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Three-way pull in
Iraq
By Ehsan Ahrari
The new Iraqi constitution
risks beginning an era of the virtual carving up
of Iraq. The Kurds and the Shi'ites are operating
on the basis of a zero-sum game, whereby any one
group's gains would approximately equal another
group's losses. The Kurds are 
determined to get the autonomous
oil-rich northern section. Not to be outmaneuvered
by the Kurds, the Shi'ites want an autonomous
southern portion. That would leave the Sunnis with
the impoverished central section. They are
watching, in horror, a process that might be the
beginning of the end of a unified Iraq that was
created between 1921 and 1932. With all its
intentions of democratizing and stabilizing the
"new Iraq", the Bush administration may be
presiding over the process of the disintegration
of Iraq.
The interim Iraqi constitution -
officially known as the "Law of Administration for
the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period",
(or transition administration - TAL) - was due to
be presented to the Iraqi parliament on Monday for
that body's approval. By Sunday night and early
Monday the 71 members of the constitutional
assembly attempting to finalize the draft were
still not in agreement. But a draft is expected on
time, with or without the approval of Sunni Arab
representatives, who are refusing to endorse any
document that calls for a federal system in Iraq.
As things stand, the draft does create a
federal system. It reads, "The federal system
shall be based upon geographic and historical
realities and the separation of powers, and not
upon origin, race, ethnicity, nationality, or
confession." This legalistic phraseology is
virtually oblivious to the possibility of how that
notion of separation of power would be interpreted
in the Iraqi polity, which has been known for its
long-standing sectarian and ethnic conflicts,
mistrust, and even mutual hatred.
America's perspective is that, like its
own polity where intra-societal conflicts have
become manageable in the past few decades, Iraq
would also have a jump-start in that direction.
However, human suffering based on sectarian and
ethnic differences has a very long history in
Iraq. These problems are not likely to vanish
overnight, just because an outside force puts
forth its best effort for their dissipation.
The Iraqi Kurds are in pursuit of their
own agenda. As an ethnic minority, they have been
suppressed and brutalized, not just in Iraq, but
also in Turkey, Syria and Iran. Such treatment
created intense feelings of alienation among them.
In addition, they had always harbored dreams of
establishing an independent Kurdistan, which
neither Iraq, nor its aforementioned neighbors,
would tolerate under any circumstances. The Kurds
tasted autonomy when the US ran a resolute
campaign of containing Saddam Hussein, between
1991 and 2003. That reality only rejuvenated the
desire to achieve an independent statehood. Even
though Washington did not envision that the Kurd's
autonomy in northern Iraq would lead to their
independence, the Kurds never had any misgivings
about what they really wanted in the post-Saddam
years.
The Kurdish dreams of independence
would not have been nurtured if Turkey had allowed
the use of its territory to US troops to launch
their invasion into northern Iraq. In the wake of
Turkey's refusal to serve as a launching pad, the
US had to use the contingency plan of still
launching the invasion from the north, but with
the heavy use of its Special Forces, and with full
cooperation of the Kurdish forces (the
Peshmergas). The result was a tacit
understanding that, even if the Bush
administration were not to support an independent
Kurdish state in northern Iraq, it would do
nothing to squelch it. Call it Kurdish wishful
thinking, but that is how they have felt about the
prospects of their independence ever since the US
dismantled Saddam's regime. Consequently, they
participated in the elections of January in full
force, believing that, if they were to emerge as a
major group in the interim government, they would
be in a very good position to demand permanent
autonomy, which would eventually lead to
independence.
Since the establishment of
the interim government, the Kurds have not stopped
flexing their muscles. They were quite boisterous
about the power that emanated from the electoral
victory (they received 25% of the vote in the
general election). They insisted on having their
autonomy, intensified their demands to resettle in
oil-rich Kirkuk, through a process of
"de-Arabization", and even wanted to widen the
boundary of their current autonomous region by
incorporating Kirkuk.
As the Monday
deadline of completing the final draft of the
constitution approached, the Kurds further
radicalized their demands. For instance, a major
leader who is not a member of the Iraqi
government, Masoud Barzani, demanded on August 12
that the Kurdish autonomous region should be
allocated 65% of the revenues from the disputed
oil fields of Kirkuk. The Shi'ites immediately
shot back by categorizing that demand as
unacceptable. Other Kurdish members of the Iraqi
parliament went to the extent of demanding a
provision in the constitution that would promise
them a vote on independence. In the absence of
such a provision, they warned, they "may simply
declare independence".
The Shi'ites also
appear to have been caught up in the Kurdish
frenzy for autonomy. The leader of the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI), Abdul Aziz Hakim, declared on Friday
that, if the Kurds were to get their own federal
state in the north, the Shi'ites should get theirs
in the south. The most noteworthy aspect of that
announcement was that Hakim made it after a
lengthy meeting with the Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani. That implied, at least, that Sistani,
the foremost Shi'ite religious leader, did not
have any objection to that proposal.
Why
would Sistani go along with such a radical
suggestion, considering that he has opposed the
notion of federalism all along? One reason might
be that he has been swayed by Hakim that the Kurds
and the US are likely to persuade the Sunnis to go
along either with a secular version of a new Iraqi
government, or with the proposition of making
Islam just one source of legislation - a position
that Sistani strongly opposes: he wants it to be
the source. Thus, by having an autonomous
region of their own, the Shi'ites are making sure
that the primacy of Islam is guaranteed, at least
in their region.
The D'awa Party of Iraqi
Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari is opposed to
Hakim's latest demand for autonomy. However,
considering that Hakim appears to have the tacit
blessing of Sistani, the D'awa Party might also
drop its opposition to an autonomous Shi'ite
region.
The Sunnis of Iraq, on the other
hand, are faced with a no-win situation. If Iraq
is divided into northern and southern autonomous
regions, which also contain almost all of its oil
reserves, the Sunnis are left with the
impoverished central province. Thus, they have
been quite intense and voluble in rejecting the de
facto partition of Iraq. In the final analysis,
they will have to rely on vetoing a
Shi'ite-Kurdish compromise, which they envision as
aimed at marginalizing them permanently. The Iraqi
interim constitution guarantees that a two-thirds
majority in any three provinces can reject the
charter. However, such an action by the Sunnis -
since they are reportedly the major backers of the
Iraqi insurgency - would further deteriorate the
security situation in the country. Neither the
Shi'ites nor the Kurds are interested in
contributing to the materialization of such a
state of affairs.
The US is also faced
with a difficult situation. It desperately wants
to see the conclusion of a draft constitution by
August 15, otherwise the whole Iraqi political
process - including full, new elections - will be
delayed. This need, however, may turn out to be a
major reason for its potential undoing in the
coming months.
The Bush administration
very much appreciates the Kurdish support for a
secular Iraq. It has been the only group that has
consistently welcomed the American presence in
their country. However, the US parts company with
the Kurds in its own firm commitment for a strong
central government in the new Iraq. It also
opposes the Kurdish position that their autonomous
province should control oil revenues from the
northern oil reserves. The US wishes the revenues
to be sent to the Iraqi central government, so
that it can redistribute them to different
regions. Such a role, in the view of Washington,
would enable the central government to keep the
autonomous impulses of the regional governments
under constant check. That would also help Iraq
evolve as a stable democracy. In principle,
Washington's thinking is based on solid ground.
That type of a financial arrangement has played a
crucial role in the evolution of a strong central
(federal) government in the US itself.
The
US also opposes any Kurdish aspirations for
independence. It knows how contentious such a
development would be for Turkey, which is watching
all Kurdish maneuvers toward autonomy and related
matters with careful attention.
No one
really recognizes what the new Iraq is becoming.
It is a constant work in progress. In the process,
it is also manifesting traits - in the behavior of
the Shi'ites, the Kurds and the Sunnis - that have
a tremendous potential of becoming
self-destructive within a very short period.
The latest declaration of the SCIRI's
Hakim for an autonomous Shi'ite region is one
example of that phenomenon. Another example is the
public statements of Kurdish lawmakers demanding a
constitutional provision for the independence of
the Kurds.
Because the Shi'ites and the
Kurds have the most to lose if a political
compromise on the Iraqi constitution falters,
hopes Washington, they will be under constant
pressure to compromise. However, it also keeps its
wary eyes on the Kurds, who frequently seem to be
carried away with their ultimate political goal of
becoming an independent nation.
The US is
finding out the hard way, even before Iraq emerges
as a democracy, that the very democratic process
that it has introduced there is creating forces
that are inherently self-destructive. It is also
learning that the process of democratizing a
long-standing autocratic polity creates momentum
that is so overpowering and overwhelming that it
is likely to sweep everything aside, including the
reforming force itself.
In this sense, the
chances are high that before democracy is firmly
placed in Iraq, it might take a detour and become
such an explosive society that it will bring about
the ejection of the US from its borders. There are
no guarantees for success. George W Bush is in for
even more surprises in the new Iraq.
Ehsan Ahrari is an independent
strategic analyst based in Alexandria, VA, US. His
columns appear regularly in Asia Times Online. He
is also a regular contributor to the Global Beat
Syndicate. His website: www.ehsanahrari.com.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact us for information
on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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