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More power to the
Sunnis
By Ehsan Ahrari
Riding the tiger of democracy in Iraq is
dangerous for the three major actors - the
Shi'ites, the Kurds and their interlocutor, the
United States - for different reasons. In the
ongoing process, the weakest group of post-Saddam
Hussein Iraq - the Sunnis - could be the ultimate
winners. They appear desperate right now, while
the Shi'ites and the Kurds are negotiating an
acceptable version of the Iraqi constitution,
which was due to be presented to parliament before
midnight on Monday.
The choices for the
Sunnis are infinitely wider and longer-lasting
than those of the Shi'ites and the Kurds. Even if
there is accord on the final draft of the
constitution, the real loser here is still likely
to be the US, which has consistently linked the
transformation of the Middle East into a
democratic region to the emergence of a democratic
Iraq. The Sunnis are poised to undermine democracy
in Iraq, either now or in the near future.
The US invasion of Iraq created a unique
opportunity for the Shi'ites and the Kurds to
become dominant groups. As long as the political
power play in Iraq is based on democracy, the
Sunnis have much to lose as they are outnumbered
by the Shi'ites. They simply don't have the
numbers to become the dominant group. The
historical repression of the Kurds by Saddam's
Sunni-dominated government left no room for a
political compromise between the Sunnis and the
Kurds, whereby the Sunnis can become a major
player, even though a majority of the Kurds are
also Sunnis.
In terms of Sunni-Kurdish
ties, the enormity and intensity of political
differences and stakes, not the commonality of
Sunni Islam between them, is the driving force.
The brutal Sunni rule of the past has left no
compassion for them among Kurds. The dog-eat-dog
style of politics ran rampant during the Sunni
rule of modern Iraq; and it promises to play a
similar role now. Except, the shoe is on the other
foot. By all indications, the Kurds will play
their political power to the hilt. They originally
wanted a federal form of government in Iraq that
would institutionalize autonomy for them. Then
they translated that autonomy by focusing on the
control of oil revenues from the fields of Mosul
and Kirkuk. As if that wasn't enough, they topped
it off recently by demanding independence. The
Sunnis suspected all along that the Kurds were
nurturing that motive. Now the genie is out of the
bottle. The Sunnis are equally adamant that Iraq
should never be allowed to become anything but an
integrated entity.
The Iraqi Shi'ites have
also been brutalized by the Sunni regimes of Iraq.
Call them magnanimous winners or hardnosed
realists, but, in the aftermath of the January 30
elections, they have demonstrated that, despite
the weak electoral showing of the Sunnis, the
Shi'ites would do all they could to incorporate
Sunni interests and representation in the new
Iraq.
However, the current power game in
Iraq is becoming intense, brutal and nasty. As
much as the Shi'ites wish to safeguard Sunni
interests, protecting their own interests has
lately emerged as a motive of utmost significance.
Besides, to show compassion toward anyone else,
especially in the long run, they (the Shi'ites)
must ensure that their own political power is not
jeopardized, as the details of the newly emerging
constitution are being hammered out. No matter how
much they manifested genuine understanding toward
growing Sunni insecurity and resentment toward
what the new Iraq will hold for them, by
announcing their own preference for an autonomous
region in the southern part of their country, the
Shi'ites have convinced the Sunnis that they, in
the final analysis, would not think twice before
sacrificing Sunni interests.
In their
desperation, the Sunnis are now pleading with the
United Nations and the US to prevent the other two
groups from pushing the draft charter through the
National Assembly without Sunni consent. The
Shi'ites and the Kurds have ample votes in the
legislative body (United Iraqi Alliance 48.2%, and
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan 25.7%)
to railroad the Sunnis into accepting it. Then the
latter will have to rely on the last legal choice
of vetoing the constitution during the
ratification process. Given the high degree of
intra-Sunni disunity, the Shi'ites and the Kurds
might be counting on the possibility that the
Sunnis will not be able to muster sufficient
support to veto the draft constitution.
President George W Bush could not have
believed how contentious, cantankerous and
rambunctious the evolution of democracy would
become in Iraq. At the same time, he does not know
that, as far as Iraq is concerned, "he ain't seen
nothing yet", especially from the Sunni side.
The Sunni perspective on the new Iraq is
that they have to live with the reality of
remaining "number three" in the political power
game from now on. They also know that they live
next door to Iran, which will do everything -
short of military intervention - to ensure a
sustained Shi'ite dominance of the political
process. The Sunnis are also fearful that the
Kurds will not stay within the framework of a
united Iraq for long, and will use all sorts of
shenanigans to disintegrate it as soon as they
can.
What the Shi'ites and the Kurds fail
to realize is that Sunni perspectives of an Arab
Iraq are couched in the larger context of
pan-Arabism. As such, it has never envisioned Iraq
as a country where they would be in the minority;
or would see the day when their country would be
known as "The Republic of Iraq" (minus the word
"Arab"), as its official name promises to be.
Being a part of a very large Sunni Arab milieu,
they have always considered themselves as a
"legitimate group" to rule Iraq. That perception
was not based on democracy, which would have given
them a lesser role, as they are experiencing
today. Rather, it was simply based on the fact
that they should rule Iraq because it is part and
parcel of a Sunni Arab region. Consequently, the
entire current notion of a democratic Iraq appears
illegitimate, fictitious or even conspiratorial to
them. It also appears to them as an outcome of a
conspiracy chiefly contrived by the US, the
Shi'ites and the Kurds. The Sunni view of the US
is that it has always wanted to bring about the
demise of their country as a major Arab power and
become a subservient actor to both America and
Israel.
As Muslims and Arabs, the Iraqi
Sunnis seem to have assigned themselves the role
of the "new Salladin", fighting for the primacy of
Sunni Islam against the nexus of "blasphemy and
heresy, and infidelity", In that fight, there may
be room for tactical compromises, but never for a
permanent sellout.
What are the Sunni
choices? First, at least for now, they will
continue to cooperate, while looking for better
provisional deals for themselves. Second, at the
same time, they will not abandon the option of
sabotaging the entire proposition of a "new Iraq",
which they envision as a recipe for their
permanent marginalization. Third, they will not
make a clean break from the insurgency, which is
as much opposed to the Shi'ite-dominated new Iraq
as the Sunnis themselves are, albeit with minor
substantive or tactical differences.
What
are the implications of this Sunni behavior for
the US? Given that it wants to promote democracy
in Iraq, any long-term commitment of the Sunnis to
undermine that arrangement goes against everything
the US government is attempting to promote. More
to the point, inasmuch as the transformation of
the Muslim Middle East has been linked with the
development of democracy in Iraq in the public
statements of all national security officials of
the Bush administration - including Bush himself -
any sabotaging of democracy in Iraq will be the
end of any prospects of its evolution in the
region. Only the Sunnis of Iraq have the potential
of doing that. Even by incorporating Sunni
political interests in the new constitution, the
other three participants of the negotiating
process - the Shi'ites, the Kurds and the US -
will only be buying Sunni cooperation for a
limited time.
Ehsan Ahrari is an
independent strategic analyst based in Alexandria,
VA, US. His columns appear regularly in Asia Times
Online. He is also a regular contributor to the
Global Beat Syndicate. His website:
www.ehsanahrari.com.
(Copyright 2005
Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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