WAITING
FOR THE MAHDI, Part 1 Sistani.Qom: In the wired
heart of Shi'ism By Pepe
Escobar
QOM - Secular voices in Tehran are
adamant: Ninety percent of the political power in
Iran is in Qom. One may be tempted to add that at
least 70% of the political power in Iraq is also
situated in Qom.
It's only a small room,
one of its walls plastered with blue cabinet files
containing e-mail printouts from all over the
world. Behind a glass wall, five youngsters scan
documents non-stop. Appearances are deceptive.
This is the room housing www.sistani.org,
arguably the nerve center of Shi'ite Islam today,
run by a soft-spoken, scholarly looking man, Ali
Shabestari. Some grand ayatollahs may be grander
than others. Since the war, invasion and
occupation of Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani
- based in Najaf, 160 kilometers south of Baghdad,
but born in Sistan-Balochistan province in Iran -
has become the paramount voice of Shi'ism. The
victory of the Shi'ite-led coalition in the
January elections in Iraq
was
basically a Sistani victory. Most of his closest
aides are based in Qom, in Central Iran about 200
kilometers south of Tehran. Sistani's unquestioned
moral authority has put the limelight on nothing
less than a silent battle for the core of the
Shi'ite soul.
Sistani's website, in five
languages, receives an average of 15,000 visitors
a day, and "700 to 1,200 e-mails every single
day",
according to Shabestari. "There were so many
page visits and e-mails from predominantly Sunni,
Wahhabi Saudi Arabia that the Saudi government
blocked the site," he says with a chuckle (10% of
Saudi Arabia's population is Shi'ite, living in
the oil-rich Persian Gulf). From non-Arabic
visitors to Sistani's website, e-mails are mostly
about Iraqi politics; nowadays overwhelmingly
about the federation of Iraq. Shabestari shows
some e-mail print outs and the relevant response
handwritten by the grand ayatollah himself.
The question is inevitable: who is the
most authoritative voice in Shi'ite Islam today?
Is it the discreet, almost recluse Sistani in
Najaf, Iraq who forced the American superpower to
bow to his wishes? Or is it the Supreme Leader of
the Islamic Republic in Iran, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei? Who has the upper hand, Najaf or Qom?
Pick your marja'a Hojjatoleslam Mahdi Hassan Zadeh is the
director of the Aalulbayt World Assembly,
dedicated to "spreading Shi'ite culture around the
world". He explains that "in a meeting 14 years
ago, Shi'ite scholars from more than 100 countries
decided to set up a center to propagate Shi'ism."
Today, according to the center's figures, there
are close to 150 million Shi'ites worldwide. These
include 2 million in Western Europe (out of 10
million Muslims); 5% of these 2 million were born
in Europe. In Asia there are 1 million Shi'ites,
mostly in Xinjiang and Beijing in China, and 3 to
4 million in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, Myanmar). India, Pakistan and Bangladesh
account for almost 70 million. In the US, since
1990, 4 million Americans have converted to Islam;
of a minimum of 10 million Muslims, 2 million
Americans are Shi'ite.
The figure of the
marja'a - a source of imitation by the
faithful - is at the center of Shi'ism. The
marja'a represents Imam al-Mahdi, the
hidden Imam who will reappear one day to save
mankind. Marja'as are also at the center of
the barely disguised rivalry between the holy
cities of Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran. Zadeh
says that previously Najaf was the center "because
there were more marja'as. Under repression
by Saddam Hussein, most of them migrated to Qom,
and now they are mostly here. Imams predicted in
books that the center [of the Shi'ite faith] would
move to Qom."
According to Zadeh, there
are now eight marja'as, all of them grand
ayatollahs. Only Sistani is based in Iraq, in
Najaf. The others are Khamenei, Makaram Shirazi,
Fazel Lankarani, Tabrizi; Bahjat, Safi Golpaygani,
and Shirazi. All the Iranians are close followers
of the late Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
father of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979.
Zadeh adds that "in each time there is a supreme
marja'a. Now it is Ayatollah Khamenei." But
who were they before Khomeini? Zadeh points to a
list of all marja'as since the 7th century.
Zadeh says, "All marja'as have a
duty to establish an Islamic government. And this
government should be established according to the
will of the people. Imam Khomeini was ready;
people wanted it." This implies that Sistani in
Iraq was just delivering what the Shi'ite majority
of the population wanted. Iraq may not become an
Islamic republic, but at least none of its laws
shall contradict Sharia, or Islamic law.
Zadeh explains that velayat-e-faqih
(the ruling of the jurisprudent) is "the duty and
belief of all marja'as. The fiqh
[Islamic jurisprudence] should be running
political and social life." The devil, of course,
is in the details. "Shi'ites in practice believe
that state and religion go together." Does that
mean the absolute preeminence of Sharia law?
"Islam says we have solutions for all aspects of
life. And all Iranians accept this." But it's
important to remember that when the concept of
velayat-e-faqih was erected as the basis of
Iran after the revolution, it was opposed by
Ayatollah Khoei in Najaf (a traditionalist),
Ayatollah Shariatmadari in Qom (a liberal) and
Ayatollah Taleqani in Tehran (a "leftist", meaning
progressive). Even with different positions, they
all agreed that the marja'a should not mess
around with politics.
Confronted with the
evidence of the Taliban mix of Wahhabism and
Deobandi ideology and its disaster in running
Afghanistan, Zadeh says, "It's not the first time
in history that we have blunders like that. The
Taliban claimed they were running an Islamist
state. They were wrong. Shi'ites on the other hand
leave a lot of space for popular criticism."
The concept of an Islamic state, according
to Imam Ali, for Shi'ites, is still the model of
pure Islam. Zadeh quotes a saying by Imam Ali,
"With the help of the people we can establish an
Islamic state." But how to adapt from the 7th
century to the 21st? "That's the advantage of
Islam. It's not a religion just for Arabs, but for
all mankind. We automatically adapt for change."
As far as the new Iraqi constitution is
concerned, the view of the Qom clerical
establishment is that "as long as laws do not
contradict Sharia, they are acceptable". Zadeh
admits that the situation in both countries is
extremely different. In Iran there was a popular
revolution, led by a charismatic religious leader,
which turned into a regime admitting no dissent.
In Iraq there was a military intervention from a
Western power, which opened the way for dozens of
political parties. "In Iraq they have to contend
with other powerful minorities. That's the beauty
of religion."
The conversation inevitably
turns to Imam Mahdi, the heart of the Shi'ite
faith. Zadeh says that "all religions seek a
savior. We in Shi'ism have the hidden Imam. Why
are we all waiting for him? We are tired of wars,
of corruption. So we must prepare and be ready for
when the imam comes."
The conversation is
enlivened by the arrival of Ayatollah Mohsen
Araki, a senior personage who until recently was
the representative of the Supreme Leader in
London. In fluent English, Araki says, "Al-Qaeda
bombings represent the absolute opposite of Muslim
ideology, of humanity. Nobody can accept these
kinds of actions. We have condemned them."
Araki equals al-Qaeda with American
politicians: "They use democracy. It does not mean
that democracy is killing people in Afghanistan
and other countries." Al-Qaeda, for its part, uses
Islam: "It does not mean Islam accepts these kinds
of actions. All Islamic instructions are the
opposite of killing people without aim." The
Islamic Center of England, according to Araki, has
done its best to publish leaflets and books and
organize conferences with European scholars
explaining the difference between Islam and
terrorism.
Pick your holy city
The heart of Shi'ite proselytizing is
Aalulbayt's global information center. It houses
three websites, plus www.sistani.org. The main
site is www.al-shia.com - available in no less
than 27 languages, boasting huge archives,
everything translated by a group of students,
native speakers, in Qom. There are Afghans,
Tajiks, Russians, northern Africans; they have
been transferring all Shi'ite textbooks online for
three years now.
Zadeh says this is
considered the number one Shi'ite website, and
number seven among all Muslim websites. It has an
average of 250,000 visits a month, from as many as
133 countries. The other sites are
www.Quran.al-shia.com - only about the Koran, the
whole book translated in 27 languages, plus
interpretations; and www.balaghah.net, with a
collection of Imam Ali's sayings in 22 languages.
The center also has offices in major world cities,
from London and New York to Karachi and Istanbul.
Aalulbayat's information center is
officially managed "under the supervision of the
office of His Eminence, Grand Ayatollah Sistani".
This makes him in fact the electronic grand
ayatollah par excellence, with unparalleled power
to reach all corners of the Shi'ite world,
something that implies a most uncomfortable
question to be posed to Qom clerics: the fact that
Khamenei, in spite of all his political and
financial muscle, has never managed to impose
himself as the undisputed supreme authority in
such a manner - neither among the clerical
hierarchy, neither among the faithful. Certainly
not in Qom, but in Tehran reformists refer to him
not as grand ayatollah but as "Seyyed Ali Shah" -
in an extremely unflattering parallel with the
late shah who was ousted in the Islamic
revolution.
Asia Times Online has
confirmed in the Shi'ite neighborhoods of Beirut
how Khamenei is regarded as a supreme
marja'a - but the feeling is far from
unanimous. For instance, Ayatollah Hossein
Fadlallah, the supreme Shi'ite authority in
Lebanon, is a very active critic of the theory of
velayat-e-faqih; he insists the faithful
are absolutely free to choose who is their
marja'a.
This "battle" between
Sistani and Khamenei extrapolates to the extremely
fluid interplay between Najaf and Qom. During
Saddam, Qom all but eclipsed Najaf. Qom was
lavished with funds from the Iranian state -
attracting teachers and students alike to its
well-funded hawza (seminaries and religious
schools).
Najaf, though, kept enjoying the
advantage of being totally independent from either
Baghdad or Tehran. Now free, Najaf is shining
again as a center of autonomy and free criticism -
thanks to Sistani's spiritual role - while Qom is
inextricably linked with political power in
Tehran. It's not a question of Tehran influencing
Qom; the point is the overwhelming influence of
Qom over Tehran.
In Iraq on the other hand,
there will be no velayat-e-faqih: in a
"republican, parliamentary, democratic and
federal" Iraq, Islam in the proposed Iraqi
constitution, is "a main source of
legislation".
The verdict is open on which
model - Iran or Iraq - best reflects the
aspirations of nearly 150 million Shi'ites
worldwide.
NEXT: Part 2 -
Waiting for the savior
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Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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according to Shabestari. "There were so many
page visits and e-mails from predominantly Sunni,
Wahhabi Saudi Arabia that the Saudi government
blocked the site," he says with a chuckle (10% of
Saudi Arabia's population is Shi'ite, living in
the oil-rich Persian Gulf). From non-Arabic
visitors to Sistani's website, e-mails are mostly
about Iraqi politics; nowadays overwhelmingly
about the federation of Iraq. Shabestari shows
some e-mail print outs and the relevant response
handwritten by the grand ayatollah himself.
