On
August 15, Iraq's constitutional drafting
committee failed to meet its deadline to deliver a
constitution to the National Assembly, which then
extended the deadline by one week. The following
week, a draft constitution was submitted, but only
on the condition that negotiations would continue
for another three days. This third deadline came
and went without agreement. Finally, on August 27,
the final draft of the constitution was delivered
to the assembly without the approval of the 15
Sunni Arab committee members, and without a vote.
The failure to win the Sunni committee
members' support weakens the prospects for
bringing stability to Iraq in the near term,
potentially laying the groundwork for civil war.
The constitution's embrace of federalism seems to
destroy any illusions of a strong, centralized
government emerging in Baghdad, and, if approved
on October 15 in a national referendum, could lead
to the further fracturing of Iraq along sectarian
lines
and
could strengthen the insurgency due to widespread
Sunni Arab rejection.
Any intensification
of the insurgency would affect negatively the
interests of the United States. Domestic pressure
is growing for the Bush administration to begin a
limited withdrawal of troops from the conflict; US
forces are overextended, which limits Washington's
capability to threaten intervention effectively
elsewhere. An intensification of the insurgency
will make it difficult for the US to pull its
troops out of Iraq since Baghdad's current
security forces are not capable of adequately
handling the ongoing guerrilla campaign.
What the constitution means Many issues proved highly contentious during
the constitutional negotiations, but most were
resolved by August 25. According to Article Two of
the proposed constitution, Islam will be "a basic
source" for the law - a compromise between
religious Shi'ite Arabs who wanted Islam to be the
fundamental source of law and secular-minded
Iraqis who would have preferred a more diminished
role for religion. This compromise will also allow
clerics to sit on the country's Supreme Court, but
not as a majority. Protections for women's rights,
religious freedom and democratic principles were
added, though it is not clear whether they will
trump Islamic law when in conflict.
A
bargain of sorts was also reached on the sharing
of oil revenues. Iraq's existing oil fields sit in
the northern region controlled by the Sunni Kurds
and in the Shi'ite-dominated south. Sunni Arabs
feared that language in the proposed constitution
would allow the Kurds and Shi'ites to control the
revenues generated by the oil fields. Article 110
proposes that all revenue generated by existing
operations will be distributed fairly based on the
population of each province. However, the language
is vague and stipulates that those regions
neglected by "the former regime" - the Shi'ite and
Kurdish areas - will be allowed a disproportionate
share of the revenue for an undeclared period of
time. This compromise did little to assuage Sunni
Arab concerns over federalism.
Federalism
became the major sticking point when pious
Shi'ites proposed a system that would allow for a
province to link up with other provinces to form a
federal region - with greater autonomy from the
central government - merely through a referendum
by simple majority. It was expected that the Kurds
would maintain the autonomy of the region they
control in the north, but this provision proved
indigestible to the Sunni Arabs. Some of the
Shi'ite negotiators imagined that the provinces in
the south, sitting on some of Iraq's major oil
fields, could link up to form a "super" region.
Their Kurdish counterparts allowed this language
to be inserted because it will strengthen their
claim to Kirkuk, which under the Transitional
Administrative Law for Iraq (TAL) will likely be
absorbed into their autonomous zone anyway.
The Sunni Arabs believed that the main
Shi'ite negotiators were laying the groundwork to
break up Iraq along sectarian lines, leaving them
with the oil-free regions. Secular Shi'ites argued
that this would allow Iran to establish a toehold
in southern Iraq, as many of the region's leaders
will be drawn from the forces that fought on the
Iran side of the Iraq-Iran war of the 1980s. The
pious Shi'ite and Kurdish negotiators bent
slightly on these issues, but no compromise with
their Sunni Arab counterparts was struck.
The other major point of contention for
the Sunni Arab negotiators was the
de-Ba'athification policy. Article 132 calls for a
continuation of the removal of ex-Ba'ath Party
members from government posts during the
transition to a new government. Sunni Arabs argue
that this had no place in the constitution since
it addresses a period of time before the
constitution will come into effect. Also, an
absolute majority in the Council of
Representatives is necessary to end the
de-Ba'athification policy, something the Sunni
Arabs simply will never be able to deliver. This
language was slightly adjusted in response to
Sunni Arab requests, but remains part of the
document.
While the National Assembly did
not vote on the draft constitution, it will be put
to referendum on October 15. As the second
deadline passed, Shi'ite and Kurdish negotiators
worked out the final details without the input of
the 15 Sunni Arab members. When presented with the
final document, the Sunnis rejected the text and
forced yet another delay.
Ignoring
previous statements about Iraqi sovereignty,
Washington became intimately involved in the final
days of the negotiations and pushed for a
compromise, but also approved of the locking out
of the Sunni Arabs. US President George W Bush
personally called Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, a cleric
and the leader of the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), to lobby for a
compromise. In the end, the constitution was
delivered without Sunni Arab approval.
Everything now depends on October 15. The
US has scaled back its ambitions in Iraq and
believes the constitution's approval will greatly
determine the timeline on which troops can be
withdrawn. The run up to the referendum will see
an increase in sectarian rhetoric and perhaps an
increase in violence as insurgents attempt to
derail the vote. It is taken for granted that the
Kurdish north and Shi'ite south will cast their
votes for the constitution. What is less certain
is how the center of the country will
respond.
Looking beyond October 15 The prospects for Iraq's future now largely
rest on the Sunni Arab reaction to the
constitution. Whether or not Sunnis participate in
the October 15 referendum, and whether or not
their participation has an effect on its passage,
will be of extreme importance. There are several
possible scenarios that Sunni Arab participation
could take, some more probable than others. In the
unlikely prospect that Sunni Arabs turn out for
the referendum in decent numbers and approve of
the text, the insurgency will lose its most potent
domestic base of support; the US plan to hand off
the responsibilities of containing the insurgency
could then continue on its proposed course. Though
this would have little effect on the jihadi
insurgents, it could undermine the Ba'athist
insurgency.
In the more likely case that
Sunni Arabs stay away from the polls in October
and the constitution gains approval without their
participation, the insurgency will likely continue
unabated, as the central government will find it
difficult to project its power into regions that
reject its authority. In the previous elections,
Sunni Arabs largely did not participate because of
threats of violence by jihadi and Ba'athist
insurgents. While some of the Sunni Arab groups
who previously argued against participation seem
to have changed course and now advocate voting
down the constitution, the insurgents' threats may
prevent any substantial uptick in Sunni turnout.
This would likely prevent any significant
Sunni Arab participation and would strengthen the
trend toward federalism based on sectarian lines
that the proposed constitution allows. A weak
central government dominated by regional
governments could eventually lead to the
dismantling of Iraq along sectarian lines - a
prospect that the Sunni Arab-dominated central
region, which lacks the oil fields of the Kurdish
north and Shi'ite south, would violently reject.
Another likely possibility is that Sunni
Arabs will turn out for the referendum but fail to
muster the two-thirds majority in three provinces
necessary to defeat the constitution's approval.
If this scenario plays out, it is highly unlikely
that the Sunni population would participate in the
newly formed Iraqi state, and the insurgency would
find an expanded base of support in the Sunni
rejection. Reuters quoted a Sunni Arab delegate as
saying, "If they pass the constitution, then the
rebellion will reach its peak." While Sunni Arab
non-participation on the referendum, if passed,
could eventually lead to civil war, Sunni
participation that fails to alter the outcome
could lead to the immediate outbreak of such a
situation.
The TAL outlines the course of
action if the constitution is defeated in October.
The government will be dissolved and replaced by a
new assembly to be elected no later than December
15. The new assembly would have another year to
draft a second constitution, of which the TAL does
not lay out a process for passage. This option may
be the best-case scenario for bringing the Sunni
population into the political process, but that
would depend on the Shi'ite-Kurdish reaction.
Potentially, Sunni Arab rejection of the
constitution could harden the faultlines between
the Kurdish-Shi'ite alliance and the Sunni Arab
leaders that they still view as oppressors. No
group has been above using violence up to this
point, but, to varying degrees, they have
maintained the political tract as the main avenue
to resolve their differences. It is possible that
Sunni Arab rejection will encourage Shi'ite and
Kurdish groups to use force to resolve the
differences, leading to civil war.
Sunni
Arabs have majorities in three provinces, but it
seems unlikely that they would be able to generate
a two-thirds majority in Nineveh, where there is a
large Kurdish population. The Shi'ite-Kurdish
decision to send the constitution to referendum
without the support of the Sunni Arab leadership
was made on the assumption that the Sunnis will be
unable to defeat the measure. The possibility that
Baghdad province could join in opposition to the
referendum seems to be the biggest gamble to the
Shi'ite-Kurdish proposal. If it is defeated, the
US-led coalition will need to fill in the void
left by the dissolved government if a singular
Iraqi state is to be maintained, necessitating the
delay of current withdrawal plans.
No
matter the outcome on October 15, rebellious
Shi'ite leader Muqtada al-Sadr seems poised to
reap the benefits of the referendum. When
Muqtadar's followers attempted to reopen his
office in Najaf on August 23, the Badr Corps, the
armed faction of SCIRI, a rival Shi'ite group,
blocked them. The violence quickly spread to
several other cities, including Baghdad, and Prime
Minster Ibrahim Jaafari took to the airwaves to
plead for peace, with little effect. Only when
Muqtada ordered it did the violence come to an
end. This demonstration of power is important to
note because Muqtada, repeatedly declared
"marginalized" by US officials, is emerging as a
bridge between Sunni Arab insurgents and
nationalistic Shi'ite in his rejections of the
trend toward federalism advanced by the proposed
constitution.
Nationalist Shi'ites fear
that religious Shi'ites, who fought on the Iran
side in the Iraq-Iran war, would dominate a
southern autonomous region and find Muqtada's
proposal of a strong centralized government
attractive. Some secular-minded Shi'ites might
also find themselves in an alliance of interests
with Muqtada as October 15 approaches. Sunni
rejectionists are aligned with him on the issue
and Muqtada has signed most of the Sunni
Association of Muslim Scholars' declarations since
January 2005.
The Sunni Arab leaders may be
able to deliver sufficient majorities in Anbar and
Salahuddin provinces to defeat the constitution,
but they will need Muqtada's help to deliver
Baghdad, a province in itself. Even if this
scenario does not play out, the referendum is
likely to find many malcontents, and Muqtada seems
poised to lead them. Whether his leadership will
be within the government or against it depends on
how the vote plays out.
Conclusion The future of
Iraq will largely be determined by the Sunni Arab
reaction to the referendum on October 15. There
are several scenarios that could quickly lead to
civil war or to the breakup of Iraq along
sectarian lines. The constitution does not propose
a strong central government; it opts for a federal
system instead. It is the Sunni Arab assumption
that this is designed to deprive them of their
share of the country's oil wealth. However, even
if Sunni Arab concerns are addressed, a future
Iraqi state without a strong center might, in
time, lead to the breakup of its geographical
integrity.
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