud family. Keeping the
line of succession among the sons of Abdul Aziz
has been difficult.
Next in
line?
Moreover, since 1975, the Saudi
monarch has appointed a second deputy prime
minister, thereby settling the third prince in
line of succession. On ascending to the throne,
Khalid named Fahd as crown prince and Abdullah as
second deputy prime minister. Following this
tradition, in 1982 Fahd named Sultan as the second
deputy prime minister. While Abdullah followed
this pattern and named Sultan as crown prince, he
avoided immediately naming anyone to be third in
line of succession.
Salman, the younger
brother of Sultan, is seen by many as a likely
candidate for the number three position. As a
member of the Sudairi Seven, he enjoys
considerable political clout. But his nomination
as the second deputy prime minister would mean
overlooking the claims of other powerful princes
like Housing Minister Mit'ab bin Abdul Aziz and
Interior Minister Nayif bin Abdul Aziz. Moreover,
Salman is not young either; he was born in 1936.
Equally aging cabinet
In the
case of Saudi Arabia, not only are the rulers
aging but the same individuals have held key posts
in the government for decades. Sultan, the new
crown prince, has been the defense minister since
1962. Foreign Minister Saud bin Faisal was first
appointed to the position in 1975. Prince Bandar
bin Sultan, who has recently relinquished his post
as Saudi ambassador in Washington, held that
position since 1983. His successor, Prince Turki
bin Faisal, headed the Saudi intelligence agency
between 1978 and 2001.
Similarly, Interior
Minister Nayif has been in office since 1975.
Deputies in the ministries of defense and interior
have been holding their positions for more than
two decades. Salman, seen by some as a possible
future king, has been the governor of Riyadh since
1962. In short, the consensus and continuity have
been stretched to the limits by members of the
royal family.
Under the Saudi system, the
king also serves as the prime minister. This is
likely to create new problems for the rulers.
Abdullah also holds the post of commander of the
powerful National Guard, a position he has held
since 1962. This has been his principal power base
within the ruling family. Will he continue to hold
onto this position or elevate his
Sandhurst-educated son Mit'ab bin Abdullah, who
was appointed deputy commander of the National
Guard in 1984?
The same question can be
asked about new Crown Prince Sultan. Will he
continue to be the defense minister or retire in
favor of his equally aging younger brother Abdul
Rahman, who has been his deputy since 1983?
Pressures for reform
It is
undeniable that there is strong domestic pressure
for reform and accountability. The introduction of
the nominated consultative council, or majlis
al-Shura, by Fahd in 1992 was a partial concession
to demands for reforms. The national dialogue
pursued by Abdullah in the past few years and his
periodic meetings with different segments of the
population and the introduction of local elections
early this year were clear indications that the
Saudi monarchy has been forced to reform itself.
However, as crown prince, Abdullah's room to
maneuver was limited and there were suggestions
that other princes impeded his ability to pursue
the reform process actively.
The
assumption of full sovereign powers following the
death of Fahd is unlikely to alter the situation
radically since Abdullah will still have to
navigate carefully. His drive for reform will
require the consent and support of other powerful
princes and this in turn will mean that Abdullah
will have to accommodate their demands for key
positions.
Likewise, introduction of
political reforms similar to those experimented in
neighboring states such as Kuwait and Bahrain will
not be easy. Principle opposition in Saudi Arabia
emanates not from the liberal segments of the
population but from the conservative elements who
feel that the al-Saud family has deviated from
Islam and the puritanical traditions of Wahhabism,
an extremist sect within Sunni Islam. For the
critics, the ruling monarch is not Islamic enough;
therefore, Abdullah will not be able to push
forward any political reforms that would alienate
the conservative support base.
In the
Saudi context, reforms would also mean fighting
corruption within the royal household. Despite the
simplicity of the funeral and unmarked grave, Fahd
amassed huge personal wealth estimated to be
US$20-30 billion. The same can be said about
Sultan who, as defense minister, presided over one
of the most expensive military modernization
programs. In contrast to Abdullah's pious and
simple lifestyle, the ostentatious lifestyle of
many princes - such as the former ambassador to
the US, Prince Bandar - has attracted considerable
attention and criticism both within and outside
the country. Reforms aimed at transparency would
mean greater accountability of the princes and
curtailing their tendencies to mass personal
fortunes.
Conclusion
Given the
situation, issues of foreign policy are unlikely
to be the top priority for Abdullah's Saudi
Arabia. Domestic stability, especially the
post-Fahd political order, will be high on the
agenda. However, despite his popularity among the
population and the current prevailing optimism,
Abdullah is literally racing against time since
his age is working against him. While the
challenges before him are truly monumental, the
window of opportunity is extremely short. Unlike
his predecessors, Abdullah is unlikely to benefit
from his appointed crown prince since Sultan
suffers from a host of health problems.
Given his popularity and personal
reputation, Abdullah enjoys the unique advantage
of bringing about radical changes, especially
within the royal family, and the ability to bring
about an orderly transfer of succession to the
next generation. Even if he cannot benefit from
such changes, he will have to introduce some
radical changes in the government since they will
be vital for the long-term stability of Saudi
Arabia. He will have to retire some of the aging
princes who have been holding the same offices for
decades. Without such changes, the al-Saud family
will be unable to address a number of challenges
facing the country.
The mishandling of the
situation or the alienation of powerful princes
will undermine Abdullah's ability to prepare the
country for the future. At the same time, however,
laws of nature will mean that Abdullah has a much
shorter window of opportunity than all of his
predecessors. Far-reaching structural changes,
therefore, will have to come in weeks and months
rather than in years and decades.
Published with permission of the Power and Interest News
Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest
around the globe. All comments should be directed
to content@pinr.com |
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